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Preface 
Coming from a background in Journalism (my first degree), I developed a 
keen eye for news and details when observing the world around me, 
physically and virtually. In 2009 when I was accepted for a Masters in Global 
Media & Communication at Coventry University, I became even more 
interested in online media and the new ways information spread, spurring 
cultural change. A favourite topic of mine throughout this masters program 
was “global information flow and counter/contra-flow” enabled by digital media 
technologies. 
I began as a Twitter user in 2010, when there were only a handful of 
Nigerians on Twitter. I kept an account of interesting communication activities 
going on in that “Naija” sphere on my blog then, Diary of a Media Junkie. The 
trending hashtags were sometimes comedic (e.g. #WelcometoNigeria), other 
times it was a campaign calling the Nigerian government to action (e.g. 
#LightUpNigeria). In April 2010, I wrote a post on my blog asking, “what 
potential can this (social media networks) hold for democracy and 
development?” What sealed my interest in this subject was my virtual 
observation of the use of new media in the 2011 general elections in Nigeria. 
It was novel, it was fresh, and I felt we had only scratched the surface of the 
potentials of digital media for democracy. This became the driving force 
behind my desire to pursue a PhD. Habermas’ public sphere theory provided 
a fruitful frame within which to explore and articulate this idea. 
This thesis is a unique contribution to knowledge because with the idea of the 
public sphere being a Westphalian/European construct, applying it to the 
analysis of a developing society such as countries in Africa has proven 
problematic. However, digital media has ‘globalised’ information flows and 
political debate in such a way as to render the ideal nation-state framework for 
conceptualising the public sphere at least partially defunct. The idea of the 
public sphere is now, arguably, ‘trans-nationalised’. Hence, this thesis is one 
of the few studies on Africa that fruitfully explores the democratic potentials of 
new media technologies within the theoretical framework of the public sphere. 
While other studies may bear solely on empirical statistics and hard data to 
generate rankings (on e.g. “the number of mobile phone users in Africa”), this 
thesis takes account of the culture of use and locates that culture within a 
more fruitful frame of the public sphere and democratic theory. 
Nigeria is fast rising as an economic giant once again, and oil is no longer the 
sole source of this good fortune. Paypal recently named the country its 
second largest market in Africa, and after but one year of entry into its 
markets. Outside of commerce, cultural producers are harnessing the 
potentials of information and communication technology in creative ways.  
Lagos for instance, is slowly, albeit haphazardly, being transformed to a 
recognised ‘creative’ city. Cultural and creative entrepreneurs are rising, using 
social media networks as their “offices” and “display windows” to share their 
wares and services for sale. By examining the democratic potentials of digital 
media in Nigeria, this thesis is but a starting point in understanding the extent 
to which digital media communication is transforming the way of life in Africa, 
and how societal conditions makes this transformation differ from the reality in 
	   vii	  
the West for instance. This is how the thesis adds to scholarship in and on 
Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country.  
For Europe and America, this thesis definitely extends the idea of the public 
sphere in a manner that throws up issues that would otherwise have not been 
considered in the West. This is simply because certain challenges faced in 
Nigeria, that conditions its (digital) public sphere to function as it does, do not 
exist in Europe and America, or at least to very limited degrees, if at all. Thus, 
this thesis aims to generate new knowledge that could serve as a basis of 
comparison of public spheres in other parts of the world outside Nigeria. An 
example of a factor that has been picked up on in the Nigerian digital public 
sphere that would be novel to public sphere studies in Europe and America is 
its profoundly ethno-centric nature – which has its roots in the colonial 
experience of the 1900s. This is but one example.  
The challenges I encountered in the process of writing this thesis included 
finding relevant literature to review on the (digital) public sphere in Africa. 
Aside a handful of scholars, such as Fred Mudhai or Last Moyo, there is 
dearth of research on the subject. Overall, it has been a rewarding, fulfilling, 
and instructive process.  
‘Tomi Oladepo 
March 2015 
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Abstract 
The rise of digital media in Nigerian public life is evident in a variety of 
contexts – from how mainstream journalists gather news and information, to 
how young people express their dissatisfaction with the government on 
matters of concern, such as the case of the 276 kidnapped Chibok Girls 
(April 2014). This thesis is an investigation into the growing use of digital 
media in Nigeria, and identifies significant developments in Nigerian 
democracy through a growing ‘digital public sphere’. New communication 
skills of dialogue and deliberation are being cultivated through an improvised 
and often creative use of digital media, and ‘netizens’ [citizens active on the 
Internet] are purposively generating social, political and cultural 
consciousness. To explore this embryonic digital public sphere in Nigeria, 
field research was conducted in the form of historical, political and interview 
based research with active digital media users. The interviewees featured 
journalists, citizen journalists, bloggers, public officials, social activists, 
religious leaders, and cultural producers, and revolved around current uses 
of digital media technologies, online dialogue and key issues, and digital 
media as a tool for democracy in Nigeria’s future development. Largely on 
the basis of the interview data, this thesis argues that despite a discernible 
‘culture’ of democracy cultivated through pervasive use of digital media, a 
digital public sphere can only be realised in a democratic-enabling political 
environment. This would necessitate public officials engaging in public 
dialogue; protections from harassment, insults and cyber-bullying; and the 
digital media infrastructure being developed, accessible and affordable. 
Furthermore, this thesis identifies how an effective digital public sphere will 
only function where the agencies of mass media are willing to take more 
active roles in collaborating with citizens online in order to cultivate 
transparency in public affairs, and also disseminate vital information, and 
work for widespread digital access.  
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Introduction 
The aim of this thesis is an investigation on the use and potential of digital media 
for the formation of a public sphere within the developing democracy of Nigeria. 
The first objective of this investigation is to review key theoretical concepts in the 
historical discourse of the ‘public sphere’ and (the more recent) ‘digital media’ so 
as to arrive at a theoretical framework for the formation of a concept of a ‘digital 
public sphere’.  
The second objective of this thesis is to undertake empirical research and 
explain the structure, dynamics and development of a digital public sphere – 
where, however, the theoretical concept of the digital public sphere remains 
contested and theoretically ambiguous. Scholarly research in this subject has 
emerged across academic fields of cultural policy, cultural studies, media and 
communications, the sociology of culture and political science in many of its 
forms, and this demonstrates a need for an examination of the technical, 
discursive and communication functions of a putative new digital public sphere. 
This urgency is underscored by the rise of digital media in facilitating new global 
flows of information, culture and entertainment as much as local debate and 
protest, the impact of which is so apparent it does not need emphasising in this 
thesis. In taking tentative steps towards this evolution in our scholarly 
understanding, this research thesis seeks to identify new methods of research 
through revisiting and revising older conceptions of ‘public sphere’. It will 
construct a critical narrative that reinserts some of the ‘critical’ concerns of 
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classical public sphere theory (since Habermas) into the contemporary new 
media studies of digital communications. The price to be paid with this approach, 
of course, is that this thesis cannot possibly contain or acknowledge the vast 
range of contributions by scholars the world over to both public sphere research 
as well as digital media research. This thesis aims, rather, to extend public 
sphere research through one line of investigation – the digital mediation of public 
sphere activities and their current function and potential within contemporary 
Nigeria’s developing democracy. 
This thesis is divided into three sections. The first section, concepts and 
contexts, interrogates the idea of the public sphere through Habermas, its 
progenitor, in the first chapter, and then through his critics, Calhoun, Fraser, and 
Kellner, in the second chapter. This is followed by a consideration of the 
relationship between digital media and the (conventional) public sphere in order 
to arrive at a construct of what the idea of a digital public sphere might stand for. 
The fourth chapter dwells on the idea of deliberation within Africa and its citizens 
in Diaspora through a potentially digital public sphere. This first section of the 
thesis is conceptual and theoretical. 
In the second section I identify how a digitally mediated public sphere may 
emerge in a practical sense – through the increasing propensity of Nigerian 
citizens’ use of digital tools in performing public-sphere-related activities and 
functions. I examine Nigeria’s existing public sphere mediated through traditional 
mass media, and the politics, policies, and legal frameworks that surrounds how 
it operates – before exploring the idea of the digitalization Nigeria.  
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The final section is where the Nigerian digital public sphere in action is made 
manifest from the perspective of its participants whom I have interviewed on 
field research. The opening chapter of the section lays out the methodology of 
this study, while the following two chapters is where I present the data gathered. 
I discuss and analyse my findings in the penultimate chapter, before concluding 
with a discussion on the challenges and constraints the Nigerian digital public 
sphere faces, which might hamper the potential of its vibrancy in promoting a 
culture of democracy in Nigeria.  
The Public Sphere and New Digital Media 
As a common concept in most theories and discussion on the nature of 
democracy, the ‘public sphere’ is a realm of communication and interaction, 
where citizens or other interested parties confer, discuss and articulate 
information, knowledge, understanding and views on matters subject to political 
decision-making, considered to be of common or ‘public’ interest. The subject 
matter or content of such communication interchange is, routinely, substantive 
social and economic issues that pertain to the relation between the state and 
civil society, law, order, security, along with issues of protocol or procedure 
internal to the various levels of jurisdiction, of government and administration of 
the country, regions or city locales. At least, this general conception echoes the 
‘classical’ terms by which ‘public’ and its ‘sphere’ is thought to be significant. The 
term, public sphere, became an object of serious theoretical analysis when 
German philosopher and sociologist, Jürgen Habermas, conducted his great 
study of the emergence of bourgeois society in late seventeenth century Great 
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Britain, and eighteenth century France. For Habermas, a process of detailed 
consideration, usually referred to as a ‘deliberation’, was the fulcrum of a public 
sphere that served to arrive at a series of judgments or general viewpoints 
historically referred to as ‘public opinion’ (specific references will be provided 
later). 
Such pubic opinion, is spurred by ‘critical’ debate, in the sense that the diversity 
of interests that are involved ensures to varying degrees that any given matter or 
issue was necessarily considered from multiple points of view and considered as 
a cause of multiple social and economic determinations. The ‘space’ of the 
public ‘sphere’, however, is more abstract than physical, given that it is 
characterised primarily by communication and not the administration of a 
specific organisation, institution or series of such. As the work of Manuel 
Castells has shown (cf. Castells, 2008), the ‘space’ of the public sphere in the 
age of new media is ever expanding, porous, co-extensive with new civic and 
governmental organizational formations and alliances, and constituted by 
multiple and hybrid flows of communication activity. The public sphere of the 
emerging bourgeoisie of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, fully 
grown, was largely bounded by physical, urban and institutional space (from the 
coffee house to the parliamentary debating chamber), and has since been 
termed a ‘a court’ of public opinion, before which the democratic state must 
demonstrate its legitimacy. Historically, of course, the media (enterprises, 
products, institutions, limited markets) that facilitated the articulation, 
amplification and dissemination of deliberations became crucial to the 
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constitution of the ‘sphere’ itself. For example, in the Seventeenth Century, the 
business owners of the printing press played a crucial role in disseminating 
information, comment and opinion. Through printed matter dialogue between 
individual citizens, associations, interest groups and state or other authorities 
combined with the evolution of nation-state democracy to the extent that in the 
context of the eighteenth century a distinction could be made between ‘state and 
civil society’ as if these were two distinct and separate entities. In theory at least, 
a Habermasian would understand this era in terms of how state action and 
government was brought to public consciousness largely through an 
increasingly professionalised ‘press’, wherein the press in turn articulated public 
opinion to the agencies of the state. A certain ‘freedom of the press’ to do this, 
therefore, is regarded as a condition of an effective public sphere.  
In present day society, at least in Europe, it is still appropriate to refer to a public 
sphere, but where the public dimension takes different forms. While members of 
the historic bourgeois public sphere engaged in social interaction and met in 
social locations such as salons, coffee houses and even private homes, the 
contemporary public sphere involves channels once removed from any physical 
realm, and as Castells has vividly articulated, is increasingly global in its frame 
of references and even its values (Castells, 2008: 79-80). The advent of radio 
and television were, of course, epoch-making for the public sphere, and now this 
‘old’ media has been subject to ‘remediation’ and not just the addition of new 
technologies or communication devices. As J. David Bolter and Richard A. 
Grusin indicated in their pioneering book of 1999, Remediation: Understanding 
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New Media, the Internet and the diversity of digital media that has recently 
appeared, are not distinct from ‘old’ media, but embody and articulate their 
function, extending that function into regions of society and culture once absent 
from media. 
Within media, communication and cultural studies since Bolter and Grusin’s 
book, it has become commonplace to observe the interpenetration of media into 
everyday life, and along with it a significant degree of ‘content’ and information 
previously confined to established channels and participants of the public sphere. 
It has also become commonplace to point out that the public sphere that was 
once facilitated by ‘old media’ has waned in terms of its democratic (and 
‘democratising’) effect, compromised by large international media corporations 
and business elites, and other actors whose interests exceed democracy, 
government or the public interest in any one nation state context. A third 
common observation is that to some extent – with, for example, citizen 
journalism, internet-based news and information dissemination through social 
media – the Internet and other digital media are shifting the axis of the public 
sphere, where the dichotomy of ‘state and civil society’ is less stable, and where 
social subjects (whether ‘citizens’ with specific interests or not) can become 
involved in reviving an ailing public sphere through new forms of public 
communication.   
As a preliminary to this research, a short clarification of terminology is in order: 
Digital media is the generic term used to refer to the World Wide Web, weblogs, 
social network sites, smart phones, tablets and other electronic communication 
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devices that can be ‘networked’ to live information channels and 
telecommunications networks. Digital media, also often referred to as new 
media, is often defined in contrast to old or traditional media in terms of the 
former’s more participatory and interactive potential. As Bolter and Grusin’s 
study makes evident, however, ‘new’ media has emerged at every point in 
history, and the digital realm which was the context of their research in the late 
1990s now seems hopelessly ‘old’ in terms of its power and capabilities. New 
media, therefore, refers to more than the shift or increase in technology; it is also 
a transformation in their mode of use, and the social activities or even social 
formations that congeal around certain forms and levels of media use.  
To cast a glance at the way ‘traditional’ national newspapers now use internet 
platforms, through which a range of interconnected stakeholders are able to use 
this platform for diverse yet highly coordinated series of interests, is to remind us 
how in the age of Facebook and Twitter (social network), any discussion of the 
public sphere can become extraordinarily complex and bound up with research 
into the evolving sphere of media technology and business itself. This is a 
presupposition of this thesis.  
Theoretical complexity of research in the contemporary public 
sphere  
Theoretical ‘issues’ are usually conceptual matters internal to the constitution of 
specific definitions and theories. For this thesis, our issues will largely be 
generated from a theoretical account of the concept of the public sphere as 
discussed within the context of the contemporary formulation of a theory of 
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digital media. This will allow us to construct a theoretical framework within the 
function and potential of a ‘digital public sphere’ that can be applied to the 
contemporary democracy of the West African country of Nigeria. It is a premise 
of this thesis that ‘theory’ is historically evolving, along with the objects or 
concepts of that theory. Theory is perpetually modified, through research, which 
often identifies the limitations of the theory, as well as areas in which it may be 
modified to accommodate, for instance, new knowledge, perspectives, realities, 
and practices. This is particularly the case with theories relating to media and to 
the political practices of the public realm involving communication, deliberation 
and debate. As the four volumes of Gripsrud, Moe, Molander and Murdock’s 
compendium The Public Sphere (Sage, 2011) indicate, the very concept is 
deeply historical and bound up with huge shifts in the practice of government, 
governance, civil society and markets, social structures and cultural values. As 
indicated above, we can only acknowledge this complexity at the outset, and 
with this a blanket acknowledgment of the many scholars who have been 
instrumental in articulating the nature of this historical change. Indeed, Gripsrud, 
Moe, Molander and Murdock’s compendium does just this, while this particular 
thesis can only but travel a single trajectory for the purposes of a specific 
investigation.  
There are vast theoretical issues surrounding the work of Habermas, our first 
port of call in our theoretical researches. His account of the public sphere was 
written in German in 1962, not translated into English until more than two 
decades later, in 1989. The complexity of Habermas’s use of the German 
 9 
language, not least his particular ‘Frankfurt School’ way of synthesising 
philosophical analysis with sociological realities, forces us to acknowledge at the 
outset that our theoretical research is conceptually defined within current English 
language confines, inevitably avoiding hermeneutic matters pertaining to specific 
Germanic semantics, political concepts and their historiography, meanings or 
nuances intended by the original author. According to Brants ‘the complexity of 
the concept (public sphere) was lost in translation’ (2005:144). The term public 
in public sphere is one of the major theoretical challenges facing theorists in this 
field. There is the added complexity of defining Habermas’s concept of private 
as opposed to public within in the public sphere. Public and private are not 
single terms but have generated cognates and terminologies with shifting 
meanings as they have historically been applied to various social and political 
realities. A ‘public’ official works for the state; private may refer to the home, but 
can also apply to huge corporate businesses. An individual is in him/herself 
regarded as a private individual, yet as citizen is a member of a public. A ‘public’ 
place is assumed to be a place open to all social subjects, where no one has 
exclusive rights of entry or exit. Yet, in an age of mass migrations, immigrations 
and diasporas, it has become apparent that many social subjects (with profound 
experience, views and interests) could well have no status as ‘citizen’ and thus 
no right to enter the ‘public sphere’ (even if their voices reverberate around it or 
‘outside’ it).  
We could continue. One issue that is indeed necessary to mention in the context 
of a study of Nigeria is, of course, the historically ‘Eurocentric’ character of the 
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concept of public sphere. Habermas’s theoretical concept emerged from an 
extensive historical study of European societies, particularly Britain and France. 
When scholars attempt to apply his specific criteria for defining a public sphere 
to non-European societies, even the USA, there are issues that therefore 
emerge by way of navigating Habermas’ crucial distinctions between private and 
public and their function in relation to state apparatus and administration. In 
order to draw a public sphere for African societies, or more precisely Nigeria in 
the case of this thesis, such tensions and complexities are to be further 
expected, notwithstanding the way Nigeria (like many countries in the post-
colonial ‘Global South’) live with the remains of democratic structures imported 
during the latter half of the huge European enterprise that was colonialism.  
A final issue that must be admitted is that Habermas generally defines the public 
sphere as a unified, single realm for public deliberations amongst citizens. Aside 
from the historical assumptions on the singular constitution of the nation state as 
a radically delimited political entity, if deliberation is the primary activity that 
defines a public sphere, one might observe that deliberation occurs in multiple 
social spheres (and no doubt always did). Positing a ‘single’ public sphere raises 
questions on the relation between social subjects and the forms of citizenship 
that grant them access or the power to participate in a putative public sphere. 
For deliberations occur in homes, churches, newspapers, political blogs, and yet 
many dissolve without trace, or their discursive orbit, logic and impact is outside 
the sphere of the officially constituted ‘public’. Habermas’ account of the public 
sphere, though providing a solid foundation for our theoretical investigation, has 
 11 
historically become an oversimplification of what has now become a very hybrid 
and complex series of concepts and realities, particularly where transnational or 
supra-national government is involved (the African Union, European Union, or 
United Nations).  
It is for this reason that this thesis has not attempted simply to find ways of 
promoting a ‘public’ sphere in Nigeria, but to consider the theoretical discourses 
and discussions around the historically-constituted concept of ‘public’ as part of 
an emerging ‘culture’ of democracy in Nigeria. This ‘culture’ involves scholarly, 
creative and discursive practices that engage social subjects, whether 
empowered as citizens or not, and all together are contributing to a force for 
change, ideas and motivations (whether actual substantive structural socio-
political change is indeed taking place is a mater for another research project). 
The relation between a ‘public sphere’ as digitally mediated and a ‘culture’ of 
democracy is therefore symbiotic, and will be discussed later. We must first 
understand the socio-political character of contemporary Nigeria. 
 
Federal Republic of Nigeria’s Political System  
“To understand Nigeria (he says) you must throw away notions like certainty and 
consensus. Instead, you have to accept you are entering a world where all truth 
is relative, all facts are transient and what seems to be most visceral and bloody 
reality can ultimately be revealed as artifice.” Alex Perry (2014) of Newsweek 
(quoting former governor Central Bank of Nigeria, now Emir of Kano, Nigeria, 
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Lamido Sanusi).  
What is the Nigerian political system? Or, as Joseph (1987:1) asks: ‘what is the 
nature of the fundamental processes of Nigerian political life?’ According to the 
Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance 2013 Report, Nigeria ranks forty-one 
(41) out of fifty-two (52) countries on the continent, with a score of forty-three 
point four (43.4) per cent (2013: 3). The Mo Ibrahim Foundation, as acclaimed 
on the Report, is an organisation that is committed to gathering data on 
governance quality in Africa, by implication underscoring the significance (and 
lack) of data to the public sphere, national and pan-African. The Foundation 
awards an annual prize for ‘good governance in Africa’, but for the fourth time in 
five years, the prize has gone unclaimed (BBC, 2013). This is, of course, 
indicative of the state of various conditions of democracy, among which 
(articulated in Mo Ibrahim’s indices of measurement) are safety and rule of law, 
participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity and human 
development. Under these categories are included the components of 
democracy to which many Western states are accustomed: accountability, 
transparency, transfer of power, free and fair elections, political participation, 
electoral self-determination. These, of course, are all internal to Habermas’s 
historically evolving understanding of a democratic public sphere.  
According to the Freedom House online, (self-defined as ‘an independent 
watchdog organisation dedicated to the expansion of freedom around the world’), 
in 2014 Nigeria was ranked as a ‘partly free’ country. Below is a table of 
Freedom House ranking on Nigeria from the full inception of democracy in 1999 
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to the year 2014. It can be deduced from this simple table all too easily that the 
period most promising in relation to emerging democratic practices was the 
country’s inception in 1999. The table’s basic numerical data, while slight in 
content and highly relative, could be easily mapped onto an historical narrative 
of the country’s recent development. Democracy in Nigeria has fluctuated for the 
worse, yet maintaining a fairly stable score of 4 out of 7, seven being the worst 
state to which a democracy can sink.  
Table 0.1 – Freedom House Ranking on democracy in Nigeria 1999-2014  
Year Freedom Rating 
(1=best, 
7=worst) 
Status 
(1=best, 
7=worst) 
Civil Liberties  
(1=best, 
7=worst) 
Political Rights 
(1=best, 
7=worst) 
2014 Partly Free 4.0 4 4 
2013 Partly Free 4.5 5 4 
2012 Partly Free 4.0 4 4 
2011 Partly Free 4.0 4 4 
2010 Partly Free 4.5 4 5 
2009 Partly Free 4.5 4 5 
2008 Partly Free 4.0 4 4 
2007 Partly Free 4.0 4 4 
2006 Partly Free 4.0 4 4 
2005 Partly Free 4.0 4 4 
2004 Partly Free 4.0 4 4 
2003 Partly Free 4.5 5 4 
2002 Partly Free 4.5 5 4 
2001 Partly Free 4.0 4 4 
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1999 Partly Free 3.5 3 4 
 
The Nigerian polity was born during the colonial period, and continued to expand 
into the period of ‘post-independence’. As Joseph explains, the notion of 
democracy was not imposed on Nigeria by the colonialists, even though a 
connection exists between ‘that commitment [democracy] and the official 
ideology of the former colonial power’ (1987: 3-4). To Joseph, the fundamental 
political and social system in Nigeria is based on concerns that are 
encapsulated in ‘how interests are represented and benefits distributed’ (1987: 
3-4). He gives an example of the Nigerians’ struggle with colonial power. There 
were demands for ‘direct political representation and a rejection of 
monopolisation of state power by foreign rulers and their affiliated local agents’. 
In addition, it was further demanded that Nigeria’s economic products were 
spent for the benefit of the indigenous producers, rather than appropriated to 
satisfy the needs of the colonial masters (Joseph, 1987: 4). Hence, ‘government 
of, by and for the people was therefore a fundamental principle of the anti-
colonial struggle…’ (Joseph, 1987: 4). Joseph’s (1987) observations are 
fundamental to our understanding: they indicate a pre-existing tendency towards 
a democratic ‘culture’ among the Nigerians, even before the exit of the 
colonialists, which translates into an overwhelmingly positive popular view of the 
values and ideals of democracy in Nigeria, despite its apparent lack of progress 
as a political system.  
However, the significant political events that heralded the departure of the British, 
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such as rigged elections, civil wars, coup d’etat and so on, all bear influence on 
what constitutes the political system in Nigeria today. Ake for instance, suggests 
that the nature of politics in Nigeria is a ‘politics of anxiety’, in that there exists a 
‘deep alienation and distrust among political competitors’ (1985: 10), a distrust 
that he explains existed before the independence from the colonialists, and has 
remained afterwards. This is understandably so, as the outcomes of this ‘politics 
of anxiety’, are evidenced in the foreward to Adebani and Obadare’s important 
edited book, Democracy and Prebendalism in Nigeria: Critical Interpretation 
(2013). Such anxiety is signified by violence, election rigging, tribalism and more. 
In this edited multi-author volume, this book contains a detailed account of the 
Nigerian political system from the First Republic to the current Fourth Republic. 
Nigeria’s First Republic (from 1960-1966) was pervaded by a culture of violence, 
fraud and ‘tribalism’. Rival political parties and politicians took advantage of 
ethnic identities in garnering electoral support. The consequences of this were 
destructive and led to the fall of the First Republic, as Nigeria spiraled into a civil 
war that lasted from 1967-1970 (Adebani and Obadare eds, 2013). Shortly 
afterwards, the military assumed government and governance and 
fundamentally re-structured the country into a multi-state federal system, which 
cut ‘…across the lines of the three major ethnic groups and empowering smaller 
ethnic minorities as well’ (Diamond, 2013: viii). Ethnicity and culture are 
significant to the evolution of the Nigerian political system.   
The inauguration of the Second Republic in 1979 established the country within 
a more complex and balanced federal system. By this time, Nigeria had become 
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a major oil exporter, and was experiencing the benefits of increased revenues, 
production and employment. In the forward to Adebanwi and Obadare’s (2013) 
edited book, Larry Diamond (2013: ix) asserts that the demise of the Second 
Republic was interconnected with the economics of the ‘oil boom’ in Nigeria, as 
well as the consolidation of ‘prebendalism’, which had become ‘pervasively 
entrenched as the way of politics and governance in Nigeria.’  
What is prebendalism? A basic definition (Dictionary.Com) proposes that  
‘prebend’ is a noun that refers to ‘a stipend allotted from the revenues of a 
cathedral or collegiate church to a canon or member of the chapter’. Joseph 
adopts this term because of such ‘historical association’; the term ‘prebend’ 
emerged from certain offices in feudal states, where through services rendered 
to a lord or monarch, or by direct purchase of supplicants (Joseph, 1987: 8), 
normal procedures of petition can be circumvented. However, in relation to 
politics in Nigeria, Richard Joseph, the pioneer user of the term in research of 
Nigeria, asserts that ‘prebendal’ more specifically refers to ‘patterns of political 
behaviour’ which rely on the justifying principles that political offices of power 
‘should be competed for and then utilised for the personal benefit of office 
holders as well as of their reference or support group’. (1987: 8) As Nigeria was 
thrown into the throes of economic struggle (despite the oil boom), Larry 
Diamond (2013: ix) argue that this was due to this ‘prebendalism’; and about 
four years later, the military government returned to a Nigeria ‘with the economy 
a shambles, the public outraged, and the opposition seething from brazen 
electoral theft in 1983…’  
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The Third Republic was born once the military again exited the arena of officially 
recognised government. This was equally short-lived and Nigeria’s third attempt 
at democracy was thwarted. The Nigerian military returned, and, according to 
Larry Diamond (2013), with ‘new depths of tyranny and plunder’ (2013: x). The 
Fourth Republic, which was inaugurated between 1998 and 1999, marks the 
longest civilian constitutional rule Nigeria has experienced since independence, 
and is really the basis for our current research. Adebani and Obadare (eds), 
whose historical observations were formative to this thesis, suggest that 
Nigeria’s political system be defined as an ‘hybrid’, as ‘elections are too riddled 
with fraud and corruption to qualify as a democracy. And yet, there remains 
sufficient competition for power, an alternation of personalities if not parties, with 
a certain freedom, ethnic, tribal cultural and religious pluralism and independent 
civil society, to allow us to think in terms of a democratic culture. It promises at 
least ‘…some degree of representativeness, and at least, some possibilities of 
reform’ (Diamond, 2013: x). It is precisely the unsystematic, dynamic, slightly 
fluid or chaotic, character of Nigeria’s political system that provokes this thesis to 
refer to the ‘culture’ of democracy and not refer to a static ‘model’ of the ‘public 
sphere’ by way of considering the conditions of democratic government per se.   
The Status of Democracy in Nigeria 
The Nigerian political system is therefore not defined in terms of system of 
procedures and government, but the dynamic institutions, practices and 
behaviours through which that system is disassembled and reassembled, and 
not simply up to the return to civilian rule in 1999 but to the present day. 
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According to the National Constitution, Nigeria is a federal state, and thirty-six 
states make up the federation. The constitutional state was established by the 
British colonial government in 1914 when the Northern and Southern 
protectorates were merged to form one entity. Prior to this arrangement, the 
various regions that make up Nigeria were autonomous – examples are the 
Kanem-Borno, Benin and Oyo empires, to mention a few (Falola & Heaton, 
2008: 7).  
At independence, Nigeria actually consisted of three autonomous regions: the 
Northern Region with its capital in Kaduna, the Eastern Region with capital in 
Enugu, and the Western Region with Capital in Ibadan, (while Lagos remained 
the national capital). In 1963, the Mid-Western Region was carved out of the old 
Western region, which comprised the present Edo and Delta States. This was 
the position in the first republic before the army overthrew the government in 
January 1966; the political crisis which paved the way for the coup d’ etat later 
led to the civil war in July 1967, when the then Eastern region wanted to secede. 
This led to the government of General Yakubu Gowon breaking the country into 
12 states in 1967; to 19 states in 1976; Ibrahim Babagida (next head of state) to 
21 states in 1987; 30 states in 1991 and General Sani Abacha breaking Nigeria 
into 36 states in 1996. This arrangement prevails to date, although, a 
recommendation at the 2014 National conference held in Nigeria holds that even 
more states need to be created (Fabiyi and Oladimeji, 2014). The governmental 
rationale for division is, I would suggest, more governmental control than 
regional devolution or a more granular form of representation. However, it is 
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important to note that since 1999, when Nigeria returned to civilian democratic 
rule, military intervention has ceased and multi-party governmental politics 
seems to have triumphed.  
The institutions that make up the Nigerian political system are broadly split into 
the: Executive, Legislature and Judiciary. There is a president (the executive) 
who is elected by popular vote, to rule for no more than two four-year terms. The 
legislature, the law-making arm of government, is made up of the National 
Assembly (109 seats) and the House of Representatives (360 seats). These 
representatives are elected into these offices for four-year terms (Freedom 
House, 2014). Then, there is the judiciary, the Supreme Court, magistrate courts, 
and civil courts.  
Another institution, albeit not ideally described as political, but significant to the 
practice of democracy in any society, is the mass media. It is often referred to as 
the ‘fourth estate of the realm, to the executive, legislature and judiciary’ (Ekeli 
and Enobakhare, 2012:2). According to Ekeli and Enobakhare, although the 
Nigerian mass media was ‘a weapon for the fight against colonialism’ among 
other roles, this same media has suffered setbacks due to the intervention of the 
military in the rulership of Nigeria for about thirty years (Ekeli and Enobakhare, 
2012: 2). This, according to Ekeli and Enobakhare, was the period during which 
‘the mass media lost their power as “watchdogs” and those of them which were 
bold enough to play their roles were to suffer under suffocating decrees and 
arbitrary repressive actions of the military’ (2012:2). The implication of this for 
citizens was that they, ‘…knew little or nothing about their political rights and the 
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few that even knew, ostensibly because of their safety, abandoned what they 
knew or just looked the other side because the prevailing conditions did not 
encourage or support political learning and discovery’ (Ekeli and Enobakhare, 
2012: 3).  
The relationship between the mass media and the federal government has been 
fraught. It was not until 2011 that the Nigerian government approved a freedom 
of information bill [The 2011 Freedom of Information (FOI) Act], and passed it 
into law – affording journalists with badly needed protections. Before that time, 
Nigerian journalists faced routine hazards such as politically-motivated threats 
and resistance in accessing public documents. The bill, is still not fully effective 
in empowering journalists.  
Ekeli and Enobakhare (2012: 9) in an important paper, highlight areas where 
they argue that the Nigerian mass media has failed democracy in the nation. It is 
worth paraphrasing the points of their argument:  
• South-West domination of the Nigerian mass media -- due to the 
economic, infrastrucutral advantages the South-West region holds over 
the rest of Nigeria -- has ‘given way to a scenario in which a Yoruba 
[tribe] dominated media conveys the world-view of the Yoruba block of 
the Nigerian ruling class’ (Ekeli, 2012: 8). 
• The practice of partisan media emerged during 1960 and 1975, where 
newspapers dedicated to defending particular interests emerged, and the 
national government began to own mass media channels. This 
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polarisation led to partisanship in the Nigerian mass media, which also 
became reflected in ethnicity and religion.  
• Partisanship in reportage is ‘excessive’, whereby the ruling and wealthy 
social class (along with politicians) is manifestly favoured at the expense 
of ‘the teeming and suffering masses and the downplaying of political 
education’ (2012: 9).  
Following from this, to borrow Diamond’s (2013) expression, the relation 
between the media and democratic government in Nigeria has become ‘a 
shambles’. Adejumobi opens his important study, Governance and Democracy 
in Post-Military Nigeria (2010) with two indicative quotations:  
First of all, I want you to leave democracy out of it. We don’t have a 
democracy in Nigeria, at least for now…We have a government that is not 
responsible to anybody. Nobody to question them, it is a sad situation – 
Anthony Enahoro (2006) 
The entire political system is a fraud against the Nigerian people and the 
present dispensation – at all levels – emerged fraudulently from the 
fraudulent political system –- Edwin Madunagu (2010)  
Reminding ourselves of the role of prebendalism in the Nigerian political system, 
mentioned above, will lend substance to these ejaculations. Yet this is not a 
condition unique to Nigeria: In his paper, ‘The Rule of Law versus the Big Man’, 
Larry Diamond (2008), a renowned scholar on democracy in Africa, explains the 
situation regionally. Referring to the continent as a whole, he states that, ‘the 
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formal institutions of democracy – including free, fair and competitive elections – 
can coexist with the informal practices of clientelism, corruption, ethnic 
mobilisation, and personal rule by largely unchecked presidents’ (2008:138). 
Diamond’s further analysis of African political systems reveals what he terms a 
‘neopatrimonial character’ (2008: 147).  
As a doctored and hybrid form of democracy, this combines ‘the forms of a 
modern bureaucratic state – constrained in theory by laws, constitution, and 
other impersonal rules and standard – with the informal reality of personalised, 
unaccountable power and pervasive patron-client ties’ (Diamond, 2008:147). 
Hence, what Diamond calls the ‘big man’ syndrome, where the ‘big man’ in 
question is the autocratic [democratic] president who presides over those who 
‘serve[s] as patrons to the lower-level power brokers’, whose power then makes 
its way down to the ‘fragmented mass of ordinary citizens’. (ibid.) In such 
systems, according to Diamond, informal arrangements often trump the formal, 
and leaders and their ‘minions’ use the resources of public and state as a 
‘personal slush fund to maintain political dominance, giving their clients state 
offices, jobs…while getting unconditional support in return’ (Diamond, 2008: 
147). Expanding on the idea of patron-client nature of African politics, he 
explains that these networks are usually organised ‘along ethnic or subtonic 
lines, and the president sees his kin as the most reliable loyalist in the struggle 
for power’ (2008: 141). 
In this context we must note the ‘zoning’ arrangement in Nigerian politics, where 
presidential power is allocated informally along ethnic lines. This is a political 
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behaviour that is not provided for by the federal constitution in Nigeria, but has 
become a norm within the ‘culture’ of democracy as exhibited by the ruling elites. 
Zoning is a phenomenon routinely discussed both in traditional media and online 
public forums – in other words, it is public knowledge. On the forum Nairaland, 
for instance, a forum topic is ‘A Powerful Argument for Rotational Presidency in 
Nigeria’. Another posting, this time on Facebook, notes a publication by Okwena 
entitled ‘Zoning, Rotation and Power Struggle in Nigeria’ (2011). On the BBC 
news online 2010, the news story, ‘Death of Nigerian Leader Exposes Sham 
Democracy’. It reads thus: (to quote the correspondent, Mark Doyle):  
Since the return to civilian rule in 1999, the ruling dominant People’s 
Democratic Party (PDP) has sought to rotate, or ‘zone’ the office of the 
president between the overwhelmingly Muslim north and the mainly 
Christian south…Referring to the deal within the PDP in the late 90s which 
saw Mr Obasanjo stand on the party’s presidential ticket, Mr Abubakar 
said: “It was agreed that the presidency should be retained in the south” for 
eight years. “And that when it reverts to the north it should also remain 
there for eight years. In fact there was a vote. I was there. And to the best 
of my knowledge that position has not been reviewed – so that is what it is 
today.’ (Doyle: BBC news online 2010) 
These are random examples of public concern over ‘zoning’, reminding us that 
democracy in Nigeria is profoundly ‘cultural’ and involves norms, procedures 
and accepted practices that are endemic within the historical constitution of 
Nigerian society as a way of life – as a relation between values, beliefs that are 
inseparable from ethnicities and religions. Nigeria is home to over two hundred 
ethnic groups brought under one national umbrella, and while Nigeria may be 
tagged a failed or flawed democracy, it retains a certain cohesiveness. It is the 
contention of this thesis, that this cohesiveness, at least in part, is the way the 
values and concepts of democracy are maintained even in the face of such a 
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highly corrupted system. And as Catt (1999: 14) suggests: sometimes, new 
models of democracy are stimulated by the perception of acute needs. The 
highly heterogeneous Nigeria has profound needs and radical extremities of 
wealth and poverty, power and powerlessness, and this is growing in a growing 
public consciousness stimulated through public media communications.  
Yet, to which my examples above attest, much open public scrutiny and debate 
on Nigerian democracy takes place in the Nigeria global diaspora, on 
international news or by scholars in Western universities. As Nigerian scholar, 
Remi Aiyede, observes, in Nigeria there is a ‘weak sense of, and commitment to, 
the common good and public interest…’ (2013: 103). By implication, in Nigeria 
there is no emphatic politically democratic consensus on the role of the media 
within the political system (other than to report facts and events in ways 
favourable to the relative patron in power). In the Nigerian political system, 
‘…public resources are privatised, political power abused, and in the general, 
there is disregard for legal restraints to the exercise of power, which undermine 
political and public institutions’ (Aiyede, 2013: 103).  
One may argue that ethnicity and religion are the source of the corruption of 
Nigeria’s democracy, in the sense of stimulating stronger tribal or ritual 
allegiance that override the demands of governmental procedure, protocol or 
public interest. Yet this perhaps oversimplifies a complex issue while appearing 
sufficiently complex. Nigeria’s political system must contain over one-hundred 
and forty million people, over 300 ethno-linguistics groups, and is the largest 
country in Africa (Mustapha, 2009: 72). Where there may be strength in diversity, 
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this diversity is a challenge for any democracy. If, as we are indicating in this 
thesis, communication, dialogue and discourse (the public sphere) are at the 
heart of a democracy, then democracy must contain and mediate the profoundly 
cultural character of these activities. The challenge of a vast diversity of ethnic-
tribal, regional and cultural lines, is not something historic European 
democracies (with their ethnically homogenous state mono-cultures) have 
developed the democratic means to contain (quite apparent in current frantic 
debates across Europe on the impact of mass immigration). How Nigeria not 
only contains but facilitates deliberation, debate and discourse through this 
socio-cultural diversity is the great challenge that faces this generation – of 
scholars, activists, creative industries entrepreneurs, as well as politicians and 
the elite social classes. The historical dimension of contemporary diversity also 
cannot be ignored, as the general geo-political composition of contemporary 
Nigerian society emerged during colonial times, where northern and southern 
Nigeria were administered under ‘different educational, legal, local government, 
and land tenure systems’ (Mustapha, 2009: 72). Unlike the case in some other 
British colonies (like Sudan, which had a single colonial administration), when 
nationalist movements were born, precipitating the forces of independence that 
would finally herald the post-colonial age, they did not establish themselves on a 
unified front, but rather through the various ‘ethno-regional blocs’ and their 
competing movements (Mustapha, 2009: 72).  
Into this situation of historic socio-cultural and political diversity and a corruption 
of statutory democratic structures of government is nonetheless a force that 
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promises hope and renewal. Increasing deliberations and discussions are 
emerging, particularly through digital media platforms. Though the People’s 
Democratic Party (PDP) has been confidently dominant in the otherwise multi-
party system, they are becoming increasingly sensitive to the voices of the 
populace as echoed through the various channels of digital media, and amplified 
in international news or through the opinions of the Nigerian diaspora. The 
power of digital media is more apparent given the restrictions on the state-
dominated traditional broadcast media channels (still exhibiting limitations that 
have their roots in the years of military authoritarianism. Through the adoption of 
mobile telephony, increasing subscription to mobile internet, Facebook and 
Twitter sign-ups to mention a few, Nigeria (citizens) are exhibiting new 
empowering means of voicing statements, reactions and formulating views (See 
Nwankanma, 20111). Digital media is gradually forming a new sphere of public 
culture, whose most visible dimension exhibits the behaviours and 
communication techniques we can identify as being internal to a public sphere.  
The challenge for the researcher 
As indicated above, this thesis attempts to insert a theoretically evolving concept 
(the public sphere) into the complicated and ever-changing society of Nigeria, 
which is governed by an unstable and amorphous state. In the opening chapters 
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of this thesis, the ‘public sphere’ and ‘digital media’ are defined, in terms of their 
provenance and evolution, as two quite distinct realms of scholarly study; the 
very terms generate different meanings depending on the discursive context. 
This study is thus by its nature interdisciplinary and not merely multi-disciplinary: 
as indicated in Nigeria, the relation between the digital media and the 
communications it facilitates is analytically separable but in a political context 
symbiotic if not integrated. This thesis will, however, take the public sphere as its 
point of departure, particularly given that ‘digital media’ as a field of knowledge 
and practice far exceeds the realm of political life, or of culture. The research 
questions I will articulate below consider the concept of culture only insofar as it 
involves communications explicitly addressing political discourse or matters 
pertaining to the nature of democracy or contemporary Nigerian democracy. 
There are a range of issues concerning language, regionalisation, inter-ethnic 
rivalries and disputes, the creative process, and many more that the reader 
would rightly assume be included in this thesis. Our purposes, given strict 
limitations on space, demand that this research delimit our study and maintain 
one line of investigation.   
This study will also retain an interest in the general and broad-based structural 
features of a democratic public sphere, risking the appearance of ‘generality’. A 
central aim of the thesis is to theorise a digital public sphere, which maintains an 
historical dimension (a theory with a critical consciousness of its historicity), and 
also informs public policy in Nigeria. For this thesis to maintain an impact in the 
world of Nigerian public policy it will need to work with broad historical terms, 
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emphatic concepts, and generate clearly intelligible strategic proposals. I have 
therefore avoided literary, hermeneutic or highly discursive approaches to the 
political and public spheres, strong in deconstructionist, post-structuralist, 
postmodernist or other (such as agonistic) accounts (from Derrida and Foucault, 
to Nancy, to Mouffe and Critchley, and so on).      
As to the matter of research practice: in conducting content analysis on the 
world wide web, challenges of access and availability of materials can hinder 
research, particularly where public documents and the internal deliberations of 
government are concerned. Even outside official realms or public institutions, 
websites can suddenly become ‘extinct’ or they are updated and the researcher 
can lose the thread, along with the content, of past debates. Moreover, debates 
and perspectives constantly change, often in irregular order or in response to 
sudden, unexpected, events. This thesis has therefore adopted a self-evident 
principle of ‘visibility’, where public debate and discourse are conveyed then that 
public debate and discourse is not concealed or buried by successive events but 
is (or was at the time of researching) openly available and visible in the realm of 
digitally mediated public communications. The analysis and resultant argument 
is not premised on, or reliant on, data or research material that is not publicly 
available or disclosed only by this research. Rather, this research attempts to 
construct a framework that is then employed to assess the conditions of a 
developing democracy in a specific (albeit large) country.      
The concept of ‘democratic culture’ is central to this thesis, but as explained 
above, serves only to indicate that democracy (as indicated by successive 
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theories of the public sphere) is not just an abstract system or set of laws and 
procedures. It is a commonplace observation of political history that the 
emergence of state and civil society (which for a range of seminal thinkers from 
Hegel to Marx embodied the progress of modernity itself), was bought at the 
cost of the ritual allegiances, kinship loyalties and communal bonds that 
characterised previous eras. Nigeria is often diagnosed with a failure to become 
democratic by overcoming the ‘cultural’ (i.e. tribal, ethnic, religious) content of its 
political system. This thesis will not be animated by such a set of assumptions. 
Rather, I will point out how the successive permutations of the theory of the 
public sphere presupposes a range of cultural allegiances, behaviours and 
values – and how communication, deliberation and dialogue itself is heavily 
mediated through cultural norms and dynamics. This is surely self-evident in the 
most fundamental presupposition of this thesis, that does not need defending, 
which is that democracy is a defensible and desirable political system for non-
democratic or partially democratic countries to seek to attain and develop. This 
is even in the face of the perpetual crisis of democratic values and practices in 
the West. More specifically, this thesis holds that if the public sphere is central to 
a viable democracy, then ‘culture’ will always be a substantive (and arguably a 
necessary) part of democracy. Throughout the empirical analysis of this thesis, I 
will be observing how it is the entrepreneurial, individualist and dialogic activities 
of persons and organisations active in digital media that holds out the possibility 
that democracy can be reformed in Nigeria.    
The rationale for conducting this research is to construct a viable framework for 
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understanding new information and communication technologies and their 
influence on the political process of deliberation and society as a whole in Africa. 
Digital media communication and its communication ‘tools’ are changing political 
behaviour and the manner in which citizens relate with government and vice 
versa. There is a need to investigate the implications of these developments, 
map out the challenges involved in empowering citizens with media tools, as 
well as the potential threats to the political process created by wholesale use of 
digital media public communication. It is important for us to be able to identify 
what roles government and the governed need to play in the digital age, if an 
effective democratic culture is to emerge and be sustained.  
It is the hope of the researcher that this project may serve as a reference for 
public policy development in Africa, as well as a resource for providing 
theoretical justification for, and explanation of, the techniques of digital 
communication in the public sphere. Governments, social movements and civil 
society groups inclined towards promoting democratic culture would find this 
research of relevance, as it addresses issues that have emerged in the last few 
years. This thesis will also, of course, contribute to existing scholarly discussions 
on the relatively new and emerging idea of a digital public sphere. There is little 
and insufficient research conducted in the West on digital media and Nigeria’s 
(Africa) political sphere, despite the increase in the number of social network 
users, bloggers and the high penetration of mobile phone use. Some key studies 
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conducted and articles published thus far include: Olorunnisola & Douai (2013)2, 
Jacobs (2013)3, and Mudhai et al (2009)4. The Berkman Centre, Harvard 
University, U.S. has also registered interest in exploring Africa’s digital public 
sphere through events and series5.  
Thesis Overview 
The main achievement of the thesis is, I hope, the strategic proposals in the 
conclusion. Admittedly, given the political complexity of Nigeria these will, in time, 
require more extensive empirical research so that they could be presented as 
viable proposals for implementation within a specific context at a particular time 
(something not possible to stipulate in this thesis). The strategic proposals are 
indicative of the means the country Nigeria can use to develop its nascent 
‘culture’ of democracy’, currently in a state of both being nurtured by a new 
digital media sphere at the same time being thwarted by a corrupted system and 
its officialdom. The strategic proposals articulated at the end of the thesis 
(Chapter 11: Conclusion) are generated by empirical analysis provided for by 
interview material (Chapters 8, 9 and 10), whose criteria of questioning and 
analysis was generated from an empirical assessment of the role of digital 
media in contemporary Nigeria (Chapter 6) itself informed by a literature review-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Olorunnisola,	  A.	  A	  &	  Douai,	  A.	  (2013)	  have	  an	  edited	  volume	  titled	  New	  Media	  
Influence	  on	  Social	  and	  Political	  Change	  in	  Africa.	  3	  Jacobs,	  Sean	  (2013)	  has	  an	  essay	  on	  the	  African	  Futures	  website,	  ‘New	  Media	  in	  Africa	  and	  the	  Global	  Public	  Sphere.’	  4	  Mudhai,	  F.	  et	  al	  (2009)	  also	  have	  an	  edited	  volume	  focused	  on	  African	  Media	  and	  
the	  Digital	  Public	  Sphere,	  which	  has	  been	  used	  in	  parts	  of	  the	  literatiure	  review	  in	  this	  thesis	  5	  As	  part	  of	  the	  Berkman	  series,	  an	  example	  of	  a	  presentation	  that	  addresses	  social	  media	  in	  Africa’s	  public	  sphere	  is	  Odewale’s	  (a	  fellow)	  Power	  in	  Our	  Hands.	  	  
 32 
based assessment (Chapter 2) and a theoretical assessment (Chapter 1) of the 
concepts of ‘public sphere’ and  ‘digital public sphere’ respectively.  
To convey this in forward numerical order:  
Chapter One: In Chapter One I construct a framework for the thesis from a study 
on the origin and development of the concept of the public sphere. I outline 
Habermas’ postulation of the theory as its progenitor, noting Habermas’ 
successive observations and points of clarification on the literary or ‘cultural 
public sphere’ or the ‘culture’ of the public sphere.  
Chapter Two: In Chapter Two, I continue a review of the public sphere theory 
from the perspectives of three key critics: Calhoun, Fraser and Kellner. Through 
Habermas, Calhoun, Fraser, and Kellner, I am able to extract certain key 
elements for the development of a public sphere. These elements are: new 
media platforms/spaces, communication techniques, agents and agencies, 
dialogue and issues, and impact & interventions. These elements are not 
exhaustive in the manner in which they encapsulate the idea of the digital public 
sphere; neither do I claim them as forming a superior model to the Habermasian 
construct. Rather, they serve to provide this thesis with a relevant framework of 
criteria, through which the emergent public sphere in Nigeria may be critically 
assessed.  
Chapter Three: In Chapter Three, I proceed with an empirical discussion on the 
concept of new digital media and the public sphere – to form the concept of the 
digital public sphere. This background is significant in that it provides a 
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contextual framework within which the term ‘digital media’ is located, thus 
limiting its definition in this thesis, especially when reference is made to the 
digital public sphere. Here, I deconstruct the digital public sphere with regards to 
its structure, development, and dynamics of use in a democracy. This is where I 
explore the multifaceted idea of digital media as technology, culture, and public 
sphere. I accomplish this through a summary review of relevant literature. 
In Chapter Four, I discuss the digital public sphere in Africa, with regards to its 
active participants in Diaspora. I address the issues accompanying an emergent 
digital public sphere in Africa and diaspora, using research generated by other 
scholars. I highlight several digitally mediated political activities that may be 
argued to contribute to our understanding of how the digital public sphere works 
in African countries and the possible challenges that hamper its effectiveness.  
Chapter Five: The Nigerian public sphere via traditional mass media is the focus 
of this chapter. In this chapter I give an overview of the ‘old’ public sphere in 
Nigeria by exploring how traditional media (print and broadcast) emerged and 
developed in the country. I also attempt to explore the state’s legal frameworks 
that affect their operations, which in turn impacts the Nigerian public sphere. 
Chapter Six: In this chapter I discuss Nigeria democratic digital media culture, by 
identifying digital media tools popularly used in the country, as well as exploring 
the relationship that exists among old media, new media, and Nigeria’s existing 
public sphere. I briefly narrate how the adoption of mobile telephony came to be 
in Nigeria, in this chapter entitled “Digitalizing Nigeria”, and go on to enumerate 
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the identifiable roles digital media currently plays in facilitating a new kind of 
public sphere in Nigeria.  
Chapter Seven: This is the methodology chapter. I provide a detailed 
description/discussion of the research methods I adopted in this thesis, the 
rationale behind their selection, as well as practical experiences from the field 
work in Nigeria.  
Chapter Eight: This chapter is the first of two ‘data presentation’ chapters. This 
is where the responses of the interview participants are integrated as a coherent 
narrative for the purposes of analysis. In the process of organising the data and 
making sense of it, I identify some key democratic organisations and initiatives 
in Nigeria that are central to her culture of democratic communication via digital 
media tools. In addition, I articulate through the respondents’ various 
observations, specific challenges facing Nigeria’s emerging digital public sphere. 
In this chapter, the key elements of a digital public sphere identified in Chapter 
One, are consolidated.   
Chapter Nine: This is the second data presentation chapter, where I identify 
active participants in the Nigerian digital public sphere, the agents and agencies, 
and describe their precise contribution democratic culture in Nigeria through 
digital media communication tools. This chapter also contains interview material 
on the nature of public discussions and dialogue on digital platforms in and 
about Nigeria. I address themes such as the content of the dialogue in the 
Nigerian digital public sphere, who sets the agenda for discussion, how do these 
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discussions take place, in what manner, and so on according to our criteria.  
Chapter Ten: Here, I give a critical assessment of the material articulated in the 
previous two chapters, and make some analytical statements against the 
background of the research questions put forth earlier in the thesis. For each of 
the digital sphere elements I identify, I generate key points that are considered 
central to understanding the nature of the digital public sphere in Nigeria. I 
highlight the ways in which digital media is being used to foster a culture of 
democracy in Nigeria  
Chapter Eleven: This is the conclusion. After the substantive critical analysis of 
the previous chapter, this chapter concludes the thesis. I start by laying out the 
challenges the NDPS faces, which could well jeopardize its potential to foster a 
culture of democracy in Nigeria. I then proceed to propose certain media and 
socio-political strategies that could be instrumental in forming broad policies for 
further cultivating a digital public sphere in Nigeria, and so the character and 
resilience of democracy itself. 
Taking into account the aims and objectives of this research as stated above, 
the political history of Nigeria, rise of digital media along with the research 
rationales as outlined, the research questions according to which our research 
investigation has been conducted, are as follows: 
• What is the new digital public sphere and how has it been constituted by 
new technology and concomitant discursive practices?  
• What organisations, media platforms, and methods of communication 
have been formative for this new public sphere?  
• How has digital media (particularly in relation to the Internet) facilitated 
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the vital dialogue, information and debate constitutive of a democratic 
public sphere in Nigeria?  
• What are the forces (cultural, social, political and religious) prohibitive to 
Nigeria’s embryonic digital public sphere?  
• What political and media strategies can we identify that may be 
instrumental in developing a fully effective digital public sphere in 
Nigeria?  
 
Reflection: The Public Sphere as Field of Research  
As a concluding section to this chapter, I wish to justify the specific parameters 
employed in the opening theoretical chapter, along with the criteria generated 
from this chapter. This thesis research emerged out of a preliminary theoretical 
consideration of Jürgen Habermas, and the self-consciously ‘critical’, 
interdisciplinary and emancipatory discourse that emerged as ‘reception’ and 
successive critique of his public sphere theory in English. Habermas famously 
set out to understand the evolution of bourgeois society in the modern period 
(1700-1974), and in so doing, understand both the specificity of European post-
Enlightenment political thought, along with the remarkable evolution of the 
political economy of Western capitalist societies. His seminal publication, The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962), established his public 
sphere theory, and our investigation will begin by extrapolating from the dense 
historical claims set out in this text.  
Habermas’ theory of the public sphere maintained an uneasy role within the 
recent evolution of the tradition of Critical Theory. Horkheimer and Adorno, 
under whom Habermas studied, famously rejected the normative dimension of 
the public sphere thesis on the basis of an insufficient critical purchase on the 
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principles of classical liberal democracy – citizenship, regulatory government, 
rule of law and, particularly, private property rights – and its instrumentality in the 
perpetuation of the capitalist system (Calhoun, 1992:4). As Calhoun (1992:4) 
puts it, Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere was born in controversy 
and would continue to spark controversy. Despite the plethora of critiques on the 
public sphere, it is universally accepted that Habermas’ conception is a model 
through which the normative principals of liberal democracy remain credible. 
There are three American scholars, whose ideas and critique of the public 
sphere will be reviewed in the next section. They are Craig Calhoun, Nancy 
Fraser, and Douglas Kellner. I have chosen these not because their work is the 
most perspicuous or indeed ‘critical’, but because they offer a visible trajectory 
of thought and their successive revisions of Habermas’ central concepts are 
highly useful in generating criteria for a critical analysis of contemporary Nigeria. 
Calhoun, Fraser, and Kellner are all prodigious thinkers, and I will not attempt to 
represent their body of work so much as to attend to the dominant questions 
they marshaled in response to perceived insufficiencies in Habermas’ public 
sphere, in turn affecting his understanding of contemporary social and cultural 
change. It must be emphasised, therefore, that this opening chapter does not 
attempt to synthesise the whole range of work these thinkers have 
accomplished on this subject; and it does not pretend to generate, by way of 
synthesis, an all-inclusive, extended or superior ‘model’ of the public sphere. 
Rather, an assessment of the basic argument and tenets of these scholars’ work 
will afford us the opportunity to generate criteria for a critical analysis of 
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contemporary Nigeria, identifying a nascent ‘culture’ of democracy and thus key 
conditions for a developing public sphere.    
Calhoun, Fraser, and Kellner are useful critics of Habermas in a second respect. 
Taken in this order, we encounter some of the significant concerns with the 
growing complexity of Western politics, language and representation, social 
class and social identities, cultural values, expression and communication – 
particularly with regard to marginalised groups. In terms of this thesis, this 
means that we will acknowledge significant critical approaches (from, say, 
postmodernist or feminist contexts) while not engaging with what I referred to 
above as literary and hermeneutic discourses. This, I hope, makes this thesis 
compatible with the contemporary discourse of Postcolonial Studies, even 
though this research has been conducted outside of this discourse.  
In various ways, Calhoun, Fraser, and Kellner seek to establish how the 
‘declined’ public sphere may nonetheless be revived, and its critical potential for 
thought, dialogue and empowerment against the state be salvaged. Calhoun, for 
instance, highlights Habermas’ neglect of elements of civil society that are 
somewhat integral to the formation of the public sphere, such as nationalism and 
social movements. Fraser raises questions regarding the omitted place of 
gender and other minority voices in the formation and development of the public 
sphere. Kellner’s central question concerns the media and its place in the 
development of the public sphere. Where old media have failed in their 
democratic functions, Kellner is proposing a critical theory of new technology 
(digital media) that may assist in salvaging the existence of a needed public 
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sphere through its capacity for hosting a multiplicity of voices, dominant and 
subordinated alike.  
 
This is a third reason why Calhoun, Fraser, and Kellner have been chosen. For 
my theoretical researches, they form a natural conceptual trajectory. For it is 
with Kellner’s critical approach that Calhoun and Fraser’s key concerns can be 
integrated as a single coherent concept of a democratic society entirely 
mediated by TV, film and new digital communications. It is Kellner that provides 
us with the basic terms of a critical theory of the public sphere that allows us to 
critically assess the contemporary realities of Nigeria. I do not regard the 
American identity of each of them significant to this theoretical work, even 
though their national identity cannot be ignored (particularly given Kellner’s 
research investment in the historical evolution of American TV in relation to 
American consumer society). On this matter I can only observe that their context 
of American liberal democracy makes them sensitive to matters relevant to a 
country like Nigeria, once formed by English colonialism and now influenced by 
both British and American cultural norms.  
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Chapter One 
Habermas and the Idea of the Public Sphere 
 
This aim of this chapter is to construct an account of the evolving concept of the 
public sphere, reviewing the central claims of Jürgen Habermas, before, in the 
following chapter, moving onto selected key critical interlocutors, Calhoun, 
Fraser and Kellner. From this account, I will be in a position to generate specific 
criteria for our analysis of the emerging public sphere in Nigeria. Habermas 
provides the basis for our account, whereby his historical narrative of the 
evolution of the public sphere within the course of Western modernity provides 
us with our core terminology. My approach to these chosen thinkers can be 
likened to Calhoun’s own approach to Habermas’ seminal theory: for, Calhoun 
states, ‘the most important destiny of Habermas’ first book’ may be to be a 
‘fruitful generator of new research, analysis and theory’, rather than an 
‘authoritative statement’ (Calhoun, 1992:41). In attending to Habermas and his 
critics, I will not be attempting to reconstruct a more integrated theory, but, as I 
said, generate criteria from central concepts. In evaluating an evolving public 
sphere in a country like Nigeria, what terms, concepts, insights and issues do 
we need to consider? However, it is indeed intentional, that these concepts are 
fundamental, and basic, and formative to a developing democracy.  
Habermas, in his seminal book, The Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere (1962) makes a number of key assertions on the necessary criteria for a 
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scholarly definition and re-definition of the public sphere, from ‘bourgeois society’ 
to what we would not refer to as ‘contemporary’ society. Our objectives are 
threefold: (i) to outline Habermas’ theory of the public sphere; (ii) to provide a 
critical reflection on that theory with the aid of our chosen critics of Habermas; 
and (iii) to generate terms, concepts, insights and issues by which our research 
can be extended into non-Western contexts. Through this, as noted in the 
introduction, I will also be adding my own emphasis – to emphasise the ‘cultural’ 
(not just political) character of the public sphere. This emphasis cannot extend 
into the rich complexity of the theoretical terrain before us, where culture itself is 
a highly inflected and contested term. For the theoretical researches of the three 
critical interlocutors I cite are extensive; I can only but summarise in brief their 
responses to Habermas’ theory of the public sphere as they understood it, and 
make appropriate observations.  
The term ‘public’ evokes in our minds synonyms and cognate phrases, such as 
‘open’, ‘available to all’, ‘common goods’, and ‘non-exclusive’, or in the interests 
of all. On the other hand, it also designates functions and functionaries of the 
state – someone who occupies a government or political position is a public 
official. ‘Public’ takes on another complexion of meaning when electoral 
candidates present their policy claims or manifesto before the public, where 
public designates citizens. The term public is thus multivalent even on the level 
of the semantic, yet whose various meanings are historically interconnected with 
the role of the state and other dimensions of society. Within a critical theory of 
the ‘public sphere’, how then is public defined?  
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Before the emergence of modernity (arguably co-extensive with the intellectual 
forces of ‘Enlightenment’ in the eighteenth century), we find early 
conceptualisations of public and private. In the Greek period, Habermas notes, 
the sphere of the polis was demarcated from the sphere of the oikos. The former 
indicated the open interaction of free citizens in a civic realm; the latter was 
concealed interactions between such free citizens (usually in the domestic 
realm). In the Roman period, we find a Res Republica – or public entity or 
‘affairs’. Res publica is said to refer to anything not regarded as private entities 
(res privata), and of common interest (Haakonssen, 1995:569) established as a 
category in Roman law. The so-called Middle Ages and its economy of 
feudalism generated something different. There existed what Habermas terms 
representative publicity, and not merely a common interest. ‘Public’ comprised 
the various forms in which the king or nobility made representations to the 
people – articulating their power and the attributions of lordship (Habermas, 
1962:7), presenting themselves as ‘an embodiment of some sort of “higher 
power” to the people’ (1962:7). For here Habermas locates a principle: for 
political power to exist there is needed an ‘audience’ before which it must be 
manifest. The signification of such representations of power, however, were 
unidirectional – the audience were not, by implication, invited to scrutinise or 
discuss the content of such representations, and whatever they individually 
possessed that could be defined as ‘private’ (their goods, or money) was of 
course never categorically separate from the all-pervasive ‘public’ power of the 
potentate. The ‘feudal’ public – where the essential private interests of a 
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potentate assumed a direct political or controlling function – is significant for 
Habermas, for even by the late 19th century Habermas observes a certain 
‘refeudalization’ of the public sphere (as the last ‘structural transformation’). 
For Habermas, the crucial historical development in our concept of public 
emerges in the Sixteenth Century with fully developed Renaissance-era 
international mercantilism. It was here private and public began to denote 
spheres of social life and economy: public began to imply the entity of state 
government beyond the potentate, ‘an entity having an objective existence over 
the person of the ruler’; private designated what was anterior to this sphere 
(Habermas, 1962:10-11). One crucial detail in this is how the growing global 
trade routes in commodities required a concurrent flow of information and news 
(on markets, currencies, events and patterns of exchange and so on), which in 
Habermas’s compact narrative anticipates the central impact of printed matter 
and the ‘press’. Through the phases of early capitalism in the eighteenth century 
the press developed ‘a unique explosive power’ (Habermas, 1962:20). Before 
this period, the news was irregularly published and not commercially distributed; 
now the news had become a commodity. The emerging modern state developed 
interests in the press, initially regarding it as an instrument of state 
administration, announcing instructions and ordinances where the recipients of 
these announcements ‘genuinely became ‘the public’ in the proper sense’ 
(Habermas, 1962:21). Yet as the new apparatus of the modern state developed, 
the press increasingly began to articulate the interests of the mercantile now 
‘bourgeois’ social class of privileged, professional, industrialists or aspirants. 
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This new ‘stratum of “bourgeois” was the real carrier of the public…’ (Habermas, 
1962:23)  
It was in the so-called ‘bourgeois’ era (by 1850 in France and Britain) where the 
concept of public became most expansive, involving a highly literate social class 
benefitting from historical changes that fully grown would generate liberal 
democracy, civil society and a ‘public life’ of independent citizens protected by a 
rule of law. With increasing freedoms of assembly and association, along with 
increasing media of publication, the bourgeois class not only developed forms of 
linguistic argumentation to a high level of rationality, but increasingly overcame 
the tendency to agglomerate private interests: in other words, they developed a 
‘public opinion’ over and beyond the sum of their individual (or even group) 
private interests (Habermas et al, 1974). The press served as media and 
disseminator of this public opinion, as well as informing the public on matters of 
the state (the legal proceedings of parliament, for example). Public opinion was 
the discursive dimension of a public realm of social interaction, where private 
interests morphed into a highly articulate commentary on the processes by 
which state power institutionalised and generated the conditions by which 
society and economy were managed (Habermas et al, 1974:50).  
Yet, as a cognate term, ‘Public authority’ emerged by way of reference to the 
constitutional state. The state was considered public authority as it was 
increasingly understood as deriving a cognisance of its various responsibilities 
through public opinion, and to a significant extent was executor of the public 
sphere; but it was not a part of that sphere (Habermas et al, 1974:49). Similarly, 
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the realm of ‘private’ individuals, (their beliefs, political views, moral convictions, 
business interests, and so on), was a sphere of autonomy and self-directed 
authority and impressed upon the public sphere but was not equal to it 
(Habermas, 1963: 30).  
The family, as the intimate dimension of the site of autonomous or private 
activity, was significant to the development of the public sphere, in that a 
citizen’s facility for reason and public conduct was cultivated through private 
experiences such as occurred in the bourgeois conjugal family’s intimate domain 
(Habermas, 1962:28-9). In comments that parallel Bourdieu’s concept of 
‘habitus’, Habermas conveys how a process of self-clarification of private 
citizens ‘focusing on the genuine experiences of their novel privateness’ 
provided a ‘training ground’ for a ‘critical public reflection’ (Habermas, 1962:29). 
The bourgeois home became the site of some cultural production, where private 
‘letters’ and literary expression, chamber concerts and so-called ‘salon society’ 
emerged. The private citizen was already a combination of roles – owner of 
property, owner of commodities, head of a family – but ‘the doubling of the 
private sphere on the higher plane of the intimate sphere furnished the 
foundation for an identification of those two roles under the common title of the 
‘private’; ultimately, the political self-understanding of the bourgeois public 
originated there as well’ (Habermas, 1962:28-9). That is, within the co-extensive 
dimensions of the private sphere, from the hearth or home to business or market, 
the bourgeois ‘subjectivity’ was developed, where the ‘self’ gained a 
consciousness of the political conditions of social status and wellbeing. 
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Habermas alerts us to this unique period of time where a range of social spaces 
nonetheless provided the context for a process of personal identification with 
beliefs, ideas and ideologies on the nature of the state, government, economy 
and market. Through acts of critical reasoning, a public dialogue emerged that 
gained a certain coherence in the printed press, as well as pamphlets and books.  
 
To reiterate some of the ‘principles’ that have guided a panoply of subsequent 
theorizing on the public sphere in scholarly criticism (Benson, 2009), emerging 
from the historical narrative summarized above: a public sphere would (i) delimit 
access as widely as possible; (ii) access would not be contingent upon dominant 
social hierarchies; (iii) citizens gaining access would not participate under 
compulsion but exhibit a certain autonomy; (iv) the rule of law would be the 
‘authority’, and not any person or group; (v) participation in the public sphere 
would require a recognition of a certain parity of credence or commitment to 
attending to the concerns of all other participants (a common commitment to 
common welfare). Of course, our critical interlocutors mentioned above will have 
cause to challenge these very principles (in the next chapter).  
From Habermas’ dense historical account of the bourgeois public sphere, we 
can extrapolate key concepts so as to carry forth and define a new emerging 
(digital) public sphere. Firstly, in Habermas’ account, the printing press (as a 
device or mechanism of mass media reproduction) was central to the 
development of the public sphere. Second, the instrument of media allowed the 
content of deliberation, debate (consolidated by reliable and consistent 
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information) to form a membership of a public sphere, not wholly dependent on 
social class other institutions or state patronage. Third, with a growing 
membership, the public sphere generated forms of linguistic argumentation, new 
‘communication techniques’, and modes of address. Lastly, the fundamental 
literacies required in the public sphere expanded and extended, not simply 
through the demands of articulation (within debate, for example) but the 
competitive dynamics and forms of competitiveness and differentiation that 
emerges with an intensification of interests and viewpoints. Such literacies were 
intrinsically interconnected with cultural production (letters, essays, salon 
discussions, chamber compositions, and so on) and thus public sphere activity 
generated certain norms and standards of social and cultural intercourse 
generally.  
In Habermas’s narrative, we also find characteristics that are fundamental to all 
subsequent conceptions of the public sphere – and accepted by our critics 
Calhoun, Fraser and Kellner. One such characteristic is the public sphere as 
mechanism for defining ‘collective’ interests (in a way that can avoid populism or 
collectivist forms of political administration, like communism). The public sphere 
also mediates ‘interests’, where it allows for the articulation of the various private 
interests (of civil society) but at the same time can generate a greater sense of 
common interest, or ‘public good’. In other words, despite the prevalence of civil 
society interests, a social consciousness of other kinds or levels of ‘interest’ are 
created. And furthermore, there remains a principle, that whatever interests are 
admitted to the public sphere, they are defined as interests through scrutiny, 
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debate and deliberation.  
Another significant characteristic, not entirely expanded upon in Habermas’ 
account, is ‘public opinion’ and how it can transcend the influence of the public 
sphere itself (i.e. become embedded in social norms or in culture); and 
moreover, public opinion can present a challenge to the state and the ideas and 
ideologies of the state. In other words, there is a sense that a public sphere is 
not simply a sphere of discussion, dialogue and deliberation – but a productive 
sphere, of values and motivations for political change or transformation. The role 
of cultural production in Habermas’ account is also significant – for the ‘literacies’ 
of the cultural life of the bourgeoisie were inseparable from the literacies 
required for the public sphere to function and develop. The same forms of 
‘critical reasoning’ were intrinsic to both. In what follows, therefore, I will not 
reiterate the theories of the public sphere held by Calhoun, Fraser and Kellner, 
but only certain relevant critical comments on Habermas’s theory of the public 
sphere (assuming these three interlocutors generally accept the principles as 
stated above).   
By way of conclusion, however, it is important to clarify the role of ‘culture’ in 
Habermas’s theory, in the light of later research and statements by Habermas, 
and for the purpose of clarifying the role of ‘culture’ in this thesis. A central claim 
of this thesis is that an ‘embyonic’ public sphere in Nigeria is being developed 
(extended, strengthened and engaging Nigerian citizens both at home and in the 
diaspora) through the ‘cultural’ dimension of public sphere discourse. This 
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‘cultural’ dimension does not only concern the dissemination of a new critical 
consciousness and its concomitant ethical values (civil rights and self-
determination, for example), but of the creativity, improvisation and individual 
expression afforded by the new digital media.  
Following subsequent criticism and interpretation of his original public sphere 
thesis, as outlined in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 
Habermas responded to points of criticism and so developed his theory in later 
writings. While, curiously, the subject of ‘culture’ and a cultural public sphere 
was not central, or indeed important to the criticisms of our interlocutors Calhoun, 
Fraser and Kellner, we must now rehearse several of Habermas’ theoretical 
points by way of properly representing the relevance of his concept of the public 
sphere to this thesis, and thus the criteria we derive from it for our investigation.  
In September 1989, on the occasion of the English translation of The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere, a major conference in the USA was 
organized by Craig Calhoun, and featured, among others, Nancy Fraser (but not 
Douglas Kellner). At this conference Jürgen Habermas was present, and made 
a number of significant statements of clarification and revision of his previous 
thesis: these were added as both a ‘further reflections’ and conclusion sections 
to the subsequent edited book by Calhoun (1992), Habermas and the Public 
Sphere, which remains the seminal overview of the first substantive English 
reception of Habermas’ 1962 book. By way of ‘further reflection’ Habermas 
noted how his original historical conceptualization of the public sphere was an 
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‘ideal’ sociological generalization, and necessarily so given the aims of the book. 
But also, given how the ‘structural transformation’ of the public sphere was 
continuing, Habermas noted how this change involved new public formations in 
a rapidly changing European democracy. Here I will attend to just several points 
relevant to constructing our conceptual framework.  
Habermas indicates that, on reflection, there were several missing historical 
dimensions of the 1962 book – significantly, the ‘politicization of the public 
sphere’ at the time of the French Revolution, where art and literature played key 
roles, and where a distinctive ‘plebian’ discourse emerged. And similarly missing 
was explicit reference to 19th and early 20th century ‘class formation, 
urbanization, cultural mobilization and emergence of new structures of 
communication’ (Calhoun: 1992: 424). This, if I may add, could have been 
illustrated by Habermas by referring to various movements in art, design, 
fashion, the cultural activities of growing Labour unions, or the now celebrated 
European ‘avant-garde’ art movements. For Habermas, informal as well as 
formal social and civic associations were also critical in expanding the public 
sphere, as well as the ever more complex realm of press, publications and 
media. He adds: ‘The modern public sphere comprises several arenas in which, 
through printed materials dealing with matters of culture, information and 
entertainment, a conflict of opinions is fought out more or less discursively’ 
(Calhoun: 1992: 430).  This touches on a matter of some significance, outlined 
in more detail in Habermas’ monumental Between Facts and Norms: 
contributions of a discourse theory of law and democracy, (published in English 
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in 1998). In a chapter entitled ‘Civil Society, public Opinion, and Communicative 
Power’, Habermas notes that the realm of public communications itself had 
gained the facility and social veracity by which the deliberations and dialogue of 
the public sphere could be conducted and shape society without the necessary 
or direct involvement of the ‘political system’ (Habermas, 1996: 359). In its 
previous iterations, the concept of public sphere historically assumed a 
substantive interconnection with the levers of political decision-making. That is 
to say, one would infer from Habermas’ 1962 book, that actual social change 
was only affected once certain public opinion and public sphere deliberations 
had been refined and mediated by the government or political system and 
converted into law, institutional procedure or some other kind of regulatory 
action. The public sphere, however, had, by the 1980s at least for Habermas, 
found many means of affecting social change, or registering social change, or 
simply stimulating social change. (Habermas was increasingly interested in the 
rise of ‘social movements’ and political pressure groups). 
In some ways, this basic point relates to the original ‘cultural’ or literary public 
sphere that appeared in the historical narrative of Habermas’ 1962 text and in 
contradistinction to a ‘political’ public sphere. Since the eighteenth century (at 
least in England, France, and Germany, Habermas’ main objects of analysis) 
the real interest of the private individual (as private business interests but also 
the private realm of domestic dwelling, hospitality, friendship and social 
acquaintance) became productive of both new cultural goods (like books) and a 
site of ‘letters’ and the associations around the growing intellectual intercourse 
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of a ‘reading public’, whose fulcrum was novels, essays, memoires, periodicals 
and the living-rooms or coffee houses in which these were discussed. This 
culminated in the highly productive ‘salon’ sub-culture of the late 19th Century, 
and formative of a range of values, dispositions, habits, linguistic refinements 
and more importantly, ethico-political concerns, that came to forge a distinctively 
bourgeois subjectivity’. Habermas’ theoretical observations on this are important 
(if brief and compressed).   
‘The sphere of the public arose in the broader strata of the bourgeoisie as an 
expansion and at the same time completion of the intimate sphere of the 
conjugal family’ (Habermas, 1989: 50). The emergence of literature in the 
domestic realm generated a consciousness of a crucial dialectic between the 
‘bourgeois’ of citizen as independent owner of commodities and member of civil 
society, and of ‘homme’ or man of feeling, refection, family intimacy, with the 
facility to reflect on their ‘human’ experience of social conditions (Habermas, 
1989: 55), generating a public articulation of feeling, sentiment, common tastes 
or judgments, and a realm of senses within which common understanding and 
empathy would emerge. The world of letters and literature was formative for the 
cultivation of this complexity in the self-representation and self-consciousness of 
a bourgeois citizen and his interests, coalescing in the facility for ‘criticism’, 
which was ‘literary’ before it was ‘political’. The cultivation of a sphere of the 
criticism of public authority seemed in contrast to the domestic ‘intimate’ sphere, 
but in fact both become co-joined. Habermas refers to the private sphere of 
family as the sphere where the cultural production of ‘letters’ emerged, defined 
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as an ‘audience-oriented’ privacy (the facility for generating deeply introspection 
and personal ejaculation for public consideration). That intimacy was co-joined 
with a perception of objective social conditions, is significant in how a ‘public’ 
discourses emerged as distinct from merely a discourse of civil society and its 
interests.  
For the nature of public interests, and with it public opinion and its relation to 
authority, became more conceptually explicit the more the ‘interiorizing human 
closeness’ of the domestic sphere refined the bourgeois citizen’s self-
understanding and sense of interrelation within others. Criticism was not merely 
an attention to particular issues, but the situation of such issues within the broad 
complexity of human experience, the construction of meaning or perception of 
truth. It is for this reason the literature of the 18th and 19th Century (Habermas 
cites Goethe and Richardson as well as, for London, the Spectator, Tatler and 
Guardian) could routinely attend to the broader ethical, religious, legislative or 
social justice dimensions of current affairs or government decisions. 
The self-understanding of the bourgeois citizen was therefore of ‘universal’ and 
‘human’ dimensions and not just of individual perceptions of social conditions 
relating to their personal interests. Their ability to articulate their interests in the 
light of experience and its conditions, cultivated essential cognitive and 
intellectual skills, which in turn, came to characterize the deliberations and 
intellectual interactions of the public sphere (Habermas, 1989: 52). In some 
sense, therefore, the ‘cultural’ public sphere (of family life and literature 
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particularly – though one could add religious devotion and a whole range of 
other cultural phenomenon arguably omitted by Habermas) was the origin of the 
most powerful ‘communicative’ dimensions of the modern public sphere.  
It was in Between Facts and Norms that Habermas makes much more of the 
character of communication as a formative force in the public sphere, and where 
the public sphere itself is referred to as a ‘communication structure’. In fact, he 
effectively revised his concept of the public sphere, offering a more nuanced 
definition, no doubt in response to forthcoming criticism: 
‘The public sphere is a social phenomenon just as elementary as action, 
actor, association, or collectivity, but it eludes the conventional sociological 
concepts of “social order.” The public sphere cannot be conceived as an 
institution and certainly not as an organisation. It is not even a framework 
of norms with differentiated competencies and roles, membership 
regulations, and so on. Just as little does it represent a system; although it 
permits one to draw internal boundaries, outwardly it is characterized by 
open, permeable and shifting horizons. The public sphere can best be 
described as a network for communicating information and points of 
view…the streams of communication are, in the process, filtered and 
synthesized in such a way that they coalesce into bundles of topically 
specified public opinions (Habermas: 1998: 360). 
In Between Facts and Norms, Habermas emphasizes the dynamics of the public 
sphere and the social ‘spaces’ it created. Public deliberation and debate were 
more specifically attributed to a facility for intersubjectivity, interchange, 
‘intellectualizing effects’ and ‘affects’, the transformation of ‘the participants’ 
preferences and attitudes’, the sharing, the processes of dialogue development, 
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the ‘quality’ of public opinion, the influences and persuasive dimension, roles 
and acts of presentation, and so on (1998: 360—379). In other words, In 
Between Facts and Norms finds Habermas attentive to the aesthetic and 
intellectual dimensions of public sphere experience, almost as if he is asserting 
its profound ‘cultural’ dimension. We may be reminded of Jim McGuigan’s 
statement: ‘The concept of a cultural public sphere refers to the articulation of 
politics, public and personal, as a contested terrain though affective – aesthetic 
and emotional – modes of communication (McGuigan 2010: 15). While 
McGuigan takes this in a particular direction, we must note that Habermas 
reconsidered the experiential dimension of a public sphere, and so too its 
‘cultural’ dimension.  
Another conceptual innovation to find articulation in Facts and Norms is the 
distinction between ‘lifeworld’ and ‘system’, where the public sphere is part of 
the lifeworld of everyday social relations in specific ‘cultural’ environments. The 
lifeworld is the immediate, socially-embedded, milieu of social actors, and to a 
great extent, the realm from which values, beliefs and ethical norms find a 
substantive purchase over the ideas, ideologies and political commitments that 
animate participation in the public sphere. The ‘system’ is the more abstract 
regime of the structuring mechanisms of market economy and the state 
apparatus. Habermas warns against the detachment of lifeworld from the 
‘system’, and the domination of the former by the latter (a domination that is the 
causal root of the ‘structural transformation’ that so defines his book).  
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I quoted the lengthy statement above, for as our chapters progress, it will not go 
without notice that my conception of the ‘embryonic’ public sphere in Nigeria 
follows just this description, and with an emphasis on ‘lifeworld’ activities and 
social contexts. As Habermas expressly states, a structural interconnection with 
the ‘political system’ (along with principle deliberators who have access to the 
corridors or power and privilege that, in Nigeria, characterize the ‘system’) is not 
necessary for the formation or function of a public sphere. Indeed, Habermas’ 
definition above could equally apply to ‘cultural’ movements, where culture has 
become ‘politicized’ by certain ethical or political aims, local allegiances in 
specific locations. It is my intention in this thesis to remain with this more 
nuanced and dynamic definition of the public sphere, retaining the ‘cultural’ 
dimension that has appeared in Habermas’ account since the beginning, and 
maintaining a ‘lifeworld’ dimension. Habermas often referred to ‘associational’ 
dynamics and networks, which emerge from (but are not identical to) civil society, 
which have the potential to generate discursive forces that act on official public 
discourse in a variety of ways. This, in my later chapters, will be observed in the 
way ‘public’ forces of debate and deliberation emerge from ‘lifeworld’ levels, 
particularly from actors or agencies with little political power. Like many social 
phenomenon that Habermas identified as emerging from ‘associational’ activity, 
like the smaller political pressure groups, these actors and agencies remain 
provisional and do not become socially substantive – not in the way civil society 
itself is substantive (structured by actual market, commodity and corporate 
entities: Habermas 1996: 373-387).  
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Indeed, in Facts and Norms it is the lifeworld that provides the ‘wild’ public of 
new activism and interest group solidarities generate quasi-independent spheres 
of public discourse. While Habermas does not believe in the possibility of the 
political autonomy of resisting groups per se (nothing is ‘outside’ the social 
totality constructed by capitalist economy), a certain relative autonomy from the 
political system of the state can been achieved, where the ‘agenda’ of the 
institutional or official public sphere is indeed influenced through indirect means 
(like the so-called ‘pressure’ of pressure groups).    
I will now conclude our discussion of Habermas, without, however, indicating 
that his basic theory of the public sphere developed no further. There were 
many points on which Habermas revised his theory, for he stated in our above 
cited edited text by Calhoun: 
‘..the  structural transformation, embedded in the integration of 
state and society, of the public sphere itself. The infrastructure of 
the public sphere has changed along with the forms of 
organization, marketing, and consumption of a professionalized 
book production that operates on a larger scale and is oriented to 
a new strata or readers…the rise of electronic mass media, the 
new relevance of advertising, the increased fusion of 
entertainment and information…’ (Calhoun, 1992: 436) 
In other words, Habermas was prompted to consider the homology between 
culture and politics. Yet, I do not want to pre-empt the important points of our 
critical interlocutors, whose points for the next chapter. 
This chapter has attempted to define Habermas’ classical concept of the public 
sphere, while remaining alert to the role of ‘culture’ in this, and later, 
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formulations. In so doing I conclude with three points:  
(i): For Habermas’ original concept of the public sphere, the cultural-literary 
origins of that sphere are significant, and to some degree remain significant. The 
role of language, experience, empathy, and generalized ethical judgments on 
current affairs or decisions taken by government, are intrinsic to the embryonic 
public sphere emerging in Nigeria. And further, the phenomenon of influence, 
persuasion, emotion, and the affective or aesthetic dimensions of public 
communications will be emphasized in later chapters as important to the uses as 
well as the content of digital media in Nigeria;  
(ii): The dynamics of communication within the public sphere can become so 
strong in generating realms for participation and social interconnections, they 
can grow and function without a direct connection to the political system or 
power of the state; the public sphere is not equivalent to either civil society and 
its private interests, or political decision making. A ‘culture of democracy’ in 
Nigeria is so defined in terms of ‘lifeworld’ against system (in Habermas’ terms, 
‘a rationalization of the lifeworld’), where a ‘wild’ public sphere of social actors 
petition and influence the formation of state politics by means other than direct 
participation in governmental debate and deliberations (Calhoun, 1992: 453; 
Habermas, 1996 358-9);  
(iii): Habermas noted a radical difference emerging between the traditional mass 
media (the main means in the 20th Century by which the public sphere was 
established) and the new, more informal and emerging world of digital media 
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communications. Here Habermas was equivocal: ‘…computer-mediated 
communication in the web can claim unequivocal democratic merits only for a 
special context: It can undermine the censorship of authoritarian regimes that try 
to control and repress public opinion. In the context of liberal regimes, the rise of 
millions of fragmented chat rooms across the world tend instead to lead to the 
fragmentation of large but politically focused mass audiences into a huge 
number of isolated issue publics. Within established national public spheres, the 
online debates of web users only promote political communication, when news 
groups crystallize around the focal points of the quality press, for example, 
national newspapers and political magazines (Habermas, 2006: 423).   
Habermas’s assumption here is that for a ‘public’ dimension to be stable, we 
require a mass media, and mass media uniquely provides for the essential unity 
of public communication around with which digital media can only seek to 
cooperate. This thesis will serve to put forward a counter-argument, empirically 
grounded in the case of the embryonic public sphere of Nigeria.  
 
  
	  
	  
	  	   60	  
Section One: Chapter Two 
Qualifications and Criticisms  
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I continue a review of the public sphere theory by presenting the 
central claims of three other critical interlocutors of the public sphere. They are 
Calhoun, Fraser, and Kellner. In so doing, I work towards generating criteria for 
our analyzing of the emerging public sphere in Nigeria. My approach to these 
chosen thinkers is as Calhoun’s approach to Habermas’ seminal text: for 
Calhoun states, ‘the most important destiny of Habermas’ first book’ may be to 
be a fruitful generator of new research, analysis, and theory’, rather than an 
‘authoritative statement’ (Calhoun, 1992: 41). Starting with Calhoun, I introduce 
us again to the concept of the public sphere, this time, from the perspective of 
Habermas’ critics.  
Calhoun and the critical extension of the Habermasian public sphere 
Craig Calhoun’s writings on the public sphere emerge in critical dialogue with 
Habermas’ historical account in Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere 
(1962). Calhoun is largely noted for his critique of Habermas’ historical account, 
focusing particularly on the concept and function of ‘civil society’ and its 
relevance in contemporary discussions on American and European democracy 
and social life.  
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The concept of civil society is central to the idea of the public sphere, even if 
Habermas was not deeply invested in it as a distinct historical category. In 
Calhoun’s 1993 article, ‘Civil Society and the Public Sphere’, Calhoun stresses 
the importance of maintaining a clear distinction between both concepts, 
especially in theoretical discussions (1993:269). Habermas tended to maintain 
that civil society emerged as a private realm that stood counter to the State: it 
‘came into existence as a corollary of a de-personalised State authority’ 
(Habermas, 1962:19). A similarity in civil society and the public sphere as 
concepts is that they each only became fully conceptualised once the State 
became divested of direct human personality (such as the age of representative 
publicity and the personality of the King). Civil became recognisable in the 
relationships and organisations created for sustaining social life outside the 
State, and for articulating issues of interests for public discussion and (or) the 
action of the State. This led to educated members of the civil elite viewing 
themselves as publicum, a counterpart to public authority or the State, where the 
bourgeois public sphere was institutionalised as co-dependent on State power 
(Calhoun, 1992: 9).  
Indeed, the extent to which citizens find a capacity for dialogue and deliberation 
that is the content of the public sphere depends on the ‘internal connections 
among people, occasions for collective action, ideologies that root popular 
consent’ (Calhoun, 1993:270) that is the civil sphere. Civil society, for Calhoun, 
is the capacity of a social community to organise itself, independent of the 
specific direction of State power, yet at the same time formed in relation to it 
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(Calhoun, 1993:270). Emphasising their relation, Calhoun asserts that the 
relation between the public sphere and civil society is that the latter’s capacity in 
operationalizing self-organisation is registered in the public sphere as the arena 
for deliberative exchange, where rational critical debate determined the required 
actions and agreements. To Calhoun, Habermas’ public sphere functioned in 
relation to its social condition, which was civil society (1993: 273). In other words, 
without a civil society, a public sphere would be form-less, disorganized and 
without direction.  
In the same article, Calhoun identifies certain aspects of Habermas’ historical 
narrative, particularly the role of the printing press. The emergence of 
newsletters met a demand for information on behalf of merchants, on prices and 
goods, later evolving as media of ‘public’ information on laws and trading 
practices. This process, he opines, promoted a general literacy and a distinctive 
set of social approaches to the published word as a source of information. 
Furthermore, the press was as much available and used by the State, which 
relayed information to the public sphere; in other words, we must not assume 
linear lines of communication to determine any ‘model’ we might form of the 
public sphere and the ‘rational’ dynamics of its dialogue and deliberations 
(Calhoun, 1992:8).  
Calhoun concurs with Habermas in that the decline of the press as central and 
dominant media of the public sphere (and the concomitant expansion and 
commercialisation of the media), was symptomatic of the decline of the public 
sphere itself (Habermas, 1962:169). However, for Calhoun the degeneration of 
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the public sphere is overstated: for the ‘public consequences of mass media are 
not necessarily as uniformly negative as Structural Transformation suggests’ 
(1992: 33), and he expresses surprise that Habermas does not mention other 
avenues through which access to the public sphere expanded (1992:24). For 
Calhoun, the normative public sphere may be resuscitated even though 
Habermas fails to find socio-economic conditions for such in advanced capitalist 
societies: to find ‘an institutional basis for an effective political public sphere 
corresponding in character and function to that of early capitalism and State 
formation but corresponding in scale and participation to the realities of later 
capitalism and States’ (1992:29). Indeed, a central weakness in Habermas’ 
Structural Transformation, is that Habermas does not consider the ‘classical’ 
bourgeois public sphere and the post-transformation public sphere (or 
‘organised’ and ‘late’ capitalism) through marshaling the same criteria. 
Habermas’ account of the Twentieth Century omits ‘the sort of intellectual history, 
the attempt to take leading thinkers seriously and recover the truth from their 
ideologically distorted writings’; an approach that marks Habermas’ take on the 
seventeenth to nineteenth centuries (Calhoun, 1992: 33). 
However, on a more positive note, Calhoun readily submits that Habermas 
successfully recovered a ‘valuable critical ideal from the classical bourgeois 
public sphere’, an important blueprint (open to critical modification) for the 
practice of democratic culture (Calhoun, 1992:29). Calhoun elucidates that 
majority of other criticisms against the public sphere expose forms of 
underdevelopment in the concept, or omission of significant issues (such as 
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gender). Thus, mentioning what these omissions are indicates possibilities in 
improving or extending the theoretical armature of the Structural Transformation 
of the Public Sphere, rather than collapsing it (1992:33). Issues that are 
‘remarkably absent’, for Calhoun, include culture and identity (nationalism), 
religion1 and social movements (1992:34, 36, 37). The ‘remarkable absence’ of 
nationalism, Calhoun observes, ‘may be due partly to the general lack of 
attention to the nineteenth century public sphere’, and a part of ‘a thinness of 
attention to matters of culture and the construction of identity’ (1992:34). 
Calhoun’s subsequent paper ‘Nationalism and Cultures of Democracy’ (2007), 
buttresses the significance of nationalism, social solidarity and social institutions 
to democratic culture. For Calhoun, nationalism is a sober reminder that 
democracy presupposes solidarity (2007:172).  
In ‘Habermas and the Public Sphere’ (1992), Calhoun points out that Habermas’ 
framework assumes that social identities and interests are settled and fully 
formed in the private sphere before being imported into the public sphere, an 
assumption that ‘impoverishes his own theory’ (1992:35). The abstract binary 
‘private vs. public’ generates in Habermas’s historical narrative an impasse 
when attempting to find what constitutes general interests or not. An instance for 
Calhoun is that Habermas’ discussion on the literary dimensions to the early 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  In	  Habermas’	  future	  essay	  in	  2011,	  he	  addresses	  the	  subject	  of	  religion	  in	  the	  public	  sphere.	  Habermas	  concludes	  that	  religious	  practices	  and	  perspectives	  remain	  relevant	  to	  multicultural	  citizenship,	  spurring	  solidarity	  and	  respect.	  However,	  it	  is	  required	  that	  religious	  traditions	  are	  translated	  into	  “universally	  accessible	  language”	  to	  avail	  itself	  in	  wider	  political	  culture	  (2011:	  15-­‐28;	  also,	  Mendieta	  &	  Vanantwerpen,	  2011:	  4-­‐5).	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evolution of the public sphere (where literary fiction, for one, helped facilitate a 
sense of identity, experience and consciousness of audience-directed 
communication) entailed a profound role for the private sphere. As the public 
realm became more emphatic, it is tempting to understand public in terms of its 
opposite to private. Calhoun’s problem is the relation between the sense of 
individual selfhood and interests emerging from a private realm and the evident 
power of the allegiance to general interests constitutive of a public realm fully 
developed. The social spaces of the public sphere (café, salon, town hall, etc.) 
are components in the passage between private and public to some degree, as 
are also the various media of the published word. Yet there remains a sense – 
particularly concerning the role of religious experience and faith during these 
periods of history – that the construction of identity, individual experience, and 
the allegiance to general interests, cannot be explained by an emphatic binary of 
‘public v’s private’ (Calhoun, 1992:35). 
Calhoun further posits that the absence of culture, nationalism and a theory of 
the processes by which social identities are constructed, in Habermas’ account 
have implication for his conception of the public sphere’s degeneration. That is, 
‘even if we grant that the problem-solving functions of the public sphere are 
being performed less well than in the past, this does not mean that public sphere 
has ceased to be at least as vibrant a source of understanding, including self-
understanding’ (Calhoun, 1992:34). Self-understanding is therefore a radically 
under-theorised component of the public sphere for Calhoun, and where it does 
appear as a dimension of the ‘interiority’ of the Marxist model of ‘liberal 
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bourgeois’ subjectivity, it neglects to fully include its social dimension. For 
Calhoun, social movements were and remain vital to the formation of the 
agenda of public sphere debates, but also the allegiances, convictions and 
values of individuals. Moreover, democratic politics itself has been ‘crucially 
influenced’ by social movements – which are in effect a ‘subsidiary’ public (1992: 
37). Further, a more socially informed understanding of public sphere debates 
and deliberations will see that individual issues and problems agglomerate 
within broader ideological confines and other forms of discursive power that 
structure collective attention. The omission of social movements from a theory of 
the public sphere is to disregard how public discourse is a site of struggle, 
through which the participants as much as the ‘sphere’ itself are made and re-
made (Calhoun, 1992:37).  
Calhoun’s central contribution to the critique and extension of Habermas’ theory 
lies in the emphatic emphasis on the social dimension of public life – identities, 
movements, ideologies and power. To some extent Calhoun is ambivalent on 
the role of nationalism in the formation of social conditions, registered in the way 
he is aware of Habermas’ unsustainable historical truism that each State 
possesses one public sphere yet at the same time multiple public spheres ‘will 
leave us groping for a new term to describe the communicative relationships 
among them’ (1992:37). To admit to the shifts in the public sphere in the age of 
nationalism’s decline as much as the rise of multi-media, mass-immigration and 
consumerism, the public sphere should be conceived as ‘involving a field of 
discursive interactions’, where there are admitted various clusters of 
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communication2. These clusters may be microcosms of the whole (like major 
cities generating their own public discourse within countries); or they may 
revolve around persons, issues, categories or basic dynamics of society as a 
whole. We therefore need to know how, within these clusters, how focus is 
maintained, how they are internally organised, how they manage their 
boundaries as well as their internal cohesion in relation to the whole – perhaps 
as an articulation of sectional interests, a functional division of labour or a stand 
against the hegemony of a dominant ideology? For Calhoun, this trajectory of 
questioning will alert us to the significance of ‘a more pluralistic, open approach 
to conceptualising the public sphere but also to a need for analysis of its internal 
organisation, something almost completely neglected in Structural 
Transformation’ (1992:38).  
Calhoun is therefore of the position that the normative public sphere may indeed 
be revived if it can be conceptualized with reference to the distinct socio-
economic conditions of advanced capitalist societies in present-day (not the 
requirements of the ‘bourgeoisie’). He identifies four dimensions of social life 
being ‘remarkably absent’ in Habermas’s public sphere theory: culture, identity, 
religion, and the ‘social movement’. In extending the construct of the public 
sphere to a non-European society such as Nigeria, these ‘missing’ concepts are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  See	  also	  Eriksen	  who	  highlights	  the	  complexity	  involved	  in	  “global	  conversations	  among	  citizens”	  in	  the	  21st	  century	  public	  sphere.	  Where	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  was	  linked	  to	  the	  nation	  state,	  national	  identities,	  democratic	  values,	  communities	  of	  languages,	  and	  civil	  societies,	  what	  then	  becomes	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  in	  these	  times	  of	  transnational	  mobility,	  cross-­‐border	  communications,	  porous	  boundaries,	  and	  destablised	  national	  identities?	  (2014:	  64-­‐77)	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even of greater significance in a formulation of a concept of a public sphere. The 
role of ethnic diversity within culture is, as Calhoun indicates, significant.  
Nancy Fraser and multiple public spheres  
Our next key interlocutor, Nancy Fraser, approaches Habermas’ theory of the 
public sphere with another distinct set of concerns. Before contributing to 
Calhoun’s edited volume Habermas and the Public Sphere, she addressed the 
issue of gender in ‘What’s Critical about Critical Theory? The case of Habermas 
and Gender’ (1985). This essay was the genesis of her critique of Habermas’ 
public sphere and its relationship to democratic culture as was subsequently 
stated in Calhoun’s edited volume. On the one hand, Fraser appreciates 
Habermas’ ‘inter-institutional’ account of the private sphere (modern, restricted 
or nuclear family) in relation to the modern economy and its divisions of labour 
(and consequent spaces of political participation, public debate and opinion 
formation) along with the relation of them both to State administration. However, 
she criticises Habermas on four major accounts: firstly, Habermas’ 
conceptualisation of the public sphere is generated exclusively through an 
understanding of capitalist labour, (the workplace and the adult male and head 
of the nuclear family); second: the publicly active agent of the citizen-speaker is 
gendered male, and that is presupposed and affirmed by both state and 
economy; third: the ‘citizen-speaker’ is positioned within the economy as ‘bread-
winner’ in such a way that determined a woman’s dependency; and fourth: the 
female child-bearer connects all institutions that are structurally necessary for 
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Habermas’ theory (1985:111-7).  
For Fraser, gender is articulated as a social condition in all areas of life, and for 
her the structural weakness in Habermas’ account is his understanding of the 
gender dynamics endemic to a posited symbiotic relation of private and public 
spheres (1985:117). She contends that male dominance is intrinsic rather than 
accidental to classical capitalism, and thus where Habermas promotes a fully 
‘critical’ account of his dimension of capitalism’s history, then gender-sensitive 
categories are required (Fraser, 1985:117). Fraser describes Habermas’ neglect 
of gender in his critical theory as a ‘serious deficiency’ (1985:98). 
Fraser’s essay ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to Actually Existing 
Democracy’ (1990), remains centrally concerned on how the ‘theory’ of the 
public sphere can so easily become detached from its object, or the social and 
historical conditions of its operation. Her contention is that for theory to be 
‘critical’ then it needs to offer us empirical insight into today’s democratic 
practices and not just those of history. On this basis Fraser interrogates the 
‘institutional’ criteria guiding the formation of a public sphere theory in 
Habermas’s work – these appear as four basic ‘assumptions’:  (i) it is possible to 
bracket status differentials and deliberate ‘as if’ participants in the public sphere 
were equals; (ii) the proliferation of a multiplicity of competing publics is 
necessarily a step away from, rather than toward, greater democracy; (iii) the 
public sphere should be restricted to common goods, and ‘private’ matters are 
undesirable; (iii) a sharp separation between civil society and the State is 
required for a functioning democratic public sphere (Fraser, 1990: 62-3).  
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It is against these ‘assumptions’ that Fraser argues, focusing particularly on how 
it is possible to bracket status differentials among members of the bourgeois 
public sphere, and to deliberate as if they were equals. She states that, 
historically, the claim to full accessibility was never fully realised. Women of all 
classes and ethnicity, plebeian men (who did not meet property ownership 
qualifications), women and men of racialised ethnicities were excluded from 
participation in the public sphere (1990:62). This realisation drew Fraser to 
further investigate the social character of interactions within the formal public 
sphere – did included participants really interact as though they were equals? 
Were social inequalities effectively bracketed? Fraser was referring to the 
‘informal impediments to participatory parity that can persist even after everyone 
is formally or legally licensed to participate’ (1990:63).  
Fraser observes that discursive interactions within the formal public sphere were 
governed by protocols of ‘style’ and ‘decorum’, which were in themselves 
markers of status inequality. Also, the language people used to reason would 
favour particular ways of seeing things over others (1990:64). She argued that if 
we took those considerations seriously, we should challenge whether there is 
the possibility for interlocutors to deliberate ‘as equals’, or if so, what can this 
mean for a critical theory of the public sphere, and more so when discursive 
behaviours are deeply inscribed in structural relations of social dominance and 
subordination (1990:5). On this count, Fraser submits that the bourgeois 
conception of the public sphere is ‘inadequate’ as long as it supposes that social 
equality is not a necessity for participatory parity in public spheres. She 
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recommends that a critical theory approach renders explicit and makes visible 
the discursive ways in in which gender inequality is a structural feature of the 
public sphere, and maintains an impact on discursive interaction (1990:65).  
Fraser’s second ‘assumption’ concerns the putative proliferation of a multiplicity 
of competing publics. Social systems that tolerate contestation among different 
competing groups do more to promote the ideal of participatory parity, whether 
in the context of stratified or egalitarian societies. For it is impossible to protect 
the public realm from social inequality, particularly where there exists a single, 
comprehensive public sphere (1990:66). As a constitutive part of the promoting 
of a single public sphere, subordinated groups require an arena for deliberation 
among themselves. Through this they develop the means to articulate and 
defend their interest through the single comprehensive public sphere (1990:66). 
Fraser does not imply that smaller ‘publics’ are necessarily virtuous or 
democratic, but they can play a role in response to the inevitable exclusions 
from the dominant public realm that take place, thereby assisting in expanding 
its discursive space (1990:67). 
The concept of a ‘subaltern public(s)’ is an important neologism within Fraser’s 
theoretical understanding of the public sphere (1990). A subaltern public 
represents members of subordinate social groups who form alternative 
discursive spaces in effective contestation of their dominant counterparts. 
‘Women, workers, peoples of colour, and gays and lesbians…’ fall within this 
group (Fraser, 1990:67). Fraser proposes to refer to these groups as ‘subaltern 
counterpublics’, in that they form equally discursive arenas, which in turn permits 
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them to establish and spread counter-discourses and ‘formulate oppositional 
interpretations of their identities, interests and needs’ (1990:67). In defending 
subaltern counterpublics 3  consolidated under conditions of dominance and 
subordination, Fraser argues that she is defending the integration of social 
equality, cultural diversity and participatory democracy (1990:70). Public life 
needs a form of critical political sociology that comprehends the complexity of 
public participation, of both multiple and unequal publics. This involves 
acknowledging the nature of the interaction between different discursive spheres, 
identifying the social mechanisms that renders some to subordinate others.  
Fraser’s third ‘assumption’ is that the public sphere should be restricted to 
issues of the ‘common good’. In Habermas’ narrative, private matters were not 
in themselves able to generate or contribute to public discourse in any period. 
Against this assumption, Fraser contends that public discourse can vary – from 
State-related issues, issues of concern to everyone, matters pertaining to a 
common good or shared interests – and each of these corresponds to a 
contrasting sense of privacy (1990:71). The concepts of ‘public’ and ‘private’ are 
not, she indicates, self-evident empirical designations within society; they are 
forms of cultural classification. They are linguistic terms that could be used to 
render some interests, views and topics, non-bona fide within political discourse 
per se. The crux of her argument is that a crucial range of social issues are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  See	  Michael	  Warner	  (2005)	  in	  his	  book	  publication,	  Publics	  and	  Counterpublics,	  which	  expands	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  publics	  (as	  opposed	  to	  one	  public)	  and	  counterpublics,	  and	  proposes	  a	  methodology	  on	  how	  they	  may	  be	  analysed.	  The	  book	  is	  a	  compilation	  of	  essays.	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effectively contained within the discourse of the ‘private’, excluding them from 
general public debate and contestation and in turn empowering the discourse of 
the dominant (Fraser, 1990:73). 
The last of the “assumptions” identified by Fraser concerns the sharp separation 
between civil society and the State, and the apparent requirement of this 
separation for a functioning democratic public sphere. This assumption, for 
Fraser, can be understood in two possible ways, both contingent on how one 
defines civil society. According to Fraser, if civil society here represents the 
privately ordered capitalist economy, then to require its separation from the 
State is a de facto defense of classical liberalism, resulting in an economically 
ordered disparity in wealth and resources along with its social consequences. If 
civil society, rather, refers to the core of non-governmental or secondary 
associations that are neither administrative nor economic but still play a central 
role in the management of the social realm, then the civil can (in its social 
variety) find means of complementarity with the various permutations of the 
public (like counterpublics) (1990:74).  
In conclusion, for Fraser, public sphere theory has a critical-political function, 
and needs to at once expose how social inequality is a structural feature of the 
public sphere, but also provides the terms by which we can investigate the role 
of representation, the marginalization of minorities, the selective use of certain 
forms of expression and communication (protocols of style and decorum, 
terminologies and so on), and the censorship of others. The suppression of the 
‘private’, and the lack of understanding of its critical role in constituting the public, 
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is a significant observation for Fraser also notes the ‘weak’ character of public 
spheres in late capitalist societies, and how this weakness allows the state to 
strip public opinion of its political efficacy (1990:77). Fraser supports the 
deliberate founding and cultivating of a multiplicity of public spheres, as opposed 
to Habermas’ historically evolving, state-directed, single and comprehensive 
public sphere. She is also attentive to the boundaries of the public sphere – 
where actors and agencies on or around the boundaries (counterpublics) can 
have some measure of determining effect on the dominant ‘sphere’ or spheres. 
(See also, Fraser et al, 20144) 
Douglas Kellner and ‘third generation’ critical theory 
Our final interlocutor is Douglas Kellner, who again attempts to extend the 
concept of the public sphere through a critique of Habermas’s original theory. In 
his article, ‘Habermas, the Public Sphere and Democracy – A Critical 
Intervention’ (2000), Kellner introduces technology as a central issue for public 
sphere theory, drawing on the work evidenced in his previous publications, 
Television and the Crisis of Democracy (1990), Intellectuals, the New Public 
Spheres and Techno-politics (1997), and ‘New Technologies and Alienation’ 
(2003). Below I will be extrapolating his main observations from these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  In	  more	  recent	  essays,	  Fraser	  (2014:	  8-­‐42)	  has	  contributed	  further	  to	  debates	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  public	  sphere	  in	  ‘transnationalising	  the	  public	  sphere.’	  Here,	  she	  presents	  a	  critical	  discussion	  on	  how	  the	  public	  sphere	  may	  be	  extended	  to	  accommodate	  existing	  globalizing	  realities,	  where	  transnational	  flows	  of	  people	  and	  information	  renders	  the	  nation-­‐state	  frame	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  problematic.	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representative texts.  
In the above cited article, Kellner reminds us that the main organs of information 
and political debate in Habermas’ bourgeois public sphere were newspapers, 
journals, institutions of political discussion like political clubs, literary salons, 
public assemblies, pubs and coffee houses, meeting halls, and other public 
spaces (Kellner, 2000). What Habermas called the bourgeois public sphere 
comprised social spaces, which provided for solidarity against ‘oppressive forms 
of social and public power.’ (Kellner, 2000). In other words, social solidarity 
required material conditions and the occupation of delimited ‘spaces’. With the 
decline of the bourgeois public sphere, Kellner reiterates Habermas’ 
observations on the ‘refeudalisation’ of the public realm: it will be useful to 
recapitulate the main tenets of ‘refeudalisation’ here, for it is from Kellner that we 
will define the trajectory of our investigation.  
• The social spaces (noted above), used by citizens for interaction and 
debate, gradually became commercialized and were dominated by the 
symbolic meanings and values of commerce. Private interests (in 
business and industry) extended their reach as providers of the social 
infrastructure of everyday life (living, working, shopping, socializing) so 
that they began assuming a direct political function (particularly, for 
example, assuming management control of the once-state owned media, 
forming its content as well as its processes of industrialisation). 
• The function of media shifted from its basis in public education, 
information and debate, to entertainment and advertising: media’s social 
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role was thus transformed from the facilitation of rational-critical debate to 
a market-orientated content that cohered with the interests of media 
corporations. 
• The State did not wither against private ownership and growing corporate 
power: rather the state formed alliances with corporate power, and 
became heavily invested in its regulation and shared mechanism of 
growth. The state thus also assumed a more fundamental role in the 
private realm and everyday life through the progressive requirements of 
the welfare state and increase in rights (eroding the difference between 
the private and public sphere).  
• Where corporate industry becomes the state’s main interlocutor on 
matters of regulation, law and management of public assets, the public 
sphere declines. Citizens become increasingly invested in increasing their 
own private interests through consumption, not political deliberation or 
furthering the cause of political agendas. As ‘passive’ consumers, a social 
trend towards largely private pursuits (acquisition; career advancement) 
and not matters of the common good or public interest, becomes a 
defining feature of modern society.  
• ‘Public opinion’ is no longer formed by political debate and consensus in 
the bourgeois public sphere; rather, the attitudes, judgments and 
aspirations of citizens are defined in a multitude of other ways – notably 
in ways administered by political, economic and media elites. 
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Kellner’s revision of Habermas’ public sphere theory is in part motivated by his 
understanding of the potential for revitalising the public sphere in response to 
‘refeudalisation’: for Kellner, while Habermas’ proposals on revitalisation are 
valid, ‘he did not provide concrete examples, propose any strategies, nor sketch 
out the features of an oppositional or post-bourgeois public sphere’ Kellner 
(2000). Although Kellner concurs with other critics in pointing out how Habermas 
idealises the bourgeois public sphere (portraying it as a wholly coherent, 
cohesive and democratic sphere of dialogue and transparent opinion-formation), 
he maintains the credibility of a single dominant sphere of power and interests, 
where the dominant issue is the collective power of citizens against the 
monolithic entity of the state. At the same time, Kellner believes that ‘it is a 
mistake to overly idealise and universalise any specific public sphere as in 
Habermas’ account’ (Kellner, 2000). A multiplicity of public spheres is a 
democratic necessity, without denying that they will overlap or even conflict.  
To Kellner, Habermas’ account highlights the central function of the media in 
modern everyday life and politics, and moreover, his account of the 
degeneration of the public sphere articulates the ways in which corporate 
interests have ‘colonised’ the public sphere, employing media and culture in 
reconstituting a realm of private interests in the places and spaces that public 
interests once inhabited. He expands on this in Television and the Crisis of 
Democracy (1990). In its preface, Kellner charged the media, and television in 
particular, with failing to fulfill obligations to democracy, despite possessing a 
profound facility for doing so. The media effectively became the Trojan horse by 
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which ‘excessive corporate power’ has occupied and even coopted the public 
realm (Kellner, 1990: xiii). 
Kellner further posits that the crisis of the public sphere (and democracy) is 
more critical (writing in the USA) than it was in Germany in 1962 on the 
publication of Habermas’ seminal text. The giant media corporations that have 
emerged since the 1960s, control huge segments of the information and 
entertainment market, regulating the content and flow of public issues (Kellner, 
1990:180); they are ‘organised for the hegemony of capital in an era of 
conservative political rule’ (Kellner, 1990: 222). Given this situation, the prospect 
for a revived sense of public and democratic life can only but be wrought 
through the use of media, with new emerging technologies (or conversely, more 
local, community or civil cooption of existing technologies) to counter the 
hegemonic occupation of all forms of pan-social communication (1990:222). In 
Kellner’s words, ‘the struggle for democratic communications system is a 
struggle for democratic society’ (1990:222).  
Given the ubiquity and evident usefulness of media, Kellner voices his 
frustration that Habermas ‘does not adequately theorise the nature and social 
functions of contemporary media of communication and information’ (Kellner, 
2000). Media is conceptualised in Habermas simplistically as a mechanism for 
mere transmission of messages. One inhibitor of a socially nuanced 
understanding of media is Habermas’ categorical distinctions between a private 
and public sphere (Kellner, 2000:online), where ‘Habermas downplays 
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broadcasting and other communication media, the internet and new spheres of 
public debate… in part because… the categorical distinctions in his theory 
denigrate these domains…’ (2000:online). These ‘blind spots and conceptual 
limitations’ undermine Habermas’ discussions on democracy and his obvious 
decision to foster democratisation himself (Kellner, 2000). In Western 
democracies (which have, for good or ill, provided the world with dominant 
models of government) the media, state and economy have become utterly 
intertwined, and Habermas’ public sphere theory does not have the facility to 
acknowledge this. However, it is practice and not theory that is providing new 
conceptualisations of the conditions of democracy, for ‘oppositional’ broadcast 
media and new media technologies, like the Internet, are serving as new spaces 
for ‘participatory democratic communication politics’ (2000).  
On the Internet as a potential public sphere, Kellner’s framework begins to 
exhibit a certain tension: historically, he admits that state control of media 
reduced its critical-public facility, yet in an age of increasing commercial 
colonisation there are nevertheless appearing greater freedoms for oppositional 
voices and resistance. This, in part of course, has been guaranteed by new 
technologies, whose social function is still in formation, to the extent to which 
Kellner can boldly proclaim that the Internet ‘expands the realm for democratic 
participation and debates’ (Kellner, 2000). Without assuming that the internet will 
too become swiftly colonised by forces of corporate capital, Kellner maps out 
some potential practical strategies for reviving a new public sphere, specifically 
that (i) it is a matter of political urgency that citizens develop skills for the use of 
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new media and computer technologies specifically for public purposes; and (ii) 
from that to develop education and disseminate both the motivation and skills 
that would foster the mediation of a multiplicity of voices as a future ‘cyber 
democracy’. 
Howard Rheingold (2012:241) claims to have confronted Habermas on the 
matter of media technology. He recounts the interchange: ‘I took the occasion to 
ask him publicly what he thought about his public sphere theory and its 
subversion by powerful interests, now that the power to broadcast and debate is 
in the hands of millions. He ducked the question. I blogged about it [cf. 
Rheingold, 2012:241] ‘Habermas blows off question about the Internet and the 
public sphere’] and concluded that we need new thinking about this important 
aspect of our media practice – one that is anchored in but not chained to 
Habermasian theory’. This has been Kellner’s view for many years: he stated 
‘…an expanded public sphere and new challenges and threats to democracy 
render Habermas’ work an indispensable component of a new critical theory that 
must, however, go beyond his positions in crucial ways’ (emphasis mine) (2000). 
Since the 1970s Kellner’s work has been growing in conviction that the effective 
use of technology is essential in contemporary political activism and the public 
realm (1997:5). He became interested in, and published extensively on, 
education theory and practice in part spurred by the observation that while new 
and extensive flows of information, debate, and participation are emerging 
through new media capabilities, writers, scholars and intellectuals are not 
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availing themselves of its potential. The arrival of what he called ‘cyberspace 
democracy’ required a new approach to pedagogy as much as the learning of 
new technical skills in media technology (Kellner, 1997:5).  
In his an important article, ‘New Technologies and Alienation – some critical 
reflections’ (N.D: 1), Kellner attempted to formulate a critical theory of 
technology, which, as indicated above, he thinks is the missing component of 
Habermas’ public sphere theory. He begins by rejecting what he regards as the 
two dominant positions on technology in critical theory – technophillia and 
technophobia. ‘Technophillic’ discourse celebrates technology as ‘our salvation’ 
and problem-solving (N.D: 1); for ‘technophobic’ discourse technology is an 
interminable threat, and symptomatic of major problems facing human beings in 
the modern age. Kellner’s nascent critical theory of technology will ostensibly 
sort technology’s ‘positive and negative features, the upside and downside, 
benefits and losses, as well as contradictions and ambiguities’ (N.D.: 5). His 
purpose is to articulate the potential of specific technologies; develop a 
substantive vision of the role of technologies in human life; project ways that 
technologies can serve human self-development, democratic values, and the 
creation of more cooperative and ecologically viable social organisations; and to 
use technology for a strategic critique of oppressive and authoritarian social 
behaviours. It seems that Kellner’s technology plays a similar role to the printed 
word in Habermas’ bourgeois public sphere. 
Yet, where for many the printed press and other forms of reproduction used 
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within the bourgeois public sphere were relatively benign, Kellner admits that 
technology is susceptible to problematic limitations, built-in interests and 
predisposition to specific uses. This does not mean that technology facilitates an 
‘alienation’ from ‘real life’ (a train of thought in both historical critical theory and 
post-Heideggerian existential phenomenology). For the user cannot be 
‘alienated’ from their own body or corporeal experience, when hands, eyes and 
other body senses are very much a part of the computer-mediated activity 
(Kellner, N.D.: 10). Given the active involvement of the subject, aesthetically as 
well as cognitively, in digital media, Kellner does not accept arguments that 
suggest technology supplants basic human functions and thus is anti-human.  
Overall, Kellner’s aim is to re-define the new world of computers and other 
digital communication devices as democratising tools, which may (then) 
currently be defined (by industry and market) in industrial or purely instrumental 
terms, and yet they are much more than that. They have intrinsic capabilities 
that can empower individuals and groups that are otherwise oppressed, and 
promote values such as democracy, justice and equality (N.D. 12). The public 
sphere was never one immutable realm of social activity, and of late has 
mutated into several overlapping spheres of dialogue and participatory debate. 
Through the Internet, people become producers as well as consumers of culture, 
and the revitalisation of democracies ‘that have been dangerously atrophying in 
an era of spectacle politics’ becomes possible (12-3). Democratic participation, 
debate and voting are important elements of democratic culture, and while in the 
big media age (of conglomerates) most people were excluded from political 
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discussions due to the limitations of broadcast technologies, the Internet has 
opened up the channel to a multiplicity of voices. Access to the public sphere is 
facilitated by information and communication technologies, generating new 
conditions for solidarity, collective interests, and new arenas for the 
development of participation (Kellner, N.D.: 13). New media technologies may 
not immediately function in terms of a public sphere, but they are generating 
conditions and frameworks that can become central to a more democratic future 
public sphere.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have presented the thoughts of our selected central 
interlocutors of Habermas on his public sphere theory. Where Calhoun’s 
concerns are articulated in the manner with which he tackles Habermas’ 
articulation of national identity, religion, and social movements, Nancy Fraser 
exemplifies a series of feminist concerns with gender identity and the domestic 
realm. She highlights the silence of women’s voices in the bourgeois public 
sphere, and that of plebian men. The perceived lack in the theoretical 
adjudication of gender by Habermas’ in his Structural Transformation of the 
Public Sphere, for Fraser, is its ‘structural weakness’. Kellner, however, 
introduces us to the technological dimension of the public sphere and the 
structural shifts in public communications. He extends Habermas’ public sphere 
conception to accommodate the potentialities of digital media, where corporate 
interests have colonised what is left of the traditional public sphere as 
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maintained in the 20th Century by mass media. Kellner calls for a critical theory 
of technology as the core of a relevant public sphere theory: this thesis attempt 
to work towards that end.    
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Section One: Chapter Three 
Towards a Digital Public Sphere 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I will provide an empirical basis to our subsequent references to 
new digital media, extending Kellner’s observations into the present day. From 
Kellner I take the fundamental observation that fundamental to the change in the 
public sphere is the change wrought by new media technologies, which in turn 
are generating new possibilities for the formation of democracy. These 
possibilities fundamentally involve (i) participation and forms of social interaction 
among otherwise unconnected social subjects or citizens; and (ii) new modes of 
articulation and expression of the experience of authority and so critical 
opposition to corporate or state domination of the economy.  
 
For Kellner, digital media is both a simple and complex concept, and for that 
reason it is easier described than defined. It simply denotes the use of new 
communication technologies as a supplement to older forms of media (television, 
film, telephone, printed matter, and so on). However, in the present, this ‘use’ is 
manifold and has generated many new devices, (like smart phones) adapted to 
specific functions and combining others. Digital Media has emerged as a field of 
study for social science researchers, in part as digital media was never merely 
technology but also culture, consumption and lifestyle. We therefore have cause 
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to benefit from Kellner’s basic claims, while recontextualising our analysis in a 
more contemporary media landscape. Digital media is now ubiquitous, much 
more so than TV, which dominated the social realm when Kellner first began 
writing on the public sphere in the 1980s. Digital media is now internal to the 
function of industry, education and social institutions, and not necessarily 
dominated by entertainment in many realms.  
 
The Emergence of New Digital Media 
The term digital may be clarified in relation to its antonym, analogue, which was 
once the standard conventional means of electronic transmission and has now 
been widely replaced. Analogue can be described as the real world (as opposed 
to the virtual world) outside computers – the transmission of continuous signal 
by means of media that retain its essential character. Digital on the other hand 
breaks down the signal, transports it in coded form, and then reconstitutes that 
signal in whatever way required. Digital signal and the information it carries is 
neither as dense nor does it have the 'real life' empirical qualities of analogue. 
However, the digital means of electronic transmission is more useful in that it 
can be condensed, manipulated, converted to other forms, and channeled into 
multiple networks and other media (Feldman 1997).  
 
It is thus safe to deduce in simple terms that digital media is any channel of 
communication that carries digital signals: however, by virtue of the transmission 
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and permeability of the content of digital signals, the term digital media is more 
than a mechanism or conduit for signals. And with the expansive nature of digital 
media is its expansive impact and multiplicity of effects on social, economic and 
political regimes of communication. In media studies, the term ‘digital media’ has 
assumed different nomenclatures and meanings over time; for example, a 
mobile phone is often defined as a device or tool (in terms of its tangible ‘hand 
set’ object-hood), yet can also be defined in terms of its networked function as 
‘mobile media’ (Feldmann, 2005); while a (digital) space on the web or its social 
media networks (Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, and YouTube), weblogs 
(wordpress, blogger), are not defined as devices or tools, but in terms of space 
and applications, and were often  referred to as the ‘virtual sphere’ (Papacharissi, 
2002).  
 
The ‘convergence’ of media content on new and multiple media platforms is one 
of the developments in information and communication technology that makes 
digital media a complex term to define theoretically. Convergence here refers to 
the flow of (digital) content over varied platforms, the synergy among multiple 
media industries and the audiences’ readiness to migrate across the platforms 
(Jenkins, 2006:2). To reiterate the earlier point about digital media being more 
than a technology but a culture, Jenkins (2006:3) argues that the convergence 
of old and new media, which depended largely on an active-participatory 
audience, should not be perceived strictly as a technological process only; 
rather, it should be understood in terms of a ‘cultural shift’ (Jenkins 2006:3). This 
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is because, unlike with old media, the behaviour of the consumer or audience is 
internal to the technological function of the media – they way they actively seek 
out information and establish links between broad categories of content in 
diverse locations. A key aspect in which digital media is differentiated from 
traditional media is in interactivity – that is, the power users have to engage and 
involve one another (Pavlik and McIntosh, 2011:190). The very technology (both 
hardware and software since the 1980s) has been developed in and through 
extensive research and knowledge of consumer or audience behaviours and 
requirements. One cannot discuss digital media without the subjects that use the 
media, epistemically as well as ontologically. 
 
On that note, digital media can be defined in terms of technology hardware 
(devices and tools), software, user-behaviour and branded products. Hardware 
refers to the tangible parts of digital technology, where examples are mobile 
phones, tablet devices, video game consoles, digital billboards, and so on. 
Software on the other hand is the applications, programmes, and the web in 
digital hardware devices, which users employ in communication processes, and 
often supplementary or ancillary to the central function of the hardware device 
(as the many available ‘apps’ are to the functioning of a handheld telephone or 
‘mobile’). We must also not forget that digital media inhabits the consumer 
landscape as products – digital media is usually heavily branded, where even 
websites, blogs, social network Sites (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Pinterest, 
and Instagram) are interconnected with other products and packages.  
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This thesis has moved beyond a fascination with the ‘new’ forms of media and 
its manifestations. Yet it will attempt to innovate an approach to digital media 
that retains the ‘cultural’ dimension of the media (its intrinsic role in the everyday 
life of the consumer, and as innovative branded technology it’s stimulus to 
creative activity). Given our subject of the public sphere, it also involves its 
socio-political function and impact. Digital media, as interactive communication, 
is intrinsically shaped by certain characteristics that have been routinely 
associated with ‘democratic’ behaviour – for example, participation, 
interconnection with sources of information, consistent commentary on daily 
issues and current affairs, capability for many-to-many interaction among users, 
free access void of immediate discrimination, and so on. ‘Theories of democracy 
designate political conversations as essential to democratically organized 
societies’ (Stromer-Galley & Wichowski, 2011:168). It is through such 
conversations that citizens are able to clarify their personal views, access the 
opinions of others and discover common problems in society. Digital media 
makes this conversation possible by its features of interactivity, ability to bridge 
the distance among citizens and freedom to speak freely (Stromer-Galley & 
Wichowski, 2011:170-2). On the face of it, digital media seems to enhance the 
basic skills of democratic systems of political life. Our task right here is to 
consider how such assumptions map onto empirical situations relevant to our 
investigation. 
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From about year 2000, participation, user-empowerment, ‘people coming 
together’, increasingly became key themes shaping debates in digital media. 
Participation, a term that concerned Habermas’ early work in the early 1960s, is 
central to digital media theory and emerges in various forms, from consumer’s 
participation on digital media platforms in entertainment (see Jenkins, 2006), to 
elections and politics (see Fox and Ramos, 2012), civic engagement, social 
movements and activism (see Walch, 1999; Earl & Kimport, 2011) etc. American 
journalist Clay Shirky is one of the prominent proponents of digital media 
fostering participation and serving as a people-empowerment tool. In his popular 
book, Here comes Everybody (2008), he considers the astonishing ease with 
which people come together to take group action that defies corporate or state 
powers and to argue that people can indeed ‘transform their world’, socially and 
politically, through ‘everyday’ behaviours. In the marketing copy on the recto 
side of the first edition of his book, it stated: ‘the revolution will not be televised – 
it will be emailed, texted, blogged, wikied…’ (Shirky, 2008). Similarly, Tim Gee 
following the Arab Spring (celebrated for its groundbreaking use of social 
networks), recognized that ‘revolution is on the tip of every tongue’, and decided 
to study how campaigns as ‘counterpower’ may be more effective – as 'a 
revolution is the result of a series of successful campaigns’ (2011:10). Gee 
defined a ‘revolution’ as the simple transition of power from one elite to another. 
In his opinion, counterpower does not need to be violent to be effective 
(2011:13).  
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In Zimbabwe, Last (2011:745) examined the use of blogs in mediating the 
experiences of citizens during a violent election. With particular reference to 
citizen journalism, he proposed that digitization has generated new ‘counter-
hegemonic spaces’, where public debate itself has now gained a new powerful 
resistance function. Harlow (2011) found that the social network site Facebook 
was used to form an online political protest that then moved offline, visibly 
articulating in the public realm a highly contentious posthumous video where a 
lawyer, Rodrigo Rosenberg, accused Guatemalan President, Alvaro Colon, of 
murdering him (Harlow, 2011:225). 
 
In the recent past it was perhaps all too easy to become excited about the 
potential for digital media to stimulate or replace actual forms of social or 
political change. Morozov (2011) declared that the ‘counter hegemonic’ power of 
digital media is a ‘delusion’. He continued, that ‘to salvage Internet’s promise to 
aid and fight against authoritarianism, those of us in the West who still care 
about the future of democracy will need to ditch both cyber-utopianism and 
Internet-centrism…’ (Morozov, 2011). He argued that the rhetoric of internet 
revolution operates on a flawed set of assumptions, unstable methodology, 
generating a widespread ‘Net Delusion’ even among academics and 
intellectuals. Rather, for Morozov, we need a realistic assessment of the risks 
and dangers the Internet poses, equally matched with an assessment of local 
context (where change can only happen) (Morozov, 2011:xviii). Succinctly put, 
Morozov is calling for an end to cyber-utopianism, to be replaced with cyber-
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realism.  
 
Without doubt, digital media enhances certain powers of communication and 
interconnection, publicity and the dissemination of information and opinion; and 
yet it also has ushered in new restrictions, some of which take the form of 
unrealistic expectations – or a degrading of actual political skills where political 
activity is shifted to Internet platforms, for example. Communication, 
participation, empowerment and freedom, are surely characteristics of many 
forms of digital media, and yet we need to reconsider this within the stringent 
demands of a public sphere. Fenton (2012:160) raises an important point when 
she states that ‘democracy means different things to different people in different 
places’; and so in considering how Africa has adopted digital media technologies, 
behaviours and language, will critical African commentators say ‘we are falling 
prey once more to a thoroughly westernized interpretation of theory and politics?’ 
(Fenton, 2012: 160). Digital media, she observes, may offer easy tools for 
participatory or even direct democracy, allowing even ‘radical, oppositional and 
progressive social and political imaginaries to emerge’ (Fenton, 2012: 160). Yet, 
we cannot neglect the material and social-institutional conditions of actual 
politics – where digitally mediated political behaviours must be reconciled with 
the complex task of addressing the ‘highly coordinated, deftly administered and 
systematic limitations of the structures of capitalism’ (Fenton, 2012:170).  
 
Lincoln Dahlberg was an early scholar of digital media, where in his 2001 article, 
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‘The Habermasian Public Sphere encounters Cyberreality’, he was far more 
sceptical in stating that cyberspace (a term now anachronistic in denoting the 
realm of digital media) is useless to the conception of a public sphere. Perhaps 
on account of the rudimentary form in which digital media still appeared (where 
in 2001, the World Wide Web was the dominant and often exclusive sphere of 
digital communication for most people), he expressed hesitation in defining too 
closely the ways in which the internet altered the very form of social interaction, 
and how in time this must be taken into account by theory (2001:83). Yet Boeder 
(1995), in his even earlier study of the public sphere, asserted that the future of 
‘Habermas’ coffeehouse discourse’ was in the digital networks of the new 
‘network society’ (a term routinely ascribed to Manuel Castells). He observed 
that the public sphere was always ‘virtual’ in the sense that as an entire entity 
the concept of ‘public sphere’ is, ‘abstract in meaning’ (1995: no pagination). 
Where more powerful power structures indeed exist, digital media offers a new 
capacity for instigating change. Digital public spheres make provision for a 
multiplicity in the communicative dimensions of a public sphere, and in Fraser’s 
view, significant counter-public formations. For Calhoun, new social movements 
could be facilitated, while perhaps contrary to Habermas’ bourgeois ideal of a 
coherent singular process of deliberation, the multiplicity could address so many 
different levels and layers of social and economic experience. In a slightly later 
article, Buchstein (1997), with some foresight, set down the potentialities of a 
digitally enhanced public sphere, which I adapt here:  
• Resistance against authoritarianism  
• Easy access – digital media, despite its heavily branded and commodified 
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operation in the marketplace, is a relatively inexpensive opportunity to 
generate content and communication (i.e. as compared to the spectrum of 
old media, such as TV, radio or print media).  
• A critical public sphere – Individually initiated interaction through digital 
media subverts the traditional power structures embedded in old media by 
enhancing citizens' independence from large organisations, government 
agencies and big business. Digital media offers a realm of communications 
not dominated by ‘spin doctors’, advertising executives, and public 
relations managers  
• Universal access – digital media to some degree redefines citizenship, in 
the sense that it is a medium in which people can communicate directly, 
quickly and reliably, and can further form distant, but diverse and cohesive 
political communities not bound by the nation state.  
 
While acknowledging these characteristics, scholars continued to argue against 
viewing digital media as providing for a fully functioning public sphere. To Dean 
(in 2003), the notion of public sphere is damaged when applied to democracy. 
For the ‘techno-culture’ of late capitalism subjects actual change and 
development to a regime of information, generating a ‘communicative capitalism’ 
not amenable to democracy (Dean, 2003). Poster (2004) similarly observes that 
forces like the Internet serve to decentralise communication, and therefore ‘the 
networked future might be different from what we have known’; for the internet is 
an entirely new medium and its effects on democracy cannot be predicted via 
historical precedent (Poster, 2004:online).  
As Bohman (2004) puts it, the Internet becomes a public sphere only through 
agents who engage in reflexive and democratic activity, otherwise, it would 
become a mere aggregate of users operating on an endlessly variable and 
expansive realm of communications. For a public sphere, it would require 
subjects ‘whose interactions exhibit features of dialogue and are concerned with 
its publicity’ (Bohman, 2004:140). Similarly, the more contemporary Rheingold 
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(2012:1) asserts that the future of digital media depends on how well we learn to 
use that media, for while digital media in itself does not offer the full conditions 
for a public sphere, it is ‘dangerously nihilistic’ to dismiss it as ‘irredeemably 
destructive’ (2012:2). Against Poster’s scepticism (above: Poster 2004:online) 
there is no reason to assume that digital literacy cannot be as powerful in 
forming an informed and active public as other print-based literacies have done 
in the past. (Rheingold, 2012:3).  
 
Culture, Technology and the Public Sphere 
We live in an online, interconnected world. The public sphere, 
that realm of political talk and action between the state and 
society, burst out of the marketplace and coffee house long ago, 
but in recent years even the pages of newspapers and the 
broadcast media have been superseded. Now the public sphere 
is virtual, digital, and dispersed across billions of desktops, 
laptops, mobile phones, and PDAs. As a result, the public 
sphere is not just a bourgeois indulgence but a global 
phenomenon. (Parkinson, 2012: 1) 
 
Digital media can be described as a range of cultural technologies. Communities 
of shared interests are built through the use of digital media tools, and in these 
spaces, cultures are generated. ‘Cyberspace offers a site of cultural production 
and expression…’ observes Bernal (2014: 171), and this is evident in how 
‘connections may be created, intensified, and expanded’ among users. As a 
cultural artefact, the adoption of digital media technologies is expectedly not 
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homogenous across societies, rather it is appropriated in different ways by 
diverse populations (Bernal, 2014: 173). That is, how digital media (and what 
type) is adopted in Nigeria, would differ from the experience in the UK, as each 
society’s culture is shaped by different factors and to varying degrees.  
 
New digital media functions in diverse ways – from the mobile device, social 
network sites (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram etc.), games consoles, 
blogs, tablets, emails, and more – the hardware to the software. Interactive 
websites and service providers like Facebook or YouTube all 'encourage users 
to generate content, share it with each other, and comment on what their fellow 
users produce' (Swigger, 2012:2, Cf. Caers1 et al (2013). In generating content 
and sharing with one another, users perform the following activities using digital 
media tools: 
• Send and receive emails (individually or through mailing lists) 
• Launch, read and comment on blogs 
• Instant message, chat (interact) – (Blackberry messenger, Yahoo chat 
room, Skype etc.) 
• Register profiles online and "follow" one another's updates online (on 
social networks, blogs, online games etc.) 
• Set-up, join and participate in online discussion forums – e.g. Nairaland. 
  
Digital media engenders a cultural dimension to mediated communication by 
virtue of a fundamental decentralization of the monopoly of the mass media, 
along with a personalization of the means of communication production, which in 
turn has made ‘everyone a media outlet’ (Shirky, 2008: 55). Individual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Caers	  et	  al	  (2013)	  in	  their	  paper	  ‘A	  Literature	  Review	  of	  Facebook,	  provide	  a	  detailed	  critical	  review	  of	  selected	  articles	  on	  the	  subject,	  between	  2006	  and	  2012	  
	   97	  
spontaneity, extemporisation, technical learning, and social interaction, is 
intrinsic to digital media. If the mass media was once regarded as the provider of 
official, collective, culture (usually on behalf of the nation state) digital media is a 
means of cultural translation, adaptation and distribution. Where publishing once 
required a printing press and a limited distribution of tangible goods, an Internet 
user ‘has access to a platform that is at once global and free’ (Shirky, 2008: 77), 
and every other user has (potential) access to them. The classical economic 
categories of production, distribution and consumption have become 
problematized, given how with digital media they can refer to different 
dimensions of the same process (of using a cell phone, sending content, and so 
on). However, it is important to note that while binaries between new digital 
media and old media are useful in deconstructing how they differ from one 
another, both are also becoming more integrated in what Henry Jenkins calls a 
‘convergence culture’.  
 
In his book, Convergence Culture - Where Old and New Media collide (2008), 
Jenkins opens with a story about a boy, Dino Ignacio. This Filipino-American 
student sparked ‘an international controversy’ from his bedroom when his 
‘photoshopped’ image of an American (fictional) character from the popular 
children’s TV show Sesame Street was combined with an image of terrorist 
mastermind Osama Bin Laden, attracting viewers in the Middle East, then 
captured by CNN news footage (Jenkins, 2008:1-2). Jenkins defines that event: 
‘welcome to the convergence culture, where grassroots and corporate media 
intersect, where the power of the media producer and the power of the media 
	   98	  
consumer interact in unpredictable ways’ (2008: 2). So widespread is the 
adoption of digital media tools globally, that Burgess & Green (2009: 36) 
suggest that YouTube has achieved ‘mainstream media’ status simply by virtue 
of its ‘reach’ (what would have been called ‘broadcasting’). This is the nature of 
convergence culture – it takes elements of old and new media, mashing it into a 
new cultural technology.   
 
Papacharissi (2010) extends the notion of ‘convergence’, arguing that even 
though convergence is used to refer to a ‘confluence of a variety of technologies’, 
it is not a character ‘exclusive to technology’, neither is it ‘characteristic of all 
technology’ (2010: 53) She adds that the convergence of information 
technologies are a manifest form of social, cultural, political, and economic 
convergences, which enable and are enabled by technological convergence’ 
Digital media spaces are sites of participatory culture. These participatory 
activities are embodied in the act of ‘coming together’, ‘sharing’, ‘following’, and 
general ‘interaction’ – all enabled by the architectures of digital media platforms. 
It is in this participation that the use of digital media promotes that the potential 
for a new digital public sphere is formed.  
 
The notion that the truly new potentialities of digital media (in the present) is due 
to a fundamental evolution of processes of convergence, provokes us to 
consider all the ways in which the major characteristics of digital media resonate 
with the major requirements of the public sphere. The formation of a public 
sphere was itself (technology, institutions and organisations, gatherings and 
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dialogues) a gradual process of convergence, where the ‘coming together’ of 
various entities and personages generated new potentials for meaning, power 
and agency. At its most basic level, digital media is a sphere of common social 
intercourse through publicly available media communications technologies, 
featuring discussions and interactions over matters of common interest. But 
does this necessarily entail that digital media involves a 'formation of a 
knowledgeable citizenry capable of taking sustained interest in the governing 
process' (Held, 1997)?  
 
Tufecki (2011), in an online essay, restated the observations of many, that the 
passive audience of traditional media – where the hierarchies of nation state 
social and economic organisation were reinforced – are barely visible in the 
realms of digital media. New digital media is not simply a range of 
communication channels, but is a social ‘environment’, with certain structural 
features, like a 'less hierarchical nature’. It therefore promotes a shift from a 
heavily stratified form of democracy to a participatory democracy, or at least 
more participatory forms of communication – 'decentering the very act of 
communicating' (Mudhai et al, 2009:3). For Fulya (2012: 490), new media are 
communication avenues that break away from the vertical and top-down 
structure of political activity to a situation where there is 'unlimited access to 
different voices and feedbacks between leaders and followers.' In the former 
situation, political decisions are made void of negotiation and input from the 
grassroots (Fulya, 2012: 490). Digital media, we could assume, engenders 
social convergence. 
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In the early stages of digital media research, McQuail (2000:152) had 
enumerated the following perceived benefits of the ‘Internet’ (benefits that 
directly related to the requirements of democratic polity): 
• Interactivity as opposed to one-way flow. 
• Co-presence of vertical and horizontal communication, promoting equality. 
• Disintermediation, meaning a reduced role for journalism to mediate the 
relationship between citizen and politicians. 
• Low costs for senders and receivers.  
• Speed greater than traditional media. 
• Absence of boundaries.  
 
In an online essay, Tufecki (2011), a faculty associate at the Harvard Berkman 
Centre for Internet & Society, stated that ‘the Internet can improve the structure 
of the public sphere by providing a liberal virtual platform for discourse.’ Using 
Facebook as an object study, she argues that Facebook cultivates a networked 
public sphere through facilitating public discussion. It enables a form of 
interaction that can ‘monitor mass-media’s power’; and it ‘allows individuals and 
groups of intense political engagement’ to play roles that intersect with matters 
of public interest. She does not express ‘naive optimism’ as to democratising 
‘effects’ of sites like Facebook, it nonetheless ‘has the potential to construct the 
transnational democratic public sphere.’ Tufecki ends her essay on this note: 
‘through the regulation efforts of the institution authorities and the active 
contribution of citizens’, Facebook has the potential to surpass Habermas’ 
‘expectations of a public sphere’ (Tufecki, 2011).  
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Interaction, engagement, the dissemination of information and an intersection 
with matters of public interest, all seem to be endemic within digital media, and 
scholars have noted this from the very beginning of digital media research. It is 
now commonplace for socially or politically marginalised groups to champion 
issues usually excluded from the mainstream public sphere, or to develop their 
own deliberative space to connect and subsequently contest dominant 
meanings and practices (Fulya, 2012: 490). Nevertheless, the Internet and its 
celebrated potentials are not without their own inhibiting factors or technological 
challenges. Some of the challenges Tufecki (2011) mentions with the potentiality 
of the net as a public sphere include: the Babel objection; centralisation online; 
the digital divide; and commercialisation.  
 
The Babel objection holds that in a situation where everyone can speak, with too 
many points of view, there exists a ‘fragmentation of online discourse’ resulting 
in ‘no common ground for action’ (also in Benkler, 2006: 23). Marcus (2012, 
Online source) in a Guardian UK article on Twitter, describes the internet as an 
'echo chamber', where people are not interested in ‘debate’ so much as social 
interaction with those who already share their views. Secondly, ‘the 
centralisation online’ refers to how only a portion of content on the Internet gets 
maximum attention, to the neglect of other potentially democracy-culture-
building pages. In other words, ‘the normalisation of power and hierarchy 
structure’ is counterbalanced against this possibility, thus somewhat invalidating 
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the democratising promise of the Internet (Tufecki, 2011). The digital divide is 
the third challenge – a concept used to describe the gap that exists between 
those with access to information technology and those without. Lastly, the 
commercialised nature of the networked environment could lead to a ‘serious 
corruption’ of the openness and honesty of communication itself. Dahlberg 
referred to the commercialisation of the online sphere as ‘the corporate 
colonisation of the cyberspace’ (Dahlberg 2005: 90). Likewise, Papacharissi 
mentioned that ‘the Internet has gradually transitioned into an online-shopping 
mall and less of a deliberative space’, which in turn, she states, ‘influences the 
orientation of digital political information’ (Papacharissi 2010: 123)   
 
On the other hand, it is empirically incontestable that in the last decade social 
media network sites (for instance) have been central to the activities of 
democratic social movements, and to that extent it is obvious how digital media 
are used presupposing their potential political impact. If we define social 
movements as groups that 'monitor and criticise the state and groups that take 
political action' (Fulya, 2012: 490), any cursory observational research can 
confirm how social activists garner attention, recruit members, construct an 
audience, coordinate activities and 'exchange best practices examples’ (Fulya, 
2012: 490). Patrick Meier (2011), in his PhD thesis on the subject of 'liberation 
technologies', cites an Egyptian activist: "we use Facebook to schedule our 
protests, Twitter to coordinate, and YouTube to tell the world" (Meier 2011: 
Abstract). Occupy Nigeria, another movement that sprang up in January 2012, 
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now has a Blackberry app that supporters can download – where participation is 
steadily structured and directed by the media application itself. To Fulya 
(2012:491-2), social media has the potential to form a public sphere for the 
spread of counter hegemonic discourses, that is, to 'mobilise public opinion 
outside the centralised authoritative state control.' (2012:491-2).   
 
Papacharissi expands on the democratising potential of convergent technologies 
(2010): a greater ‘access to information’, provides increasingly active ‘tools’ that 
‘develop informed viewpoints and engage in substantive political discussions’ 
(Papacharissi, 2010: 120). Reciprocity through digital media can transcend 
geographical boundaries and provide a degree of anonymity in interactions that 
is empowering to once-inhibited bearers of public opinion (Papacharissi, 2010: 
121-2). As reciprocity ‘implies a mutual exchange of opinion and information, 
where in the same advantages and privileges are granted and observed by all 
participants’, online media makes for a suitable platform where citizens of 
democracies can connect (Papacharissi, 2010: 122).  
 
For Bohman (2004: 133), digital media demands that we reconstruct our 
conception of communication in political-public contexts. While the Habermasian 
public sphere featured large fora for face-to-face communication (reciprocity) 
‘there are other ways to realise the public forum and its dialogical exchange in a 
more indirect and mediated manner, even while preserving and re-articulating 
the connection to democratic self-rule’ (Bohman, 2004: 133). For Bohman, 
dialogue is significant in the public sphere, not only because it launches a 
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communicative exchange ‘in the form of turn-taking’, but it is equally guided by 
the ‘the mutual expectation of uptake’ – reciprocity as a political obligation.  
 
For Bohman (2004), the Internet’s capacity to support a public sphere cannot be 
judged in terms of intrinsic features, that is, just the software and the hardware. 
Rather, the Internet is a public sphere only if agents make it so; if agents 
introduce institutional ‘software’ that constructs the context of communication’ 
(2004:132). In Bohman’s words: ‘the Internet becomes a public sphere only 
through agents who engage in reflexive and democratic activities…’ (2004: 140). 
Dahlberg’s approach to the problem of a digital public sphere is precisely from 
this vantage point – the necessity of an engaged, reflexive and dialogic activity 
that delivers content comparable to older forms of democratic deliberation 
(Dahlberg, 2011). His chosen context of evaluation is therefore deliberative 
democratic thought.  
 
Dahlberg’s approach focuses on two areas: firstly, the extent and quality of 
rational deliberation in online spaces; and secondly, the identification of factors 
that ‘facilitate’ and ‘retard’ deliberation in those same spaces (2011). Factors 
that facilitate deliberation in digital communicative spaces include ‘the two-way, 
low-cost, user-friendly, pliable and readily moderated form of digital 
communication’ (Dahlberg 2011: 860). These factors are regarded as ‘affording 
information sharing, rational debate, and public opinion formation’ (Dahlberg, 
2011: 860). On the other hand, given the ‘ever increasing colonisation of digital 
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communication systems by state and corporate interests’, the extent and quality 
of rational deliberation in online spaces is called to question (ibid.) According to 
Dahlberg, research suggests that ‘ideal deliberation can be closely 
approximated in online interactive spaces’ that specifically aim at realising 
rational debate through ‘effective rules of engagement, moderation systems, and 
interactive software tools’ (2011: 860). It is now worth examining specific 
societies that have adopted digital media as part of their culture, and analysing 
how it has become a part of their democratic practice – in this case, Nigeria.  
 
Conclusion: the Digital Public Sphere as an object of analysis 
In this thesis, my emphasis will remain on the astonishing new communicative 
potential of digital media, it will also maintain a critical view of its capacity to 
supplant older forms of political organisation, mobilisation and participation. And 
while the very concept of ‘social’ shifts on its axis in the digital realm, the 
material conditions of social life still remain – the need for embodied, place-
based association and a position in relation to the ownership of the means of 
production and broader economic structures of power.    
 
To go forward from all that has been discussed above, from Habermas’ 
conceptualisation of the public sphere, particularly on his understanding of the 
‘cultural public sphere’ and cultural dimension of the public sphere, and then the 
critical claims of Habermas’s interlocutors, to the extensive review of literature 
on the emergence of new digital media as a field of research & potential public 
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sphere, certain points are evident. There is a need to identify what characterises 
this potentially new digital public sphere, and I do this here by aligning it with the 
terms of the old conceptual construct (of Habermas) and its critical revisions 
(Calhoun, Fraser and Kellner). From the above narrative on the evolving 
concept of the public sphere, I here extrapolate five structural features that allow 
us to generate criteria for assessing the phenomenon of a new digital public 
sphere. These features are basic empirical characteristics from which I derive 
conceptual criteria. These structural features, or components, are evidently 
present in even Habermas’s account of the bourgeois public sphere, if we 
involve his later observations on what I identified as the ‘cultural public sphere’ 
or cultural dimension of the public sphere. I assert that their significance is 
pragmatic, in that they allow us to organize and analyse the range of research 
material, along with the many observations and comments that emerge in my 
interview data. These components are:   
• Media platforms and the spaces or places within which communication 
takes place.  
• The techniques and protocols of communication.  
• The persons, agents and agencies who communicate, or are instrumental 
in facilitating communication.   
• The dialogue and issues that are the ‘content’ of communication.  
• The aims, impacts or interventions undertaken by such communication. 
 
These ‘components’ are basic empirical observation. Here below, I adapt them 
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for a digital media sphere, to which I add the clarifications and questions that in 
turn will generate criteria for my investigation. 
 
• New media platforms/spaces – these provide socially accessible 
mechanisms of information dissemination, and the emergence, use and 
adaptation of new technologies within particular social contexts, spaces 
and places. Furthermore, these new platforms and spaces generate new 
cognitive horizons and a power of imagination. They do this through 
extending the social capabilities of the media (facilitate leisure and 
cultural life, for example).  
• Communication techniques – new media requires new cultural (or 
creative) production methods (particularly before it becomes absorbed 
into the main broadcasting apparatus or corporate infrastructure). This 
generates new styles and means of address, and the capacity for 
communication literacies, With mobile and cheap media devices this can 
take place evading social divisions (gender; class, and so on).  
• Agents and agencies – we need to consider the role of the individual, 
group allegiances and the social formation of movements; this also 
involves considering organizational formations and the role of institutions 
in the evolution of a public sphere. The historical narratives or political 
demands of nationhood and the nation state, particularly with regard to its 
social order (values, identity, allegiances), is internal to this.   
• Dialogue and issues – this involves the content of communication and 
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character of dialogic interchange, of the issues and ideas that so often 
motivate and animate such interchange. The public sphere, once rooted 
in discussions of various ‘interests’, now features more critical (and 
ethical) deliberations on the nature of the state itself, and the integrity of 
its members, its management and administration, as well as its decisions.  
• Impact and intervention – the actual ‘change’ or result (tangible or 
intangible, personal or political) that may emerge forms the very rationale 
of a public sphere. This involves forms of solidarity and collective 
allegiances, and indicate multiple overlapping public spheres. Where the 
collapse of a categorical separation of private and public, and where 
actors and agencies have no intrinsic function in state decision-making 
processes, the state can nonetheless be subject to pressure, where 
change is stimulated through the presence of agents and agencies as 
‘counterpublics’.    
 
These basic components and their elaboration as descriptive criteria have 
simply been extrapolated from our critical discussion on Habermas, Calhoun, 
Fraser and Kellner, and of course possess a basic (if obvious) empirical 
dimension. However, elaborating on these components with issues and 
questions, as I have done above, allows us to generate criteria that are used to 
investigate the various dimensions of a public sphere that is in the process of 
emerging, or is not fully formed. These components above will be used to 
structure a systematic investigation (notably, our data presentation chapters, 
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Chapter Eight and Chapter Nine). The ’criteria’ they generate will not be used 
systematically, but will appear through my analysis as required.      
 
A major claim in this thesis is that in Nigeria, while there exists state broadcast 
media, the press and news, various professional associations and political 
agencies lobbying the government – the apparatus one normally associates with 
a ‘public sphere’ – there is a marked absence in the above criteria. There is a 
marked absence in the criteria of the development of the literacies required for 
mature communication, of imagination and creativity, of the organizational 
formation of new enterprises in response to new needs or crises, of reflexive 
dialogue and a deliberation informed by objective information; and a lack of 
actual agencies of change.   
 
My central argument in this thesis is that it is within the landscape of digital 
media that we can locate the criteria (and thus evolving conditions for) a 
dynamic and fully developed public sphere. This emerging public sphere I define 
as a ‘culture’ of democracy, because it is not defined by established, uniform, 
systematic or corporate processes and organisations. It is more random, 
spontaneous, improvised, socially dynamic, and as Habermas’s observations on 
the cultural public sphere, emerges from personal, individual, local, sometimes 
domestic sometimes leisure spaces, and other times through enterprising 
individuals, social interaction and reaction to social issues and conditions, 
imaginative and part of expressive behaviours. It involves experience and 
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emotion, as well as social identities and perceived injustices or general issues of 
public concern. It involves individual styles of expression and communication, as 
well as device-mediated general messages. And as Habermas noted of the 
‘literary public sphere’ of letters – such communications, while rooted in personal 
and individual experience or motivation, transcend the ream of self-interest or 
the interests that characterize civil society. Personal and individual experience 
or motivation is, rather, reflected on using assumptions about ethics, what is 
right or just, that is ‘human’ and universal in the particular. The new evolving (or 
‘embryonic’, as I say later) public sphere in Nigeria, is made possible by new 
digital media, and is not institutionalized in any way – it can only be described as 
a ‘culture’ of democracy, which is distinct in its fundamental characteristics from 
the democratic system of the Federal Republic. In Section Two I will make this 
distinction and contrast clear with an historical account of the development of 
the political system in Nigeria.  
 
I will therefore investigate what new media platforms are central to public sphere 
activities in Nigeria, and through what techniques and strategies is democratic 
communication made more effective. In addition, in Section Three, I will identify 
who (“who” being individuals and organisations) are significant contributors to 
the Nigerian digital public sphere. This thesis will also consider the nature of 
dialogue in the Nigerian digital public sphere, and analyse the issues that arise 
from the so-called democratic deliberation by digital media users. The element 
of impact and intervention becomes useful in articulating in precise terms the 
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effect of the influx of digital media into Nigeria, and the subsequent uptake for 
democratic purposes, on the polity.  
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Section One: Chapter Four 
Deliberating Africa 
 
 
 
Introduction 
In the previous three chapters, I attempted to establish the central terms, 
concepts, insights and issues that form the analytical trajectory of this thesis. In 
discussing Habermas' theory of the public sphere through Fraser, Calhoun, and 
Kellner, I reaffirmed a commitment to both the basic terms of Habermas’s 
historical and critical framework, extending it through his observations on 
‘culture’, while at the same time appreciating the importance of a revision and 
expansion of terms in response to more recent social, political and technological 
developments. This chapter proceeds to provide an analytical description of new 
communicative technology as it has impacted Africa, and generates the 
empirical basis on which we can assert, along the lines of Kellner, a 
technologically enhanced public realm of communication. Where for Kellner’s 
theoretical development, TV and radio were central, for us it is digital and social 
media. How do the new communication media function as technology, culture, 
and public sphere? I construct an interconnection between digital media (its 
technical and discursive functions), democratic culture and the public sphere.  
 
In this chapter, I address the concept of the public sphere in Nigeria, Africa, 
keeping the citizens in Diaspora in perspective. The digital public sphere, unlike 
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its predecessor, has the capacity to traverse geographical boundaries with 
immediacy, hence, its impact on national politics and otherwise, in various 
African polities cannot be ignored in this thesis. In this chapter, I also highlight, 
using existing literature, the challenges for a digital public sphere to serve as a 
facilitator of democratic culture in Africa. This is followed by a passage on 
existing digital media research on Africa, and methods adopted thus far.  
 
Deliberating Africa with its Diaspora 
According to Katz and Rice (2004), democratic participation online can be 
realised through the following digitally mediated political activities: (i) online 
political browsing and (ii) online political interaction.  
• Online political browsing involves:  
o Reading bulletin boards or discussion groups. 
o Visiting websites with political information. 
o Following elections online. 
o Viewing information online after the election. 
• Online political interaction involves: 
o Participating in electronic discussions. 
o Receiving email concerning the election. 
o Sending and receiving email to or from a government official, 
candidate for office, or political campaign committee. 
o Sending email to others concerning the election. 
 
This list could be updated with other online activities such as reading and 
blogging about political issues, and sharing links to political content among an 
individual's social network. Mudhai (2009: 28-9) provides detailed examples on 
how specific countries in Africa have incorporated digital media into their socio-
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practices: 
E-information 
• Congo, Egypt and Togo use email to update their citizens. 
• Togo uses RSS Feeds to involve and update citizens. 
E-Consultation 
• Botswana employs interactive methods to solicit citizen opinion, feedback 
and input (online channels, informal polls, bulletin boards, chat rooms/instant 
messaging) and formal online consultation. 
• Botswana, Cameroon, Congo, Cameroon, Mauritania and Mozambique 
are some of the countries that use open web. 
• Mozambique is listed as the only African country that publishes 
findings/results of citizen opinion, including e-opinions on websites. 
 
African diasporas is an important dimension of the African digital public sphere 
that should not be neglected in this section. In Zimbabwe for instance, an 
'exponential' increase in websites offering Zimbabweans interactive spaces, was 
attributed to the rise of digital media – which in turn can be credited to the 
Zimbabweans living in Diaspora (Last, 2009: 60). Diaspora communities have 
established multiple online public spheres where citizens, both home and 
abroad can, 'discuss politics or listen to the news…[where the] main agenda is 
usually Zimbabwe politics' (Last, 2009: 60). In Kperogi's (2011) doctoral thesis 
on the citizen journalism of the Nigerian diaspora he examines some major 
diaspora online citizen media outlets and identifies points where these citizen 
media sites, though located outside the Nigerian geographical territory, 
managed to shape and influence both national politics, policies of the homeland, 
and the media practices of the domestic media formation.’ Examples of the 
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Nigerian citizen news sites he studies include Elendu Reports, Sahara 
Reporters, and Nigerian Village Square, to mention a few.  
In 2014, Victoria Bernal, a professor of Anthropology, conducted an 
ethnographic study of Eritreans in diaspora and how they engage with national 
politics from outside the nation – that is, remain active citizens. Her study 
revealed that relations of citizenship and sovereignty which were once rooted in 
national territory, now increasingly span borders; secondly, that ’social contracts 
between citizens and states are being constructed and contested in new political 
context and spaces’ (Bernal, 2014: 1-2). In essence, her argument is that the 
Internet is ‘allowing for the creation of an elastic political space that can serve to 
extend as well as to expose the limits of territorial sovereignty’ (Bernal, 2014: 2). 
She conducted this study through a content analysis of specific Eritrean 
websites. Although this thesis is not focused on the equivalent, the Nigerian 
Diaspora, it is still important to acknowledge that it is the nature of the digital 
public sphere to admit participants who are not necessarily geographically 
located within the national territory of the State under discussion. Their links to 
the state, however, such as citizenship, grants them entry into the public sphere. 
Hence, the Nigerian digital public sphere is not limited to active digital media 
users in Nigeria who engage in rational critical dialogue - it includes the 
Diaspora, and any user with vested interest in matters of common concern to 
members of the Nigerian state.  
Strategic institutions in Zimbabwe such as news media, government and political 
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parties, among others, now possess 'new digital public spaces' due to the 
increasing adoption of the Internet. These institutions are thus provided with new 
channels for four new media specialisations: Public communication; Information 
production; Information packaging; and Information dissemination.  
According to Last (2009: 58), Zimbabwe has a 'relatively good' 
telecommunication infrastructure, which has made it a part of the 'global 
information society' and as such, served as a foundation for democracy. 
Zimbabwe's authoritarian and repressive political environment is a key 
motivation behind the growth of the Internet and its digital public spheres: 'public 
spheres for free expression and political debate now find expression more 
through the new ICTs...' and the Zimbabwean government is aware of this (Last, 
2009: 60). The optimism for the growth of digital democracy in Zimbabwe is 
reliant on how many people actually have access to the technology, and the 
following spaces are the access points for those who use the Internet to promote 
democracy in Zimbabwe: cyber cafes, public libraries, several public and private 
colleges, and other civil society organisations. For Last (2009:67), Zimbabwe's 
digital public spheres operate by conducting the following activities:  
(i) civil society actors using the Internet to lobby elected representatives, public 
officials and policy elites; (ii) using the Internet to network with related 
associations and organisations; (iii) using the Internet to mobilise organisers, 
and members through action alerts and emails (Last, 2009:67). (See more on 
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social media uptake in Zimbabwe Mpofu (2013)1 ). 
Similar activities can be observed in Nigeria: In January 2012, Nigerians took to 
the streets to protest a sudden rise in fuel pump price; the protest was mobilised 
and directed through Twitter. Another example is the Twitter Town Hall meeting 
with former Nigerian Minister of Youth, Bolaji Abudlahi, engaging Nigerian 
youths on current issues (Olawale, 2011). Other examples are apps for 
democracy designed by citizens, for example, Revoda*, Occupy Nigeria for 
Blackberry*, BudgIt*, to mention a few. The online sphere has also been used 
for civic interventions, such as fund raising for a fellow citizen's medical 
condition. Examples of such campaigns on Twitter were the Save Oke hash tag, 
Save Funke (breast cancer); and when the Dana Air crashed on June 3rd, 2012, 
over a residential area, Twitter was used to mobilise offline donations for victims 
of the crash who had been rendered homeless.  
However, there remain basic challenges for a Digital Public Sphere as facilitator 
of democratic culture in Africa, which must be noted at the outset. First, as 
mentioned above, the so-called ‘digital divide’. In any discussion on technology 
and Africa, the challenge of the digital divide is often mentioned. There exists an 
emphatic imbalance in communication capacity, in terms of education, gender, 
class, ethnicity, income, and education (Macnamara et al, 2012: 625; McQuail 
2000: 157), and this is exacerbated by irregular levels of physical access to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Mpofu	  (2013)	  carried	  out	  a	  study	  on	  social	  media	  and	  ethnicity	  in	  Zimbabwe	  using	  three	  opinion	  articles.	  He	  arrived	  at	  the	  conclusion	  that	  ‘social	  media	  has	  enabled	  the	  expression	  of	  both	  popular	  and	  unpopular	  constructions	  of	  identity	  and	  belonging’	  (2013:119).	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technology and its networks. Even for those who use public access points such 
as cyber cafes, their engagement in the digital public sphere remains limited 
(Last, 2009:69) because of generally poor and unreliable levels of 
telecommunication infrastructure. Low Internet usage in turn results in lower 
levels of political engagement online, which in turn makes an impact on the 
intensity, breadth and quality of political engagement online (Mudhai et al, 2009: 
2). The language2 and literacy barrier is a part of this conundrum of problems, 
for at every level we may encounter limitations in the indigenous, regional or 
national capacity for pan-public communication, not least in the face of the 
undeniable cultural issue concerning the symbolic domination of 'Western 
knowledge’ by the linguistic systems and structures of Western software, 
applications and platforms, giving the popular impression that ‘African 
knowledge is under represented' or in fact devalued (Frere & Kiyindou, 2009: 
80). 
A second challenge is the way digital and online media are predominantly 
entertainment-oriented media. Popular tools such as the blogs and social 
network sites most common, well-known, and most frequented by citizens, are 
entertainment-oriented. These sites and platforms do indeed encourage and 
facilitate discussion and participation of many kinds, and yet the character of this 
ensuing discourse is for most critical observers not politically engaging. To 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Barro	  (2010)	  has	  published	  a	  paper	  addressing	  trans-­‐border	  languages	  in	  Africa	  and	  assesses	  their	  potential	  for	  fostering	  a	  trans-­‐national	  public	  sphere	  (albeit	  not	  digital)	  in	  the	  continent.	  It	  is	  his	  conclusion	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  transnational	  African	  public	  sphere	  is	  far-­‐fetched	  based	  on	  certain	  factors,	  but	  the	  potential	  very	  much	  exists.	  
	   119	  
Macnamara et al (2012: 630), political discussions on digital media rarely meet 
the criteria of the public sphere, even when they are politically engaging (as on 
specific political issues). The dominance of an entertainment-based digital 
media in the lives of citizens does not cultivate the political literacy required for 
public sphere deliberations, Macnamara et al (2012: 630) argue. Rather, these 
interchanges are mostly informal, frank, colloquial, satirical, sometimes 
emotional, occasionally heated and less rational and objective, and so on. Yet 
as a counter to Macnamara’s important observation is Ogola, Schumann and 
Olatunji’s (2009:204) observations that popular music, for example, is often 
satirical and informal in its standards of rhetoric, but is a potentially powerful 
alternative platform for social and political engagement in Africa. This 
observation could be particularly relevant in Nigeria, where the satirical and 
sometimes humorous music by Fela Anikulapo-Kuti has in the past generated 
political discussions. In the 1970s and 1980s, Fela Anikulapo-Kuti was even 
jailed for using his 'politically charged lyrics to criticise Nigeria's military 
government’, as Fela's music ‘exposes abuses in Nigeria' (Amnesty International, 
2010: online). Other examples of music with public impact includes the work of 
Mariam Makeba (also known as Mama Africa – spokeswoman against 
apartheid), Eldee's song ‘One Day’3 (2010) and Nneka's ‘Vagabonds in Power’4 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Eldee	  is	  a	  Nigerian	  musician	  who	  released	  the	  song	  One	  Day	  in	  2010.	  The	  lyrics	  of	  the	  song,	  one	  day	  e	  go	  better	  [Nigerian	  “pidgin”	  English	  for	  “it	  will	  be	  better”]	  articulates	  society’s	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  state	  of	  the	  nation.	  Phrases	  from	  the	  lyrics	  include	  “one	  day…money	  go	  circulate,	  light	  go	  dey…”	  [one	  day	  money	  will	  reach	  the	  masses	  and	  there	  will	  be	  power	  supply].	  4	  Nneka	  is	  a	  German-­‐Nigerian	  musician	  who	  also	  released	  a	  song	  Vagabonds	  in	  Power,	  is	  similar	  to	  Eldee’s	  message.	  Exercepts	  from	  her	  lyrics	  include:	  “As	  you	  dey	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(2012). The argument concerning ‘criteria’ on public sphere deliberation 
therefore requires much more research into informal and popular (particularly 
entertainment or artistic) discourses and their actual and potential impacts.  
Thirdly, we must consider the recurring issue within digital media on audience 
fragmentation. Traditional media had at its disposal, a mass audience, with 
whom nothing significant competed for their attention; for digital media on the 
other hand,  'many sites struggle to gain audience of any significant size ' 
(Macnamara et al, 2002: 626). Hence, the audience is fragmented, and as such, 
any democratic impact intended through the use of digital media requires great 
effort to build the necessary audience for such democratic messages. 
 
In relation to this is the way that small, fringe and extremist groups can more 
easily gain power and influence over public debate, raising the challenge of a 
dystopian new media landscape always attracting (and tacitly justifying) 
repressive new media regulation. Digital media is equally as open to non-
democratic purposes as democratic. New media technology constitutes a realm 
of effective spying technologies and devices (by both repressive and non-
repressive governments), tracking the behaviour of citizens. As Maduka puts it, 
'it is left for governments to employ these new devices in the defence and 
promotion of democracy' (1999:210). In the U.S., central government is 
'expanding a cyber security program that scans Internet traffic headed into and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  torture	  me	  so…dey	  make	  my	  pikin	  dey	  suffa…na	  only	  rich	  man	  dey	  gain…”	  [as	  you	  torture	  me,	  make	  my	  children	  suffer,	  only	  the	  rich	  profit…]	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out of defence contractors to include far more of the country's private, civilian-
run infrastructure' (Menn & Charles, 2013:online). The new landscape of 
surveillance, detection and monitoring in otherwise democratic countries 
remains an open question for researchers, where the political and public impacts 
of such remain undecided. It also raises a question concerning the proximity of 
state power to a putative digital public sphere, and how a digitally mediated 
public sphere, while more effective in terms of some of its democratic attributes, 
remains an open field of government and security surveillance, intrusion and 
possible intimidation. 
Fourth, given the uncertain outcomes, impact, and the porous or at least 
indeterminate boundaries of a digitally mediated public realm, there remains an 
ambivalence on new media technology on the part of political leaders throughout 
Africa. It ‘is viewed as portending major political, economic, social and cultural 
“catastrophes” by the African ruling elite’  (Uche 1999: 197). In a Nigerian daily 
newspaper, the Daily Independent, Shittu (2012) published a story on David 
Mark, the Senate President's reaction to social media use in Nigeria. According 
to Shittu (2012) Mark called for 'measures to check the negative tendencies of 
the social media,' as it 'has become a threat to ethics of media practice and 
good governance because of its accessibility and absolute freedom' (Shittu, 
2012: online source) In another vein of a politician who was (initially) willing to 
engage on new media, Helen Zille, South Africa politician, disclosed her 
perception of social media (Twitter) in a video interview on Mail & Guardian 
Online (2012). In her words, 'because of the 140 character limit, you have to find 
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very constrained or concise ways of saying things; and if people are always 
looking how they can catch you out, how they can abuse what you are saying in 
the context that you didn't intend, then of course it (Twitter) is rife, rife with 
dangers for any politician' (Helen Zille, South African politician, in an online 
video, 2012). However, there is also a political impulse, less articulated – where 
digital media might exacerbate social divisions: Frere and Kiyindou (2009: 85) 
assert that the 'Internet will reinforce the interests of the well-connected living in 
the cities, while most of the population turn their back on political participation' 
Frere and Kiyindou (2009: 85).  
 Towards a putative digital public sphere in Africa we need to be mindful of these 
open-ended challenges. While this thesis will be arguing for the democratic 
potential of digital media, I concur with Mudhai in stating that 'Africans need to 
strike a cautionary note about the supposed emancipatory nature of new media' 
(Mudhai et al, 2009:17). The digital public sphere is gradually emerging across 
Africa, and particularly in one of its most industrially-developed the country of 
Nigeria. Yet the more this emergence unfolds, the more we can witness the 
necessary socio-cultural, political and economic conditions of a properly 
functioning public sphere. A critical approach is therefore central to an objective 
assessment of the potentials of digital media in facilitating the development of a 
‘democratic culture’. I will now consider the various methodological challenges 
for the researcher of this new digital media landscape, citing what I judge to be 
specific examples of significant research in the field, a few of which were 
mentioned above.  
	   123	  
Digital media research and Africa 
In the field of digital media research, what are the specific achievements (and 
methodological challenges) for the researcher? Every subject proclaiming itself 
to offer an insight into a ‘new’ phenomenon must confront the primary issue of 
methods and the means by which the ‘new’ is identified and assessed. In this 
section I consider examples of research that allow us to expand the theoretical 
reach of our basic theory of the public sphere, while also increasing our critical 
consciousness of the challenges of proposing digital media as a new facilitator 
of a ‘culture of democracy’ aiming for a fully functioning public sphere. The 
research that was particularly significant to the development of the field and thus 
this thesis were as follows: Valtysson (2012), on Facebook as a digital public 
sphere; Meier (2011) on the use of information and communication technology 
(ICT) as 'liberation technologies' in repressive states; Mudhai and Nyabuga 
(2009), on the use of new media by key political parties in Kenya's 2007 
presidential elections; Last on the repression, propaganda and digital resistance 
in Zimbabwe (2009), and the 'blogging down a dictator' through citizen 
journalism (2011);  Meier’s (2011) examination of the use of ‘liberation’ 
technologies by civil society and its relationship with repressive rule; 
and  Kperogi (2011) on citizen journalism in Nigeria, driven by the ‘digital 
diaspora’.  
Valtysson’s (2012) innovative study on Facebook as a communicative space 
offers us some further issues concerning the challenge of a digitally mediated 
public sphere. Facebook is a socially embedded ‘communicative environment’, 
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and thus for Valtysson offers us insights into communicative behaviours and 
capabilities relevant for considering a putative public sphere. More specifically, 
he attempts to disabuse us of the notion that ‘media’ is a mere conduit for 
communication – but has the power to affect a ‘colonising mediation of the life 
world’ (Valtysson 2012:89).  His objectives were thus to identify the processes of 
'colonisation' and 'emancipation' at work in this social network of evolving 
communication behaviours, determining the conditions for a properly ‘social’ 
communication per se. Valtysson (2012) focused on 'user terms', 'user 
manoeuver', 'privacy/data use policy' and 'ownership and use of uploaded 
material', and thus observed how Facebook as a technology is formed around a 
series of control mechanisms on the usage preferences, motivations and 
perceptions of consumers. His research was based in Denmark (not Africa) and 
his methods were qualitative in-depth interviews and subject observation. His in-
depth interviews featured respondents between the ages of 20 and 25 years, 
where at the time Danish statistics on the use of social media identified this age 
grouping as dominant. The seven interviewees also allowed Valtysson to 
observe them using Facebook via video recording, during which they verbalised 
the purpose of each action they conducted on their profiles  (2012: 78). The 
researcher is able to compare data gathered from the interviews (verbalised) 
with that from the observation (actual use). 
Of relevance to this thesis is the means by which the interviewees were selected. 
Valtysson used the ‘snowball-sampling’ technique, where this non-probability 
technique involves initially selected member(s) of the sample identifying other 
	   125	  
potential relevant members of the sample to the researcher for inclusion. It is 
particularly applicable in situations where the research subject is of sensitive 
nature (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981: 141), though in Valtysson’s study, this does 
not seem to be the case. This nonetheless serves to indicate a fundamental 
challenge for media research – identifying subjects and using specific data on 
their digitally mediated behaviour: what strict criteria on sampling can be used 
with such an open-ended subject? And how can ‘digitally mediated behaviour’ 
be assessed without prior knowledge of these subject’s non- digitally mediated 
behaviour?  Making general observations on such specific data is indeed a 
methodological issue.  
The findings of Valtysson's study were, however, made specific by his 
theoretical terms 'colonisation' and 'emancipation'. This might indeed seem 
prescriptive, given the specific provenance of these terms (it is doubtful whether 
consumers would operate with such terms) yet made specific his potential 
generalisations. The interviewees did not perceive Facebook's communicative 
environment as ‘colonising’, or micro-managing their communication with 
another agenda; rather, it was seen as 'an emancipative media environment' 
(2012:85). While the interviewees were aware of (what were, for Valtysson) the 
colonisation processes in Facebook usage (privacy policies, the use of data for 
commercial purposes, and so on), these processes were not regarded by the 
users as being of equal importance to the emancipative processes (Valtysson, 
2012: 85). Their principal uses of Facebook were communication with friends, 
maintaining friendships, organising social meetings or events, networking, 
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looking at pictures, and the said colonising processes were not explicitly 
identified as being internal to these.  None of the interviewees claimed to use 
Facebook for political purposes (Valtysson, 2012: 77 & 86), on which Valtysson 
suggested that Facebook as a political tool '…generates irritation, rather than 
deliberation – associated with spam, rather than serious involvement' (2012: 89). 
His paper concludes with a question rather than a substantive argument: 'the 
question remains whether it is fit to maintain that Facebook represents a 
colonising mediation of the life world – when users do not perceive it as such?’. 
Yet, he suggests, ‘…such concealed, devious colonisation is usually the most 
powerful one, as people only realise its mechanism and its consequence when it 
is too late' (Valtysson 2012:89).  
Valtysson’s conclusion offers a salutary and balanced viewpoint on digital media 
per se: it suggests that one be skeptical in perceptions of digital media (here, 
Facebook) as while forms of social communication are indeed cultivated, certain 
processes of control (colonisation) remain increasingly at work subtly exerting 
power over users. His study does not enlighten us to Danish cultural and 
political realities, nor the intrinsic socio-cultural limitations of the snowball 
sampling technique, but it nonetheless remains relevant to us here. In 
African societies the penetration of Facebook usage is considerable, and the 
social-media assisted protests in North Africa (Libya, Egypt etc.), might warrant 
further research on its supposed a-political character.   
Patrick Meier published his pioneering doctoral thesis in 2011, which focused on 
	   127	  
the use of ICT throughout civil society with a view to challenging repressive 
political rulership. He referred to these ICTs as 'liberation technologies', and 
used  'mixed-methods' in his research, a combination of both quantitative and 
qualitative methods. The first part of his thesis contains 'a large-N econometric 
analysis to test whether ‘liberation technologies’ are statistically significant 
predictor of anti-government protests in countries with repressive regimes' (a 
link between the use of Internet and mobile phones and the frequency of 
protests). The second part of Meier's (2011) thesis assesses the impact of 
"liberation technologies" during the Egyptian Parliamentary Elections and 
Sudanese Presidential Elections of 2010, through qualitative comparative 
analysis, using the case studies of both countries. Meier's object of analysis was 
predominantly Ushahidi (Swahili for "testimony" or "witness"), a ubiquitous open-
source software that enables users’ crowd sourced crisis information to be sent 
via mobile. Meier (2011) conducted a descriptive analysis, 'process tracing' and 
semi-structured interviews, for each of the case studies. The significance of 
interviews – in terms of their unique penetration into the activity of disparate, 
semi-organised or partially concealed processes of public debate or political 
action – is underscored by Meier’s study.  
 
Another scholar, Last Moyo conducted two important studies on the digital public 
sphere in Zimbabwe. In 2009, Moyo examined repression, propaganda and 
digital resistance in Zimbabwe's democracy through new media usage. Where 
the main objects of his research were the news websites Newsnet 
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(mainstream news site), Kubutana and New Zimbabwean dot com (alternative 
news sites). His main objectives were to trace the development of the Internet 
and various forms of digital interaction and information-sharing occasioned by 
the new medium in Zimbabwe, and to draw some inferences about their 
contribution to the structural and substantive elements of digital democracy in 
Zimbabwe.  
Last positioned his study within public sphere theory and Nancy Fraser's 
counter-public sphere theory (2009: 58, 65), and in analysing the news websites, 
Last conducted a content analysis using critical discourse analysis. His findings 
reveal that for Newsnet (the mainstream news website), news is framed within a 
nationalistic discourse based on other constructed myths of patriotism and 
heroism. On Kubatana, like Newsnet, Last (2009: 65) explains that the news site 
seems to construct the human rights discourse in the binary divisions of 
"good" versus "evil", and has hyperlinks to about three hundred and sixty 
civil society websites that specialise in democracy, human rights, elections, 
media, citizenship etc. New Zimbabwe.com also has 'a vibrant discussion forum 
where participants from different parts of the world discuss politics and other 
issues pertaining to Zimbabwe… public officials have been invited to answer 
participants' questions in the forums, thus demonstrating digital democracy in 
action' (2009: 68). According to Last (2009: 69), analysis of the websites depicts 
that Internet usage rests mostly in the hands of the 'powerful in society, where 
state and donor-funded elite institutions consciously or unconsciously use it to 
promote discourses that revolve around their own interests' (Last, 2009: 68). 
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However, his argument succinctly put is that, the Internet has gone beyond 
expanding the form of Zimbabwe's public sphere and pushing its physical 
boundaries by offering opportunities to Zimbabwean diaspora to participate, but 
also 'through new multimodal narrative techniques brought about by multimedia 
convergence' (2009: 68).  
In a more recent study, Last Moyo focuses once again on Zimbabwe but this 
time on the act of communication through blogging within the frame of 
alternative media and citizen journalism. The object of his study was Kubatana 
blogs, revealing how they were used in mediating the experience of citizens 
during a violent election in Zimbabwe. Through his examination, he revealed 
ways in which political crisis motivated new means of disseminating and sharing 
information, and the generation of people's ‘narratives of the crisis’.  
In terms of method, twelve bloggers were randomly selected from an initial 
sample population, of which in the event only five were willing to be interviewed. 
From in-depth interviews were extracted narrative accounts of how ‘…blogging 
was constructed and perceived through their experiences, accounts and 
interpretation' (Last, 2011: 750). A more detailed Critical Discourse Analysis was 
then employed in analysing both the interview data and the 'news' texts 
produced by the Kubatana bloggers, 'to gauge the extent to which they 
articulated the social and political struggles' (Last, 2011: 750). The eventual 
findings reveal that the content on the Kubatana blogs depict the important role 
Internet and citizen journalism played in 'mediating the crisis' and 'exposing 
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human suffering during the run-off election'. Also, the Kubatana blogosphere 
represents a practical demonstration of how the Internet (as an alternative 
medium and citizen journalism tool) serves as a 'counter-hegemonic' space 
where people practice the right to communicate (Last, 2011: 754). According to 
Last (2011: 445), as reflected by Kubatana's bloggers, the 'capacity to envision 
alternative social and political orders outside the neoliberal framework' is lacking 
in alternative media. He contends that this is partially due to the 'political 
economy of both blogging as a social practice and alternative media as 
subaltern spaces’ (Last, 2011: 745).  
Both of Last's studies (2009 & 2011) express the significant role of digital media 
in mediating democracy in less democratic states. As found with Valtysson 
(2012) and Meier (2011), interviews once again surface as the research data 
gathering tool. Critical Discourse analysis is another recurring method in both of 
Last's studies, which perhaps indicates the centrality and significance of certain 
recurring phrases or key concepts. It is a matter of general observation that 
digital media demands a certain compression of available vocabulary, and given 
the limited time and space, and the need for rapid intelligibility, the generation of 
common terms of reference, phrases and concepts emerge.  
 
Turning to Mudhai and Nyabuga (2009) on Africa's digital public sphere, the 
focus of attention shifts to the use of new media technologies by political parties 
in mediating the presidential elections in Kenya in 2007. Mostly regarding the 
Internet and other platforms such as cellular telephony and short-messaging 
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service (SMS), Mudhai and Nyabuga’s aim was to account for significant change 
in the uses of new media compared to 'traditional' forms of media by political 
actors (Mudhai and Nyabuga 2009:43). 
Largely attending to the websites of political parties' websites, and their use of 
interactive and feedback facilities, email address availability and/or physical 
address and phone number availability, Mudhai and Nyabuga found that digital 
media was in this case not offering forms of communication that encouraged 
participation or active involvement. Rather, most websites had no feedback 
facilities, and evaded direct communication. New media, they deduce ‘…can 
also reinforce the positions of those in power' due to the limitations of the 
technology and 'manipulability by scheming human agents’ (2009: 41). Their 
general argument is that new media cannot engender political interest and 
activity on its own; there needs to be a 'significant shift in political structures, 
behaviour, and culture’, to make the spectrum of political spaces more 
accessible and and inclusive (2009:52).  
My final example is Kperogi's doctoral thesis from Georgia State University, U.S., 
published in 2011. It examines the influence of citizen journalism practiced by 
Nigerians in diaspora, on Nigeria's public sphere. The theoretical approaches 
framing his study are, alternative media, deliberative democracy and public 
sphere theory. Kperogi's research aim was to understand how specific citizen 
journalists (resident in the diaspora) influence the politics of the homeland (if at 
all). To achieve this he employed in-depth case study research of various 
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diaspora groups and their concerns, and the means and media by which they 
articulated these concerns through a ‘flowering' citizen and alternative online 
journalism throughout the Nigerian diasporic public sphere (located primarily in 
the U.S.). In summary, his findings are instructive: he revealed examples of 
online sites and participants that were evidence of an increasingly vocal, 
politically educated, concerned and skilled diaspora concerned about their 
homeland. This new trans-national citizen media was 'actuated and propelled' by 
six underlying factors: 
• The dearth of a truly critical press tradition in Nigeria (along with the 
absence of an independent media accountability, like a ‘watchdog’ 
agency). 
• The undeveloped state of Internet news mediation.  
• The comparative richness and reliability of diaspora online media – and 
how Nigeria-based sources trust them. 
• The geographical distance of diaspora citizen journalists – ensuring 
anonymity and protection from the routine pressures facing home 
journalists (into revealing sources, and so on).  
 
From the cited studies in this above section, it is evident that citizen journalism 
(alternative media), social movements, protests, blogging (freedom of speech), 
and other uses of new digital media tools etc. seem to be promising to extend 
the most salient components of a properly functioning democracy. However, 
new digital media is still open to abuse by state powers, in as much as it 
evidently equally empowers citizens.  
It is clear that even though a ‘culture’ of democracy can be stimulated by new 
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media of communication, a public sphere cannot be developed without certain 
levels of political engagement, irrespective of the tools available to them. This 
involves both the content of the communication (deriving from substantive 
dialogue and reliable flow of information) along with responsive socio-economic 
structures able to change (both of state and civil society). Since Habermas, 
along with the changes in western nation state media and society since the early 
1960s, it is doubtful that one model of a public sphere and its construction is 
possible. There are socio-cultural (religion inclusive), economic and political 
factors that influence how well or not a digital public sphere would thrive in a 
particular society. In Africa, a continent of fifty-four globally recognised countries, 
there are different 'democratic realities'. That is, each country is faced with 
peculiar challenges to their democracies, and there is no across-board strategy 
to be developed in tackling the democracy challenge in Africa. In the history of 
Nigeria's democracy, her politics and parties were divided along ethnic lines 
right from the period of independence from colonial powers (Dare, 2000: 19). 
Hence, ethnicity is a strong factor to consider in building democratic culture in 
the Nigerian society, despite the digital media tools that could be used to foster 
the culture. In another African country, ethnicity may not have such a strong 
influence on their democracy; rather it could be a stronghold dictatorship.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I addressed the core of Habermas’ concept of the public sphere – 
the communications, deliberations and debates, in our case between Africa and 
her citizens in Diaspora. This featured an account of the relevant issues and 
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‘content’ of the communications, along with observations on the research and 
theorization of such by scholars. I called attention to the challenges Africa faces 
presently, in terms of building and strengthening a digital public sphere, which 
may serve as a facilitator of democratic culture on the continent. The chapter 
ended where I interrogated digital media research in Africa, identifying what 
tools and methods have been used, partly to understand how we have arrived at 
our understanding of the DPS in Africa to date, in turn informing the methods I 
may adopt later on in the thesis.  The next chapter will account for the evolution 
of the political system in Nigeria, and the significance of this for our 
understanding of a putative ‘culture’ of democracy and a fully developed public 
sphere. 
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Section Two: Chapter Five 
Nigerian Media, and Politics 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will offer an instructive outline featuring key detail on the evolution 
of the political system in Nigeria, the technologies that facilitate the ill-fated 
national public sphere, from the introduction of the printing press to Nigeria in 
the 1800s to new information technologies, along with observations on the 
country’s social structure and concomitant changes in political behaviour. The 
first section opens with an overview of the development of traditional media in 
Nigeria and the influence it wields on the public sphere, from the first newspaper 
publication, Iwe-Iroyin, to present-day journalism practice involving newer media 
like YouTube, social network sites, to mention a few. This is then followed by a 
description of the normative frameworks within which this public sphere operates. 
That is, how do the economic, social and state-legal systems affect the public 
sphere in the country (especially via the media)? Are there any existing laws 
guiding how the public sphere operates in the Nigeria, media laws, policies and 
so forth? This chapter concludes with a mention of the influx of digital media 
devices into the markets, homes, offices, and spaces of association within 
Nigerian society, and the changes in how the dynamics between how the people 
relate with traditional mass media, and convey public opinion may have been 
altered. This is considered in more detail in the following chapter entitled, 
‘Digitalising Nigeria’.  
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Colonialism, National Statehood and the emergence of National 
Media 
The introduction of the printing press into Nigeria is entwined with the recent 
history of religion and of political struggle. The profession of journalism arrived in 
Nigeria in 1859 largely through the influence of the Christian Missionary Society 
(CMS) under the leadership of Reverend Henry Townsend. While the influence 
of the Church of England on the changing culture of British colonies is a subject 
of vast interest, Townsend was specifically keen on promoting literacy in Nigeria. 
Duyile thus describes the introduction of the newspaper to Nigeria as being by 
‘the sole effort of a Missionary gentleman…’ (1987: 2). A letter by Townsend to 
the home offices of CMS read, ‘I have set on a foot a Yoruba newspaper…my 
objective is to get the people to read…to beget the habit of getting information 
by reading’ (Kperogi, 2013: 4).  
Although, earlier attempts at using the printing press had been made in Nigeria 
in 1846 by Reverend Hope Waddel, a clergyman of the Church of Scotland, his 
efforts were not directed at wide-dissemination newspaper publishing (Duyile, 
1987: 2-3). Townsend’s paper, Iwe Iroyin, however, was intentionally pervasive. 
Essentially a religious newspaper, it quickly gained a political dimension as 
Reverend Henry Townsend was inclined to challenge the colonial authority at 
the same time as publishing religious news.  As Idowu (2000: 152) puts it, 
although Iwe Iroyin was ostensibly religious, it equally served as a ‘political 
propaganda tool to fight the colonial administration’ (Idowu, 2000: 152). It was 
published in both English and the local Yoruba language, and Duyile writes in 
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his important historical account, Makers of the Nigerian Press (1987) ‘One could 
easily fall under the delusion that these religious African newspapers were 
nothing more than pamphlets of religious sermons, but on close observation of 
their content one discovers that they were highly influential in our political affairs’ 
(1987: 3). 
In 1863, the Christian Missionary Society cautioned Reverend Townsend, and a 
year later the colonial Governor Freeman filed a complaint to the British 
government Colonial Office that Townsend was ‘aggravating problems of foreign 
policy’ (Idowu, 2000: 152). Not too long after, Iwe Iroyin went out of print and 
collapsed, which in Duyile’s account could be attributed to numerous local 
rivalries (wars), which the paper ‘got involved in’ and hence ‘could not escape 
from the local hostility which accompanied the riots’ (1987: 13). The fall of Iwe 
Iroyin came in 1867, as Townsend’s printing press had been destroyed in a 13th 
October 1867 uprising against Europeans and European missionaries (Duyile, 
1987: 13).  At the collapse of Iwe Iroyin, other (religious) newspapers sprang up 
in its place. According to Dare (2000: 12), newspapers having no affiliations to 
the church began to emerge in the 1880s. In his words: ‘Educated Africans, 
especially in the crown colony of Lagos, were becoming disillusioned by the 
glaring contradictions between the vaunted benevolence of Christian colonialism 
and its alienating, exploitative nature…taking advantage of the growing literate 
population and the expansion in the printing industry in Lagos’ (Dare, 2000: 12), 
he continues that these ‘educated Africans’ set up newspapers, which ‘soon 
became the spearhead of a nationalism that was at once cultural and political’ 
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(Dare, 2000: 12). Nationalist-owned and state-owned regional publications 
began to emerge, some owned by Nigerian citizens, and others by publishers 
from other African countries. Duyile notes that ‘in the first seventy years of the 
growth of the Nigerian press…nearly all the publishers and editors were either 
Liberians or Sierra-Leonians’ (Duyile, 1987: 22-23).  
The religious foundation of early journalism in Nigeria, however, is significant to 
this thesis given how religion is fundamentally cultural and given the ongoing 
impact of religion (specifically Protestant Christianity and Islam), on Nigerian 
socio-economic and political systems, political decision-making and the values 
and ethics that frame its nascent public sphere. The intertwined relationship 
between religion and politics in Nigeria resides in, for example, how politicians 
routinely appeal to religious (as well as ethnic) sentiments during electoral 
campaigns, or the ethical imperatives of Northern Nigerian Islamic politics (The 
name of the extremist Islamic militant group ‘Boko Haram’ can be interpreted 
‘western education is sinful’).  
After Iwe Iroyin, the second newspaper to be published in Nigeria was the Anglo 
African (published in 1863 in Lagos, the city’s first newspaper). It was not 
religious but provided information-based news items and commentary, 
advertisements and fiction, and was started by Robert Campbell, a Jamaican 
born maverick businessman and journalist. While for the most part business-like 
in its aims, according to Duyile, ‘when Governor Freeman [colonial governor] 
knew of the coming of Anglo-African he made frantic efforts seeking authority to 
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impose a tax upon newspapers published in the colony to frustrate them out of 
business and to prevent them from being viable’ (1987: 17). Nonetheless, Duyile 
goes on to say that, ‘when Governor Freeman later discovered that Campbell’s 
Anglo-African was “friendly” he supported it with government’s advertisement 
patronage, rather than muzzle it’ (1987: 17). Other newspapers such as Lagos 
Times and Gold Coast Advertiser (founded 1880), were said to have been used 
by its publisher to ‘ventilate public opinion on topical issues’ (Duyile, 1987: 19). 
Newspapers like The Lagos Weekly Record (founded1890), enjoyed 
government patronage, an arrangement that lent it ‘long life and tended to make 
it look like a government mouthpiece’ (Duyile, 1987: 21). As nationalism was on 
the rise during this period, papers that seem to pander to government needs 
became unpopular. Another newspaper said to have ‘had a reputation’ of being 
‘silent over criticisms of the colonial government’ was the Nigerian Pioneer by 
Kitoye Ajasa, founded in 1914. Dare (2000: 14) describes Kitoye Ajasa as 'the 
urbane lawyer and confidant of the colonial authorities.' (See appendix for table 
of early newspapers in Nigeria and their publishers). 
Nevertheless, the struggle of nationalists led Nigeria to her independence. The 
foreword to Duyile's esteemed literature reads, 'the war of independence was 
fought on the pages of the Nigerian press. Not one shot was fired. But many 
thundering editorials were written' (1987). Citing Omu's (1978) words Dare also 
adds that the early Nigerian press was 'the most distinguished intellectual forum 
in Nigeria's history', where the 'high standard of debate and discussion' would 
'fascinate the modern reader' (Dare, 2000: 13). One newspaper acclaimed to 
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have been significantly active in the nationalist struggle was Herbert Macaulay's 
Lagos Daily News, 1927. Dare says this newspaper is 'credited with wielding the 
deadliest pen in Nigerian journalism', as it was 'a ferociously anti-government 
newspaper' as well as a political springboard and organ for Macaulay's then 
founded political party (2000, 14-15). Herbert Macaulay is widely acclaimed as 
the "father of Nigerian nationalism", and it was from his leadership on this 
newspaper, that he gained this title (Dare, 2000: 15). Other active newspapers 
in the nationalist struggle are: Nnamdi Azikwe's West African Pilot (1937), who 
went on to establish Nigeria's first newspaper chain with holdings in regions 
around the country. Other titles in Azikwe's chain of newspapers were equally 
active in the nationalist struggle; Obafemi Awolowo's Nigerian Tribune (1949). 
Other papers such as the Daily Times and Daily Express, both of which were 
controlled by business men and 'foreign interests', deliberately steered clear of 
political issues and focused on economic and social matters (Mabadeje, 2004: 
8-9).  
Newspapers embroiled in the nationalist struggle of the years 1937-1960 could 
be viewed as facilitators of the early resistance movements that resisted colonial 
government (Mabadeje, 2004: 6). Duyile explains that, aside from the water 
rates protests, uprisings against taxation, the Aba Women’s riot of 1929, ‘the 
Lagos Press added impetus to all political protests organised by educated 
elites…the influence and political thoughts of such famous Negro leaders as 
Edward Blyden and Marcus Garvey had already infused a strong sense of 
human rights and political rights in many educated elites of the period’ (2004: 
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25). Hence, even in this embryonic state, the Nigerian ‘public sphere’ was 
shaped by international influences and thoughts, as indeed the political sphere 
itself was formed by foreign colonial rule and all its imported state and 
educational apparatuses.  
In 1960, Nigeria gained independence from the British colonial government. 
Through the periods of successive nationalist struggle, however, the public 
sphere of political debate became radically divided along ethnic lines. Why 
ethnicity became even more pronounced with political independence, is the 
subject of some debate. Isichei (1983: 4) claims that ethnic stereotypes and 
imagery from pre-colonial times evolved through the colonial era and endured. 
She suggests that colonial government inflated ethnic divisions by placing the 
ethnic groups in different administrative units, whereby ‘…mentally, by 
constantly grouping people in ethnic categories, colonial rulers did much to 
ensure that they viewed themselves in the same way, and encouraged them to 
act as such’ (1983: 50). Dare (2000: 17-18) continues this train of thought 
explaining that, ‘a distinct feature of the press in Nigeria before independence 
was [that it was] almost entirely owned and controlled by individuals [members 
of different ethnic groups] and political parties’ with the exception of one, the 
Nigerian Outlook. Hence, ‘with the attainment of political independence in 1960, 
the cleavages that had been subsumed by the nationalist struggle came into 
bold relief. Britain, the “common enemy”, had departed. The regions, the ethnic 
groups and the political parties around which they were organised, turned 
inwards and on themselves…’ (Dare, 2000: 18). That is to say, while the people 
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were united in their struggle through the embryonic public debate facilitated in 
the press, (and perhaps other means, such as on-ground protests), without the 
common commitment to expel the colonialist enemy, a predictable fragmentation 
occurred. Different regions (split according to ethnic groups) in Nigeria had 
already begun to own newspapers before independence, so at independence, 
as Idowu mentions,  ‘each paper saw its loyalty to the region’ not the nation, and 
the ‘pursuit of truth was subsumed under regional consideration’ (2000: 157). 
Falola, in his important book, Colonialism and Violence (2009), categorises the 
history of colonialism and violence in Nigeria into three phases. The first phase 
involved ‘an unlawful use of force by an imperialist power to obtain political 
dominance’; the second phase occurred from the 1900s to the late 1940s, where 
Nigeria opposed the forces of colonisation, especially on issues such as policies 
on taxation and the consolidation of colonial rule. The final phase of violence is 
marked by the struggle for power that ensued among to-be political leaders of 
Nigeria, when the British began disengaging in the 1950s.  The 1900s to the late 
1940s were in some ways the crucible out of which modern Nigeria was formed, 
as many of the struggles of this era remain today and form central political 
dilemmas and matters of public concern. The resistance to colonialism took the 
form of physical protests, such as the ‘Women’s War’ of 1929, where Igbo 
women resisted some British policies. According to Falola (2009: xii), ‘many of 
the protest movements and “wars” were led by the precolonial leaders’. This was 
the ‘warrior class’ of tribal leaders and others who saw their power on the 
decline. While the majority of the Western-educated African elites did not directly 
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join the protests, they communicated their anti-colonial sentiments through 
means such as organising elite-based political associations, commentary in the 
media. As Falola (2009) puts it, ‘while it was the kings and chiefs who organised 
the resistance of the nineteenth century, new leaders and centres of power 
began to emerge in the twentieth’ (Falola, 2009: xii).   
The final phase of violence is marked by the struggle for power that ensued 
among to-be political leaders of Nigeria, when the British began disengaging in 
the 1950s. At this point, Nigerians began to fight, not with the British, but with 
one another. Falola (2009: xiii) explains the situation in detail thus, ‘just as the 
process of establishing colonial control divided Nigerian groups, so too the 
process of colonial disengagement turned one Nigerian group against another…’ 
(Falola (2009:xiii).  In the colonial phase, the motive was to weaken and destroy 
local power centres, but here in the third phase, Nigerian groups and their 
representatives were involved in the lasting struggle for intra-communal political 
dominance. This struggle was formative for the allegiances and values of the 
Nigerian press, and in turn prohibitive of a single coherent public sphere. Dare 
confirms: ‘Since the press was deeply polarised along party lines and the parties 
themselves were divided along ethnic lines, it seldom spoke with anything 
resembling a consensus on the major issues of the day’ (Dare, 2000: 19). In this 
context, any reference to a Habermasian public sphere -- where issues of public 
interest were to be debated and arguments won on the basis of their strength 
alone, and where such arguments were assumed to be valid for the welfare of 
the nation – seems tenuous and itself ‘colonialist’. To this day, while Nigeria has 
	   144	  
indeed constructed a coherent and singular state apparatus, key concepts like 
‘consensus’ remain unattainable.  
In 1936, the British colonial rule in Nigeria set up the Plymouth Committee so as 
to take steps to ‘improve and create more wired broadcasting in her colonies’ 
(Duyile, 1987: 282). This committee was to ‘consider and recommend what 
steps could be taken to accelerate the provision of broadcasting services in 
colonial empire, to co-ordinate such services with the work of the British 
Broadcasting Corporation and to make them more effective instrument for 
promoting local and imperial interest’ (ibid.). The committee recommended the 
‘installation of loudspeakers in schools, colleges, town squares, town halls, 
market assemblies and other places for communal listening’, but these 
recommendations were not implemented as the war [world war] had broken out 
(Duyile, 1987: 283-4).   
The Turner-Byron report of 1949 succeeded the Plymouth Committee effort. 
Turner and Byron were tasked with investigating the ‘the feasibility on technical 
grounds of a proposal to establish broadcasting services in Nigeria, the Gold 
Coast  [now Ghana], The Gambia and Sierra Leone…’ (Duyile, 1987: 284). Their 
report contained recommendations of the ‘urgent establishment of wireless 
broadcasting service for Nigeria…studio centres for Lagos, Ibadan, Kaduna, 
Enugu and Kano’ (Duyile, 1987: 285). It was also ‘strongly’ recommended in the 
report that fifteen to thirty minutes daily, broadcast should be made in the ‘more 
important Nigerian languages such as Hausa, Fulani, Igbo, Yoruba, Edo, Ibiobio, 
Kanuri and Efik. In Kano it was Hausa and Arabic’ (Duyile, 1987: 285). Hence, 
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the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) was sent by the British government 
to train Nigerians who would eventually carry on with running the Nigerian 
Broadcasting Service. According to Duyile (1987: 285-286), the BBC ‘produced 
Nigeria Broadcasting network both in leadership and content’ – from programme 
orientation to style of presentation and the contents of broadcast. This had 
implications on the Nigerian public sphere at the time, which was more vibrant 
on print media and almost non-existent on the government-controlled broadcast 
media.  
Unlike radio broadcasting, which was founded through the efforts of the colonial 
government in power, television broadcasting came into Nigeria by the 
accomplishment of a regional government. Western Nigeria Television (WNTV) 
began in on October 31, 1959. Umeh (1989: 56) citing Egbon (1982), claims that 
setting up this television station in Nigeria was ‘borne out of political dissension’ 
between Chief Obafemi Awolowo, leader of the then Western region and his 
‘party men’. The defence of this purportedly ‘wasteful’ and ‘prestigious’ project 
by a region, was that ‘it was being established to satisfy the educational 
aspirations of the people of the Western region’, according to Umeh (1989: 56). 
Following in the trail of the Western region, television stations began to spring 
up in the Northern and Eastern region of Nigeria. However, regional ownership 
of television stations later became subsumed in federal government ownership 
at the establishment of the Nigerian Television Authority, NTA, in 1976. The 
Nigerian federal government took over all television station services in Nigeria 
on April 1st, 1976, ending regional ownerships of broadcast stations (Duyile, 
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1987: 296).  The broadcasting deregulation act of 1993 under military leader, 
General Ibrahim Babangida, led to the end of government monopoly over 
broadcast stations. Private enterprises were now granted authority to set up 
broadcasting enterprises.  
Content-wise, early television broadcasting in Nigeria was not culturally 
indigenous. As Duyile points out, ‘the only set back which the television station 
(WNTV: Western Nigerian Television) suffered was its reliance on foreign films 
for the better part of nearly ten years of its formation…thereby creating a 
communication problem of cultural imperialism’ (1987: 291). Related to this idea 
of cultural imperialism is the film industry in Nigeria. Ekwuazi (1991:1) states that 
the combined efforts of the colonial government and the Church (various 
European missionary groups), supported the development of the film industry in 
early Nigeria. As the missionary groups capitalised on religious films and their 
potential for acculturation, the colonial government also supplemented them with 
non-religious films that were made to ‘condition the audience to “civilisation”’, an 
example being Mr. English at Home (Ekwuazi, 1991:3).  
National Policy and Legal Frameworks: the past in the present 
The policy and legal frameworks that shaped, and still affect, the media, press 
and thus public sphere, must be outlined here. There are strong lines of 
continuity from Independence in 1960 to today – as many foundational national 
laws remain in place. Tony Momoh, scholar and author of Nigeria Media Laws 
and Ethics (2004), complied a compendium of the laws that have been 
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instrumental in structuring and framing Nigerian traditional media since 1917 
(during colonial rule), through Independence and up to the 1990s, omitting the 
crucial Nigerian Freedom of Information bill of 2011 (at the time an ongoing 
debate at the legislative arm of government). Prior to the passing of the Nigerian 
Freedom of Information Bill to law in 2011, according to Duyile (1987: 260), 
although Nigeria professed to allow the operation of a free press, ‘their degree of 
tolerance is measurable by their records of detention of journalists, closure of 
newspapers etc.’ He says that the constitution, Act No. 20 of 1963 guarantees 
‘freedom of expression’ and ‘freedom to hold and receive opinions’ - however, at 
this time, ‘the battle for press freedom has not been won’ (Duyile, 1987: 261). 
Duyile says one should be wary of the ‘impression’ that leads to the ‘delusion’ 
that press freedom has been won (1987: 261). He explains that ‘the nature of 
modern Nigerian newspaper business’, which is ‘profit-motivated’, has to 
‘operate economically to stay in business’ – hence it becomes compulsory to 
‘play safe’ (Duyile, 1987: 262). In other words, the press is not free in practice. 
Nigeria’s Freedom of Information Bill was however, fully passed into law on May 
28, 2011 (Freedom House, 2011).   
Tracing the history of policy frameworks and laws that regulated how the early 
newspaper industry operated in Nigeria, worthy of note is the Newspaper Act of 
1917, which made provision for the setting up of independent newspapers. 
Momoh (2004: 11) draws attention to the fact that this Act was an amendment to 
the Criminal Code of 1916, which in turn was ‘a consolidation of the Newspaper 
Ordinance of 1903 and the Sedition Ordinance of 1909’ (Momoh, 2004: 11-12). 
	   148	  
In other words, legal provisions for independence have always been bound up 
with state control. On the Seditious Ordinance of 1909, Duyile points out that the 
law was ‘greeted on arrival with strongly worded criticisms from the 
knowledgeable public, the elites and opinion leaders in Lagos and the popular 
press’ (2004: 25). At the time the embryonic Nigerian public sphere positioned 
the press itself as an issue of public interest. However, ‘opinion leaders’ played 
significant roles in the formation of this public sphere(s), and to date public 
debate tends to coalesce around assertive political figures, and not otherwise 
objective issues directly pertaining to a public interest.  
A second seminal legal act is the Printing Press Regulation Act of 1933, which 
came into force at the time when the nationalists’ struggle for independence was 
most active (Momoh, 2004: 15; Duyile, 2004: 45). This Act prohibited ownership 
of a printing press except the owner made a declaration in court providing 
information on where the press is situated – and in the advent of a change of 
location, the printing press owner must make a new declaration or be fined a 
sum of N100. This was one of a cluster of laws during the colonial era positioned 
in and around the Criminal and Penal Code, such as the law on Sedition, 
purposively enacted by the British administration to ‘put a check on the press’ 
(Momoh, 2004: 16). A seditious publication was one with seditious intention, and 
seditious intention in turn translated as ‘to bring into hatred or contempt or to 
excite disaffection against the person of the Head of the Federal Military 
Government…to raise discontent or disaffection among the inhabitants of 
Nigeria…’ (Momoh, 2004: 17, citing the Nigerian Constitution).  
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Between 1960 and 1966, after the Nigerian independence, new laws regarding 
how the press operated were promulgated. Not all were harmful to the freedom 
of the press; for instance, the Children and Young Persons (Harmful 
Publications) Act of 1961, which prohibited the dissemination of pictorial 
publications harmful to children (Momoh, 2004: 23). However, laws that 
threatened press freedom or had the potential to were - the Emergency Powers 
Act of 1961, that authorised the Govenor-in-Council to make any regulations 
deemed necessary in ‘maintaining and securing peace, order and good 
government in Nigeria’ (Momoh, 2004: 25). Another of such laws was the Official 
Secrets Acts of 1962, that makes ‘further provision for securing public safety’ 
(Momoh, 2004: 27). The Act prohibits disclosure to the public of any matter 
defined as ‘classified’. According to Momoh, ‘Classified matter is defined as “any 
information or thing which, under any system of security classification…is not to 
be disclosed to the public and of which the disclosure to the public would be 
prejudicial to the security of Nigeria”’ (2004:28). It is matter debated as to 
whether the passing and provisions of the Freedom of Information bill will negate 
the restrictions of the Official Secrets Act. Freedom House online (2012) gives 
account of a 2011 incident where Olajide Fashikun of the National Accord 
newspaper was arrested over publishing articles that allegedly accused the 
Nigerian Football Federation (NFF) of fraud. He was being held on libel charges.  
 Between 1966 and 1979, the military took over power in the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, and what followed were another slew of anti-press laws. Some of the 
prominent decrees that led to the harassment of many a journalist were: The 
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Defamatory and Offensive Publications Decree No. 44, 1966, and the Public 
Officers (Protection Against False Accusation) Decree No. 11, 1976. The 
defamatory and offensive publications decree made it an offence to ‘publish or 
display or offer to the public’ any pictorial representation of a person living or 
dead that would offend any section of the community, according to Momoh 
(2004: 31). In addition, songs, sounds or recordings with words ‘likely to provoke 
any section of the community’ was also deemed offensive (ibid.) As for the 
Public Officers (Protection Against False Accusation) Decree, otherwise known 
as the Ohonbamu decree (Momoh, 2004: 32), it made it an offence ‘to 
propagate, by any means, any false allegation of corruption in relation to any 
public officer.’  All these laws would have had an impact on a nascent Nigerian 
public sphere at the time – they were stifling.  
Media organisations such as the News Agency of Nigeria (Decree No. 19, 1976) 
and Nigerian Television Authority (Decree No. 24, 1976) were also established 
during this time. In the case of the latter, the government took over all the 
broadcast stations in the country (Momoh, 2004: 34). The News Agency of 
Nigeria on the other hand, was set up as a ‘monopoly’ to curate news ‘from 
within and outside Nigeria’ and supply ‘same to subscribers for a fee’ (ibid.) 
These are just a few of other decrees under the military. At the return to civilian 
rule in 1979, the Presidential system of government was introduced where the 
entire country would elect one representative. Prior to this, Nigeria practiced ‘the 
Westminster model’, i.e. the parliamentary system, which was dismantled by the 
military in January 1966 (Momoh, 2004: 39). This new arrangement was short-
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lived, as the military took over power once again in 1984. According to Momoh, 
the bill which the National Assembly, under the civilian government, passed into 
law regarding the press, was the Electoral Act, ‘which provided for the 
monitoring of the press during 1983 elections’ (2004: 40). From 1984 to 1999 
the military ruled in Nigeria and promulgated more laws against the press.  
Since broadcast media operated as a monopoly under the government, as 
mentioned earlier, there was no need to hamper electronic media. Some of such 
laws promulgated by the military government from 1984 included: Constitution 
(Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 1, 1984, which allowed the military to 
make decrees that ‘were binding and could not be questioned’ (Momoh 2004: 
41); State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree No. 2, 1984, which in addition 
allowed the detention of persons deemed to be involved in ‘acts prejudicial to 
state security…’ Momoh (2004: 42) says that ‘most of the people held during the 
military regime were held under Decree 2’. Other decrees promulgated at this 
time further consolidated the powers of the military, setting them above even the 
judiciary. Examples are The Federal Military Government (Supremacy and 
Enforcement Powers) Decree No. 13, 1984. The media-related decrees that set 
up the Nigerian Press Council (formerly, Nigeria Media Council) were the 
Nigerian Media Council Decree No. 59, 1989 and Nigerian Press Council 
Decree No. 85, 1992 (Momoh, 2004: 47).  
It was the National Broadcasting Commission Decree No. 38, 1992 that 
deregulated the electronic media in Nigeria, and allowed free entry to private 
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enterprises to equally set up broadcast stations. This was a milestone in 
Nigeria’s media history. This decree broke the monopoly over the broadcasting 
industry in Nigeria by providing for private interests in broadcasting (Momoh, 
2004: 47). The subsequent establishment of many private radio and some 
television stations followed this decree, examples of which are Africa 
Independent Television (1994), Channels Television (1995), Silverbird TV 
(2003), Raypower FM, Star FM, and more recently Wazobia FM, Inspiration FM. 
All programming actions of broadcast stations remain under the guidance of the 
National Broadcasting Commission, who reserve the right to censor. For 
instance, in 2014, the Nigerian government, through the Commission, banned 
the airing of a documentary, Fuelling Poverty (directed by Ishaya Bako and 
whose making was sponsored by the Soros Foundation’s Open Society Justice 
Initiative for West Africa), which explored the alleged scam surrounding the then 
removal of fuel subsidy by the Government. The Committee to Protect 
Journalists condemned the censorship and the banning of the distribution of the 
film (CPJ, 2013). 
Idris Mabadeje (2004) published a compendium of cases of press freedom 
violations in Nigeria from 1966 to 1999 (under the military). In his work, he gives 
account of journalist arrests, brutality and killings. For example, Nduka 
Obiagbena, the then editor-in-chief of ThisWeek magazine (now defunct), was 
arrested June 14, 1988 by the State Security Service (SSS) for publishing a 
story on ‘power tussle among close aides of the president’ - his international 
passport was equally seized (Mabadeje, 2004: 47). Another example is the 
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three-month detention without trial of Etim Etim, the Financial Correspondent at 
Guardian (another Nigerian newspaper) in August 1988, for ‘obtaining and 
publishing information on the Central Bank’ - he was held under Decree 4 of 
1984 (ibid.) Such were the harsh conditions under which traditional media in 
Nigeria attempted to flourish. It was not until 1999 that the transition to 
democratic rule began, and although civilian rule commenced the constitution 
still bore underpinnings of the military government in terms of how it shaped the 
practice of journalism.  
More recently, press freedom is still to a large extent, a challenged phenomenon 
in Nigeria. According to Freedom House’s 2014 report on the state of press 
freedom in Nigeria, the country is ranked ‘partly free.’ Freedom House accounts 
for ‘more than a dozen arrests and prosecution of journalists’ being carried out 
‘under the antiterrorism and public incitement law.’ Freedom House (2014, 
online) online notes that though none of the trials ‘has amounted to a conviction’, 
‘harassment, obstruction, and intimidation of the media combined’ creates a 
‘chilling effect on free expression.’ On the Nigerian Freedom on Information bill 
that was passed into law in 2011: this was the first constitutional provision that 
addressed the needs of journalists. The Act is ‘to make public records and 
information more freely available, provide for public access to public records and 
information, protect public records and information to the extent consistent with 
the public interest and the protection of personal privacy’ (FOI Act, 28th May 
2011). However, at the same time, the Act is to ‘protect serving public officers 
from adverse consequences of disclosing certain kinds of official information’ 
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without ‘authorisation’ (FOI Act, 28th May 2011). With this new law, ideally, the 
Nigerian media was guaranteed the freedom to access information that would 
enable them better to carry out their democratic functions of holding the 
government accountable through keeping the citizenry informed.  
The rise of digital media adoption in Nigeria sparked another milestone in 
Nigeria’s media history. With it came the rise of citizen journalists, online social 
activists, and everyday users who formed the audience of these platforms. In 
terms of legal framework and regulations, there have been speculations (from 
the research interviews) that the Nigerian government may seek to legislate 
digital media and perhaps limit Internet freedom. However, it must be highlighted 
that at the time of writing this thesis, there has still been no legislation against 
the use of digital media for public communication in Nigeria.  
Nonetheless, there have been a number of incidents where bloggers and digital 
media users have been arrested or detained going by accounts from the 
websites of international organisations such as Committee Protecting Journalists 
(CPJ), Freedom House and more. According to Bayiewu Leke of Punch 
newspaper (2012), Senate President, David Mark, criticised and called for the 
censorship of social media in the country. On the Committee to Protect 
Journalists website, there is a report on the arrest of US-based Nigerian 
bloggers upon arriving in their home country (CPJ, 2008). According to the 
report, both Emmanuel Emeka Asikwe of Huhuonline (based in Arlington) and 
Jonathan Elendu of ElenduReports (based in Michigan) were arrested and 
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detained at different times. Local reporters told CPJ that ‘the detentions are part 
of a government crackdown on foreign-based Nigerian political web sites ever 
since controversial photos of President Umaru Yar’Adua’s son were published 
on a popular news blog’ (CPJ, 2008). According to data from Freedom House on 
Internet freedom in Nigeria (2014), access and use of the Internet is ‘partly free’ 
– that is neither fully free or fully bridled. Freedom House submits that this 
ranking is based on the fact that Nigeria has a population of one hundred and 
seventy-three point six million (173.6 M), and no social media or ICT apps, 
including web application apps have been blocked, no political or social content 
have been blocked either, but bloggers and ICT users have been arrested. 
Freedom House records Internet penetration in Nigeria at thirty-eight per cent.  
Key developments on how the Nigerian government has regulated digital media 
use so far in the country are recorded in the Freedom House online report 
(2014). First, there was the shutting down of mobile phone services in three 
northern states from May to December 2013. They claimed this was part of 
‘military strategy’ against the extremist terrorist group in Nigeria, Boko Haram. In 
November 2013, ‘pro government trolls’ were blamed for ‘blocking links’ to the 
Facebook page of an ‘investigative online news outlet, Premium Times’ 
(Freedom House, 2014). Another incident was also the arrest of two individuals: 
one who allegedly criticised the Bayelsa State governor on his Facebook page 
in October 2013, and the other for ‘live-tweeting an incident involving Boko 
Haram militants and the State Security Service in March 2014 (Freedom House, 
2014). Lastly, the ‘suspicions of government surveillance’ still remains, following 
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from the 2013 report from Freedom House, especially as the 2014 budget is 
said to make provision for the ‘purchase of specialised surveillance equipment’ 
(Freedom House, 2014).  
In the Freedom House online 2013 report, it was alleged that a device that could 
be used in controlling ‘undesirable traffic’ was discovered on many private 
Internet service providers in Nigeria – it was commonly referred to as ‘the Blue 
Coat PacketShaper appliance’. However, details as to why the technology was 
being deployed and by whom remains unknown (Freedom House, 2013). In 
addition to that, the report also mentioned that in April 2013, the suspicions of 
online censorship and surveillance by Nigerian users was confirmed when a 
certain Premium Times published a news report alleging that the federal 
government ‘had awarded a secret contract to Israel-based Elbit Systems to 
help monitor internet communications in Nigeria’ (Freedom House, 2013). 
‘Citizen Lab research also found a FinFisher command and server, which 
communicates with malware that can be used for surveillance, located on a 
private ISP in April 2013’ (ibid.)  
In 2013, Sesan et al of Paradigm Initiative Nigeria (a civil society organisation), 
published a policy brief document titled, An Internet Freedom Charter for Nigeria. 
It is recorded in the report that the Nigerian State Security Service, and private 
telecoms companies in Nigeria (MTN, Airtel, Etisalat, Glo) are listed as clients to 
Digivox. Digivox is ‘a company that specialises in lawful interception services’ 
(Sesan et al, 2013: 1). In addition, back in February 2011, Nigerian telecoms 
	   157	  
companies were mandated to ‘conduct sim card registrations and collect the 
personal information of users.’ Sesan et al (2013: 1) express concern that while 
the ‘most popularly touted benefit of this procedure’ is to monitor crime, there 
remains no legal framework (on the ground) to ‘ensure only legal access to said 
information.’ They conclude in the report that although Nigeria remains “partly 
free” by Freedom House’s 2013 ranking, ‘current trends foreshadow a backward 
slide.’ It is their position that ‘Nigeria Internet freedom advocates and civil 
society must continue to stand firmly…to protect liberties’ as ‘whatever hurts 
Internet freedom will not only be a violation of citizens rights, but will also hurt 
the Internet economy…’ (Sesan et al, 2013: 2). 
Paradigm Initiative Nigeria, headed by Gbenga Sesan (who was one of the 
interviewees in this thesis), drafted a Charter for Internet Freedom in Nigeria, 
and presented it at the Net Mundial event, which was held at Sao Paulo Brazil 
on April 23-24, 2014. The Net Mundial is a global forum where stakeholders 
gather to discuss the future of Internet governance. Gbenga Sesan presented a 
work-in-progress report on Internet Freedom Declaration for Nigeria. This report 
is published online. In his presentation, he explains that ‘the purpose of the 
Internet Freedom Declaration for Nigeria is to articulate public expectation on 
Internet freedom in Nigeria.’ Sesan makes the following key submissions on 
Internet freedom. Firstly, ‘citizens and lawful residents of Nigeria should be able 
to send electronic communication to one another free from the fear of 
surveillance, monitoring, interception, or the violation of privacy.’ Secondly, on 
data and information privacy, Sesan submits that ‘there should be clarity on the 
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means by which the private data of individuals, stored by intermediaries, can be 
accessed.’ Thirdly, on access and content, he contends that ‘individuals and 
institutions have the right to create and access content on the Internet’ and such 
acts ‘should not be subject to censorship.’ In addition to this point, Sesan adds 
that ‘it should be illegal for government or any entity to deny or censor access to 
the Internet without providing adequate and acceptable reasons.’ Lastly, on 
Freedom of Expression, Sesan states explicitly that that every form of 
expression, including ‘retweets, likes, favourites, shares, online comments, 
joining groups on social network sites…’ all ‘constitute speech’, hence, they 
should equally ‘enjoy the protected status of fundamental human rights.’  
In summary of what has been discussed so far, the introduction of the press to 
Nigeria was a result of religious efforts that later became embroiled in the 
political struggle for independence from colonial powers. However, the 
introduction of the broadcasting media came about as a result of both efforts of 
the colonial government (radio) and regional governments (television). The 
press in Nigeria, through a vibrant public sphere of nationalists, was 
instrumental in securing independence from the British colonial government in 
1960. However, the newspapers that made up the Nigerian press, were 
enmeshed in ethnic sentiments that divided them at independence and fractured 
the Nigerian public sphere. The public sphere that existed on the broadcast 
media was less vibrant for no reason other than the fact that until 1992, 
broadcasting was statutorily under the monopoly of the government in power. 
Hence, the opportunity to debate, dialogue, expression of public opinion were 
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limited, unlike in the print media.  
The public sphere that existed via the press still struggled due to limitations of 
freedom of expression in Nigeria. Suffice to say that there was no constitutional 
provision for press freedom until recently in 2011. Several laws, promulgated by 
both the civilian and military rule in Nigeria somewhat stifled the press, while 
others outrightly muzzled the freedom of expression. Journalists were arrested 
and detained and newspaper houses were shut down, and these are just a few 
examples of the oppressive acts of the Nigerian government against the press, 
which of course generates forms of self-censorship and a generalised fear of 
reprisals that by their nature disincentivize even journalists for participating in an 
embryonic public sphere. However, the influx of digital media into the Nigerian 
polity made for forms of participation that partially concealed the identity of the 
speaker and, in the form of mobile phones, internet service providers, rise of 
cyber cafes (internet access points), whose operation is not vulnerable to open 
social coercion by the authorities. Digital media has altered the dynamics of how 
people communicate and express public opinions in Nigeria.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I presented the history of the Nigerian mass media, from the 
press to the broadcast media, radio and television. I also laid out the national 
policies and legal frameworks that have shaped its existence and how it has 
operated within the Nigerian polity over time. The rise of digital media adoption 
in recent times in Nigeria has altered the dynamics of the relationship between 
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members of civil society, the mass media, and the government. In this next 
chapter, ‘Digitalising Nigeria’, we will see in exactly what ways how information 
is spread, shared, and discussed, has been transformed.  
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Section Two: Chapter Six 
‘Digitalising’ Nigeria 
 
 
Introduction 
In Habermas’ classical conception of the public sphere, ‘culture’ is a significant if 
nebulous dimension of society. It concerns more than the patterns of everyday 
life (family, food, shelter and cohabitation, work, social interaction, organisation) 
and the symbolic languages through which these are articulated (clothing, ritual, 
artistic production, and so on). Culture is a means of provisional solidarity and 
collective allegiance through values and beliefs concerning the nature of 
solidarity and collective allegiance and the individual benefits of such. The 
dynamic of social interaction that generates this provisional collectivity is 
communication.  
In this chapter, I expand of the concept of digital media as culture in Nigeria, in 
terms of public communication, dialogue and solidarity among members of her 
public sphere – the state and the people. I identify using existing literature, what 
digital media tools are popularly adopted in Nigeria, and explore the relationship 
among old media, new media, and the Nigerian public sphere. Here, I offer a 
narrative on the increased adoption of the Internet, via mobile telephony in the 
country, and list identifiable roles digital media is currently active in, in facilitating 
an embryonic public sphere in Nigeria. 
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Nigeria Democratic Digital Media Culture 
Public communication emerged as a specific genre of communication, with 
identifiable modes and methods of delivery, places and spaces, content 
(message) and visual accompaniment. Given the sudden influx of digital media 
technology into the Nigerian society, it has generated new forms of social 
interaction and thus the potential for solidarity and collective allegiance on 
matters of public interest. The new ‘culture’ of communication demonstrates 
democratic characteristics in the sense that it is consolidating individual 
identities, awarding legitimacy to individual statements and opinions, forming 
mass trends in discussion topics, drawing attention to current affairs and 
international events, and stimulating creative behaviours and new values in and 
through new communication networks. These networks can be demonstrated to 
respond to certain democratic needs and societal issues in Nigeria, and facilitate 
the emergence of specific ‘communities’ of interest who otherwise would have 
no means of social interconnection. More importantly, they are increasingly 
provoking the response of public officials, public services and government. In 
Nigeria, new digital media communication tools have been made available, and 
we will be exploring their consequences on society, culturally.  
In the West, the use of Web 2.0 for engaging with citizens is increasingly 
commonplace. In the U.S., President Barack Obama, has a dedicated Twitter 
page (askobama.twitter.com), and Twitter Town Hall Meetings* with him are 
becoming frequent occurrences. Likewise in New Zealand, Macnamara et al 
(2012: 623) explain that strategies are shifting from 'an initial focus on delivery of 
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information and services, to the use of social media (interactive Web 2.0), to 
'engage citizens in consultation and participation to redress a concerning 
‘democratic deficit’ and reinvigorate the public sphere' (Macnamara et al. 2012: 
623). Although African countries still struggle with closing the ‘democratic deficit’ 
in their respective societies, it is safe to claim that the continent is gradually 
adopting ‘eCulture’ as well. According to Heeks (2002:1), '…eGovernment is 
only slowly diffusing within Africa because of a lack of e-readiness for e-
government.' He argues that this challenge needs to be met through 'strategic 
building of national infrastructure' (Heeks, 2002:1). See seventeen other 
examples in Barkat (N.D)1. 
Some African governments have indeed attempted to engage with citizens over 
the Internet. For instance, Goodluck Jonathan, the recent previous President of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria, initially announced his ambition to run for 
presidency over Facebook (BBC Africa, 2010). He also has a Facebook page, 
where as at February 5th 2015 had a total of 1, 779, 557 ‘likes’. Examples of 
other African leaders who have active profiles online include, Joyce Banda, the 
President of the Federal Republic of Malawi (Twitter, 2013), President John 
Mahama of Ghana (Twitter, 2013) and many more.  
There is expressed optimism around Africa's democracy and her engagement 
with digital media and the facilities for communication, information, interaction 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Barkat	  et	  al	  (N.D)	  provide	  17	  examples	  of	  social	  media	  and	  government	  innovation	  around	  the	  world,	  such	  as:	  SeeClickFix	  (U.S.),	  Ushahidi	  (Kenya),	  GovLoop	  (U.S),	  Votenaweb	  (Brazil),	  and	  others	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and learning that it affords its citizens. For Uche (1999:202): 'the information 
superhighway is a promoter of democracy. It is a liberator of the downtrodden. It 
is a harbinger of economic good tidings and fortunes. It is a leveller of some sort 
at both the political, social and economic realms. That is why it has become an 
allergy to those African leaders...' On the other hand, Mudhai et al (2009:1) calls 
for caution against this seeming ‘cyber-utopian’ line of thinking: '…the advent of 
new media technologies...was accompanied by the hype about the continent's 
possibility of "leapfrogging" some stages of development...after over a decade of 
the emergences of new ICTs (information and communication technologies), the 
old questions about access, inequality, power and the quality of information are 
still valid' (Mudhai et al., 2009:1). Alzouma (2005)2 also calls for similar caution. 
In Africa, the argument is that, while there is significant use of new digital media, 
they often take on complementary roles to traditional media forms, as opposed 
to holding any significant advantage over the latter. This is to say that, new 
media can be successful in Africa when combined with more familiar forms of 
media (e.g. print and broadcast media, trusted face-to-face interaction), while 
outside of this, new media 'may offer only limited influence on the political 
process' (Nyabuga and Mudhai, 2009:51). Aptly put by Mudhai et al (2009:2), 
the value of new media in Africa resides 'in the extent to which they enmesh with 
old media to provide multimedia platforms that allow for greater democratic 
participation, inclusion and expression' (Mudhai et al. 2009:2).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  In	  Alzouma’s	  2005	  article,	  he	  also	  calls	  for	  caution	  in	  advocating	  ICT	  for	  development	  in	  Africa,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  not	  totally	  rejecting	  the	  promises	  it	  might	  hold	  for	  the	  continent.	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We need to identify the actual ‘providers’, interfaces, websites and service 
portals that make up the aesthetic-technological landscape of new digital media 
in Nigeria. I do this, not from a desk-survey of economic and corporate or market 
data, but from my research interviews: the following catalogue of digital media 
brands represent the Nigerian landscape, and from this it will be evident that the 
domination of US and Western media is almost total:  
• Facebook 
• Twitter 
• Instagram  
• BBM  
• Whatsapp  
• YouTube  
• Blogs  
• SMS 
• Google Alerts  
• Linkedin  
• Google+  
• Email  
 
In addition, we should indeed also refer to economic and corporate or market 
data. According to the Africa Practice Report 2014  – from a prominent strategy 
and communications consultancy seeking to ‘accelerate growth in Africa’ – the 
top ten most visited webpages in Nigeria (by Alexa ranking) can be tabulated as 
follows:  
• Google 
• Google Nigeria  
• Facebook 
• Yahoo  
• YouTube 
• Blogger 
• Nairaland (a web forum)  
• LinkedIn  
• Twitter 
• Wikipedia  
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(Africa Practice, 2014:2) 
Mobile chat apps are also found to be popular in Nigeria, because they augur 
well for the people where there is poor information and communication 
technology infrastructure. These apps remain effective in situations of lower 
bandwidth and use less data. In addition, mobile chat apps cost significantly less 
than SMS, yet serve the same function of communicating by text messaging 
(Africa Practice, 2014: 6). The top nine web-blogs or forums visited from Nigeria 
(by Alexa rankings) according to the report are:  
• Nairaland (forum) 
• Linda Ikeji (gossip blog) 
• Naij.com (news) 
• Bella Naija (gossip) 
• Jobberman (career)  
• Notjustok (music)  
• 360 Nobs (music and entertainment)  
• Net Ng (entertainment)  
• YNaija (politics & opinion)  
(Africa Practice, 2014: 28-32) 
However, according to the UN eGovernment Survey for 2014, Nigeria ranks in 
the ‘middle EGDI’ (eGovernment Development Index), where the ranking was 
split into the following: 
• Very High EGDI  
• High EGDI 
• Middle EGDI 
• Low EGDI 
(UN, 2014: 21) 
Although general government trends in Africa tend towards mobile government 
initiatives and social media strategies, the above UN government report 
recommends that policymakers explore the idea of eGovernment on a ‘more 
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fundamental level through adjusting legislation and policies to encompass 
technology in national development strategies and welcoming new ideas and 
ways of connecting with citizens’ (UN eGov, 2014: 22). The digital divide, a 
common concept used to describe the discrepancy between the ‘haves and 
have-nots’ of digital media devices and the necessary network access, exists in 
Nigeria. The majority of those with access to digital media are located in the 
urban areas, while rural areas have less access to the Internet and other digital 
media technologies. Availability and affordability are the major challenges to 
Internet access in Africa (Human IPO, 2014).  
Data on the precise number of Nigerians with access to new digital media is 
difficult to access as there is a dearth of statistical surveys on the subject; of 
those available, only a few are reliable. According to the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) Report of 2014, in the world over, by the end 
of 2014, there will be three billion internet users (3b), two-thirds of which emerge 
from the developing world. In addition, mobile broadband subscriptions will climb 
to two point three billion (2.3b) globally, and fifty-five per cent (55%) of that rise 
is expected to come from the developing world as well (ITU, 2014). Nigeria is 
regarded as a developing society. Furthermore, Internet World Stats 2012 
Report states that Internet penetration in Nigeria is at twenty-eight point four per 
cent (28.4%) in relation to a population size of one hundred and seventy million, 
one hundred and twenty-three thousand, seven hundred and forty (170, 123, 
740). Although in year 2000, there were a total of two hundred thousand 
(200,000) Internet users in Nigeria, by 2012, there were a total of forty-eight 
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million, three hundred and sixty-six thousand, one hundred and seventy-nine (48, 
366, 179).  
 
Africa Practice 2014 report on the social media landscape in Nigeria, has it that 
the top ten most visited webpages, based on Alexa ranking, in Nigeria are as 
follows: Google, Google Nigeria, Facebook, Yahoo, YouTube, Blogger, 
Nairaland (forum), LinkedIn, Twitter, and Wikipedia (Africa Practice, 2014: 2). 
The report suggests that mobile chat apps are popular in Nigeria, due to the 
relatively low bandwidth available, the use of less data and the low-cost involved 
when compared to how much short message services (SMS) cost (Africa 
Practice, 2014: 6). In terms of blogs and webpages visited by Nigerians 
according to the report (Africa Practice, 2014: 28-32), the top nine are: Nairaland 
(online forum), Linda Ikjeji (gossip blog), Naij.com (news), Bella Naija (gossip), 
Jobberman (career), notjustok (music), 360 Nobs (music and entertainment), 
Net Ng (entertainment), and YNaija (politics and opinion).  
Along the same vein as the ITU, Internet World Stats and Africa Practice, The 
Open Society Foundation equally published a report, Mapping Digital Media: 
Nigeria (2012). From the executive summary, it is stated that Nigeria has a 
relatively high [digital media] penetration rate, however, it is predominately 
driven by a ‘rapid expansion of mobile platforms’ (Open Society, 2012: 2). The 
report also points out that although there is Internet access in Nigeria, it is 
overwhelmingly concentrated in the urban areas that make up only sixteen per 
cent (16%) of the country (Open Society, 2012: 6).  
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Old media, new media and the Nigerian public sphere  
In an article in the daily Vanguard newspaper in 2010 [there is no corresponding 
official or scholarly account available], an article entitled “Internet: 13 Years of 
Growth from Ground Zero in Nigeria…” constructed the ‘story’ of the rise of the 
Internet in Nigeria. Its founding moment was 1996, in this year, the Nigerian 
Communications Commission (The NCC: Nigeria’s telecoms regulator), granted 
38 Internet service providers the licence to operate nationally. The following year, 
the first Internet service provider (ISP), Linkserve, was launched. Prior to the 
influx of these licensed companies, a body known as the Nigeria Internet Group 
(NIG) had been established as a non-governmental organisation tasked with the 
purpose of ‘promoting and facilitating full access to the Internet in Nigeria.’ This 
group was formed in 1995, after the first Internet workshop to hold in Nigeria. 
This workshop was organised by the Yaba College of Technology, supported by 
other organisations such as the NCC, National Data Bank and more. The 
purpose of this workshop was to ‘raise the level of awareness of the benefits of 
the Internet in Nigeria and provide a forum for discussing the future of 
networking.’ Later in May 1999, the NCC in partnership with the NIG organised 
an Africa Internet Summit. This was to discuss ‘the sustainable development 
and utilisation of the Internet in Africa’ and equally sought to launch a forum 
where ‘African Internet practitioners can come together and discuss policy 
issues peculiar to Africa’ (Vanguard, 2010).  
The adoption of the Internet in Nigeria came before the widespread influx of 
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mobile phones. However, the latter has led to an increase in Internet use, as the 
Internet is more accessible through the mobile phone. GSM technology came 
into Nigeria in 2001. Prior to its introduction, the majority of phone lines were 
provided by the state-owned Nigerian Telecommunications Limited (NITEL), and 
a few other private telecoms operators (Obadare, 2006: 97). Obadare says their 
services were abysmal (Obadare, 2006: 97). According to him, ‘a decree 
regulating the activities of the GSM companies was promulgated as far back as 
1992’, however, the policy was not actualised under the then Head of State, 
General Babangida, nor under his predecessor (Obadare, 2006: 97).  
On May 29, 1999, ‘one of the first acts’ of the then civilian President, General 
Olusegun Obasanjo, was to suspend telecommunication licenses that had been 
issued by the previous regimes (Obadare, 2006: 98). In 2001, according to 
Obadare (2006: 100), ‘the federal government threw open the auctioning 
process for four mobile licences in January 2001.’He says the mobile technology 
became so popular that ‘within a few months, the companies had exceeded their 
highest expectation’ (Obadare, 2006:100). According to data from Nigerian 
Communications Commission online, as at October 2013, there were a total of 
57, 840, 299 mobile Internet subscriptions in Africa (NCC, 2014). In addition, 
Internet World Stats (2013), claims that of Nigeria’s 177, 155, 754 population, 67, 
319, 186 are Internet users. 
The public sphere, since Habermas, has been defined as a space of social 
interaction as well as communication, where the communication generated 
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rigorous forms of debate and deliberation, and where the participants were 
defined largely by the content of such and not economic, social or political rank. 
However, I have observed that the Nigerian public sphere, despite its history of 
journalism, publishing and legislative reform, would not be recognized in the 
Habermasian framework, or any framework since. Rather, public discourse is 
unstable and intermittent, fraught with ethnic strife and religious influences, and 
set against a backdrop of colonial and military struggles whose authoritarian 
tendencies remain. This socio-political reality thus complicates the notion of the 
public sphere in Nigeria. The hybridity and multi-dimensional character of the 
digital media sphere is thus highly relevant in a country where social and 
political structures and boundaries are ambiguous and porous.  
While the hybrid character of digital media potentially supports the creation of 
spaces for citizens to interact and deliberate on matters of common concern, 
how these interactions can take place among citizens and coalesce into a 
general public opinion is difficult to assess. For citizens to join the public sphere 
via the print media, they are able to write opinion articles or letters-to-the-editor, 
even though in reality the readership of newspapers was highly segmented even 
with a national distribution. With digital media, horizontal communication from 
one citizen to the other via blogging, tweeting, face booking, still dominated, yet 
the element of mass participation and public visibility, and vertical 
interconnection of public and successive levels of authority, are only tentatively 
present. The apparent distinction between the impact of digital media in the 
West and in Africa is that there is a lack of interconnection between the new and 
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the old media, where a low level of ‘remediation’ means that old media does not 
facilitate the circulation and dissemination of new media content, and that new 
media has no competent and substantive role in old media delivery and its 
communication with its audiences.  
Nonetheless, as a preliminary overview of perspectives, observations and views 
derived from the research interview material (quoted in more detail in Section 
Two), I here list the identifiable roles digital media currently plays in facilitating 
an embryonic public sphere in Nigeria: I list them here, as a preliminary to my 
detailed empirical research and analysis, as they would be considered ‘general 
knowledge’ or at least general observational data, by the informed reader: 
• Digital media is used to draw immediate attention to inconsistencies in 
Government policy, for example, Occupy Nigeria and the policy on fuel 
subsidy. 
• It is being used to identify individual public officials responsible for 
particular public policies, and target them with questions.  
• It is currently beckoning (and often goading) Government into a formal 
and systematic account of its actions.   
• Digital media has diversified the channels of communication of social and 
particular issues – where issues can inhabit the most effective channels, 
or migrate to other channels or platforms depending on the requirements 
of the communication.   
• It is increasing voter awareness, (mobilising voter behaviour in response 
to particular concerns – outside of traditional or tribal allegiances).  
• Digital media has been used to monitor elections and incidences of 
violence and vote rigging in Nigeria.  
• It has also been used to mobilise medical and emergency interventions 
by citizens for fellow citizens (e.g. #Save projects) 
• Digital media is also used to sustain or interrogate reports or commentary 
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appearing in broadcast on traditional media. 
• Information spreads more cheaply in Nigeria due to uptake of digital 
media and is more immediate 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I explored the idea of digital media as culture in Nigeria, and 
identified what digital media tools are popularly adopted in this African country. 
The modes of interrelation between old media, new media, and the Nigerian 
public sphere, was placed in focus later in the chapter, where I presented a 
narrative on the increased adoption of the Internet, via mobile telephony in the 
country. I also listed identifiable roles digital media is currently playing in 
facilitating an embryonic public sphere. 
In the next section, which is the final section, put forth in detail, ‘the Nigerian 
digital public sphere in action’, but through the perspective of my interviewees. 
Before then, I discuss the methodology adopted in this thesis in Chapter Seven. 
In the later Chapters of Ten and Eleven, I critically discuss the findings of my 
research, and in detail, explore the challengers and constraints the NDPS faces 
in order to be effectively democratic in Nigeria. I also put forward certain 
suggestions for further study.  
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Section Three: Chapter Seven 
Methods 
 
Introduction 
As a way of representing the complexity of the subject of this research 
investigation into the digital public sphere in Nigeria, I constructed in the 
previous sections an outline of the central characteristics of its historical political 
and legal contexts. This constituted the field of research. In this section I will 
therefore clarify my approach to field research, and the various methodological 
and theoretical questions that it raises, before considering my interview findings. 
I have chosen interviews as a means of offering verifiable, explicit and 
contemporary insight into the embryonic public sphere, where few publications 
and little data are available.  
Outline and Rational 
Traditionally, the methodology section of a thesis comprises steps taken by the 
researcher in order to respond to the research questions guiding his/her 
respective study. In this introductory chapter of Section Three I will simply 
explain the nature of my selected method – field research interviews – and 
discuss its objectives and significance. This section is important as it also 
conveys the extraneous factors and unforeseen circumstances that may have 
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affected the outcome of the research, hence allowing the limits of the analysis 
and discussion to be clearly plotted. In order for the reader to understand the 
connection between the research problem, questions and findings, this 
methodology section needs to be clearly structured. The systematic nature of 
conducting a social scientific research makes it pertinent that the researcher 
reveals in a step-by-step format, how he/she approached the research questions, 
laying emphasis on the limitations of the study therein.  
Research interviews can function productively in both qualitative or quantitative 
frameworks of analysis. Of course, human beings are conversational beings, 
and so the interview is not in itself a pure research method, or at least a 
research method that could claim pure objectivity. The process of gathering 
knowledge through conversation precedes the adoption of interview as a 
qualitative research method. A classic definition of interviews by Maccoby & 
Maccoby (1954) as cited by Brinkmann (2013), ‘a face-to-face verbal exchange, 
in which one person, the interviewer, attempts to elicit information or 
expressions of opinion or belief from another person or persons’ (Brinkmann, 
2013: 1). However, the interview method has gone beyond the face-to-face 
interview to encompass other forms such as phone interviews, email interviews 
and others. Gubrium & Holstein give a more up-to-date description of interview 
research. It goes thus: ‘The interviewer coordinates a conversation aimed at 
obtaining desired information. He or she makes the initial contact, schedules the 
event, designates its location, sets out the ground rules, and then begins to 
question the interviewee or respondent. Questions elicit answers in more or less 
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anticipatable format until the interviewer’s agenda is completed and the 
interview ends’. (Gubrium & Holstein, 2001:3). 
Qualitative interviewing, to be precise, as the case is in this study, is one that is 
founded on conversation, with emphasis on the researcher asking questions and 
listening for responses. It might be similar to the Survey Interview method, but 
unlike that, ‘interview respondents are more likely to be viewed as meaning 
makers, not passive conduits for retrieving information from an existing vessel of 
answers’ (Warren, 2001: 83). These interviews may be unstructured, structured 
or semi-structured. Structured interviews are used in survey research, and follow 
the same format as questionnaires. Unstructured interview on the other hand 
‘have little preset structure’; examples are ‘the life story interview’ (Brinkmann, 
2013: 20). The semi-structured interview is located somewhat in-between both 
formats (to be further explained subsequently). Brinkmann highlights that the 
distinction to be made between these three forms of interview need to be 
‘thought of as a continuum ranging from relatively structured to relatively 
unstructured formats’ (2013: 18). For surely there is no such thing as a 
completely structured interview, where the interviewer has a strictly pre-
determined agenda of knowledge to elicit from the respondent. In Brinkmann’s 
words, ‘utterances that “spill beyond the structure” are often quite important’ and 
are sometimes significant in understanding the interviewees’ responses (2013: 
18). In the same vein, regarding the unstructured format, Brinkmann argues that 
‘since the interviewer always has an idea about what should take place in the 
conversation,’ no such thing exists as a completely unstructured interview.   
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I determined that the semi-structured format is best suited to this research study. 
Brinkmann (2013: 21) posits that the semi-structured may be regarded as the 
most common form of interview in human and social sciences. In comparison to 
the structured or unstructured interview, the semi-structured interview has the 
following advantages: (i) they can make effective use of the knowledge-
producing potentials of dialogue by giving allowance for follow-up ‘on whatever 
angles are deemed important by the interviewer’; (ii) the interviewer also has 
more control in steering the conversation to issues significant to the research 
project (Brinkmann, 2013: 21). Brinkmann defines the semi-structured interview 
as ‘an interview with the purpose of obtaining descriptions of the life world of the 
interviewee in order to interpret the meaning of the described phenomena’ 
(Brinkmann, 2013: 21). The emphasis of this definition is on three points: 
purpose, description (of life world) and interpretation of meaning. This research 
study employed the semi-structured interview method, carried out on a field 
research trip to Nigeria. This research method was best suited to the study for 
various reasons.  
Firstly, Nigeria is a developing society where the adoption of digital media 
technology is still emerging. Developments are taking place at an accelerated 
pace, and as a researcher, one needs to be in the field to go beyond observing 
how these changes are taking place, to gathering data on people’s experiences 
in using digital media tools for public communication. Secondly, the concept of 
the digital public sphere is relatively new, and in order to map the digital public 
sphere in a developing society, where information and communication 
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technology is equally emerging, the interview method is the most effective in 
determining the pace, context and practices of this new terrain. Effectively 
mapping a digital public sphere entails gathering data on people’s experiences 
on these digital communicative spaces; while quantitative statistics from 
marketing research firms may exist as to how many people are using a 
particular technological device or service, or visiting a webpage, the interview 
method enables the researcher understand how and why it is being used - this 
provides insight into the culture of the people’s digital media use.  
In the data used for the next two chapters, the interview format was semi-
structured, to grant respondents the leeway to share information they deemed 
relevant to the subject that the researcher may not have considered when 
drawing up the interview guide. These semi-structured interviews were 
conducted in Nigeria at locations such as offices, technology hubs, and other 
relatively quiet spaces. The interviews were audio recorded and later transcribed 
for analysis. The interviewees on the other hand, were grouped into seven 
categories, and they were required to meet certain criteria to be fit for interview 
on this research study. These categories are:  
1. Public officials  
2. Mainstream journalists  
3. Information technology experts  
4. Social activists  
5. Bloggers/Citizen journalists  
6. Religious leaders  
7. Cultural producers  
 
These groups were regarded as democracy stakeholders and active players in 
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Nigeria’s digital media space.  
Public officials: People who work in government, from governors, to their special 
assistants, who are active users of digital media, especially for engagement with 
the public. They could be safely described as ‘mouthpieces of the government 
online’.  
Mainstream journalists: The press occupied a key role in the traditional public 
sphere of Habermas’ narrative. Here, although digital media has expanded the 
definition of journalism beyond the press, traditional journalism (otherwise 
known as old media) are still central to understanding the digital public sphere in 
Nigeria.  
Information Technology experts (app developers): This group is significant to the 
digital public sphere because they create the locally relevant technology that is 
used in discourse or action directly or indirectly. An example is the interviewee 
who designed the Nigerian Federal Constitution for Blackberry App.  
Social Activists: People who have been involved in one public social cause or 
the other; whether solely online or solely offline but use digital media tools for 
their processes.  
Bloggers/Citizen Journalists: This group comprised active bloggers who either 
ran their own platforms or were astute contributors to other citizen platforms.  
Religious Leaders: Given that religion is a strong part of the Nigerian public 
sphere, right from the colonial period, religious leaders who were active digital 
media users formed part of the respondents of this study.  
Cultural Producers: Cultural producers also make up a significant part of the 
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Nigerian public sphere as they create and distribute (cultural) media messages 
that filter into public sphere discourse. An example of cultural producers are film 
and documentary producers.  
Although the interviewees were organised into clear categories or groups as 
listed above, in the following chapters their responses, presented in narrative 
form, are presented using another categorization. Where interviewees’ 
professions and civic/social roles, such as ‘journalist’ or ‘activist’ are useful in 
simplifying the diversity of public sphere participants I interviewed (as seen in 
the Appendix), in the discussion chapters it became necessary to represent their 
contributions in terms of our prior construction of a theoretical concept of the 
digital public sphere – in terms of new media platforms, communication 
techniques, dialogue and issues, and so on. This was for several reasons, both 
theoretical and pragmatic.  
First, theoretically, the purpose of agglomerating a diverse range of interviewees 
was to demonstrate the substantial presence of civil society and non-
governmental actors within public debate and the forms of public 
communications that are becoming formative of a ‘public sphere’. To the extent 
that this was a fundamental aim of this thesis, they were required to represent 
roles and contributions within the increasingly broad civil participation in public 
discourse as defined by the introductory sections of this thesis. 
Second, pragmatically, arranging them so, also afforded me the opportunity to 
represent them in a more significant light, as contributors to a broader discourse 
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of an emerging public and not merely as individual civil society actors 
representing their own interests or simply airing their own personal views. So 
arranged, the interviewees are positioned within the structural development of a 
new public sphere in Nigeria, and the knowledge and perceptions they so 
express are not merely indicative of their profession or limited context of social 
class, but pertain to the functioning of the public discourse within Nigerian 
democratic society.  
Furthermore, the fluidity and complexity of the content of the interviews (the 
interviewees were unpredictable, and could swiftly change subjects, or talk 
about multiple subjects simultaneously) could be more intelligibly 
accommodated by assigning single statements to our categories of public 
sphere development. The interview responses revealed, furthermore, that as 
professionals and established interlocutors in an embryonic public sphere, their 
roles became increasingly blurred, as their views, their professional position, 
and indeed digital media itself, changed rapidly. A freelance journalist by day 
may also be a social activist by night; the same could apply to the social activist, 
who may from time to time, assume the role of a private individual running a 
business, yet, in the same digital public sphere reach the same audience 
segments for these different communications. It is a structural feature of 
Nigerian society and its labour markets, that even professionals often have two 
jobs or represent two very different roles within the same company or position of 
responsibility.  
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Representing our interviewees in terms of their profession, therefore, may 
indeed misrepresent the content of their interview responses, implying that they 
are a ‘sample’ viewpoint of their profession, and in Nigeria this cannot be 
assumed. Diversity in opinion and viewpoint is another feature of Nigerian 
society, and in no place I wished to imply that individual professions were 
representative of the views or opinion of that profession (unless where I 
specifically make that point). The most effective and transparent means by 
which to contain this complexity was therefore to place an emphasis on the 
conceptual content of interviewee’s statements, and situate this within an 
aforementioned category that would further my thesis on the development of a 
public sphere.    
The snow-ball technique was employed in identifying and soliciting participants. 
This technique is defined by Atkinson & Flint (2013, online) as a way of 
gathering research subjects through identifying an initial subject, who then links 
the researcher to other prospective subjects. Atkinson and Flint (2013, online) 
propose that the technique is primarily used ‘as a response to overcome the 
problems associated with understanding and sampling concealed populations 
such as the socially deviant and the socially isolated’ (Atkinson and Flint, 2013: 
Online). While the participants in this research study did not fall in either the 
category of the socially deviant or isolated, the snowball technique was relevant 
(per category) in that the area of study, digital public sphere, made it crucial that 
the participants met certain criteria such as: being active users of the digital 
media communicative space, belonging to one or more of the slated categories. 
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For social movements for instance, there had to be identifiable advocated 
causes.  
The snowball technique can be used within a wider set of methodologies 
(Atkinson & Flint, 2013), hence, for this study, other methods that were 
employed for an effective field research process included digital participant 
observation. This involves the researcher being a member of social media 
network(s) where potential respondents were already active, and observe their 
interactions online - sometimes contributing to their general discussion. The 
researcher used this digital participant observation method to take advantage of 
social network platforms on the web, envisioned as new public sphere sites 
where public discourse takes place, in order to establish an initial list of potential 
respondents. These purposively selected respondents were observed and then 
recruited into the sample size, and they then offered referrals of other potential 
respondents within their respective categories.  For this study, there were a total 
of thirty-eight (38) participants interviewed during the field research, data from 
35 have been used in this research. Each interview lasted a minimum of thirty 
minutes.  
Interview data and theoretical framework 
Key public officials were not available to be interviewed. In this thesis, only one 
key public official, governor of a state in Nigeria availed himself for an interview, 
and it was conducted via email. However, “special assistants” and other lower 
level public officials who were equally active users of digital media platforms 
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were available for interview. It is important to note that there were times when 
there was no clear distinction in category and there was an overlap. For instance, 
someone was interviewed under the citizen journalist category because she 
worked on a citizens’ platform, however, she was equally a trained and certified 
journalist. Under the category, religious leaders, the digital participant 
observation exercise did not yield any prospective active digital media user to 
represent the Islamic religion. A pastor (who runs a Christian church) was 
interviewed in this category.  
 
Information and communication technologies bring about cheap, fast and 
widespread communication, and communication in the form of deliberation and 
debate is an essential ingredient of any public sphere. Our theoretical 
understanding of the digital public sphere in Nigeria has been constructed 
through the past two chapters of conceptual research, but our empirical content 
(on the embryonic public sphere in Nigeria) will be informed by the interviewees, 
the supporting documents provided to the researcher while on field work, and 
relevant published literature on the Nigerian situation.  
For Habermas and his subsequent interlocutors, the public sphere is a space of 
communication between civil society and the state, where rational-critical debate 
on substantive matters of public interest should emerge. The mass media was 
central to the functioning of this public sphere throughout the era of nation state 
development and consolidation. As noted in the previous chapter, my attempt to 
conceptualise a digital public sphere in the light of the critique of the classical 
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model entails an attentiveness to structural change in five key components:  
1. New media platforms/spaces 
2. Communication techniques  
3. Agents and agencies  
4. Dialogue and issues  
5. Impact and intervention 
 
Being semi-structured interviews, these subjects were broached in a direct but 
not prescriptive way. Here below I will indicate the conceptual background that 
formed my various interview questions, based on these components.   
New media platforms/spaces: As mentioned earlier, the printing press was 
central to the effectiveness of the bourgeois public sphere in Habermas’ study. 
For Kellner however, the media in focus was television. In his book, Television 
and the Crisis of Democracy (1990), it is his submission that the television and 
media in general have both failed in promoting an informed public discourse for 
democracy to thrive, as well as fuelled the growth of excessive corporate power.  
 
In the digital public sphere, the new media spaces active in the public discourse 
here are blogs, social network sites, chat rooms, email groups and more. Where 
in Habermas’ construction of the public sphere, the printing press was central, in 
the digital public sphere, these new equally ‘abstract’ spaces play significant 
roles in fostering interaction and dialogue among citizens, including across 
borders. Although the quality of the conversations, the so-called deliberations, is 
up for debate, the potentialities of new digital communication tools for a 
democratic public sphere remains significant. New digital media platforms 
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represent in contemporary times, the old coffee houses and salons where public 
deliberations took place in Habermas’ public sphere.  
Communication Techniques: In the use of digital media communication 
technologies for public interaction, it is found that various techniques are 
employed in the ‘bringing together’ of the voices through specific forms of 
messaging, linguistic convention, protocols and forms of address. Voices 
interact online through ‘tweet-meets’, ‘twitter town hall meetings’, ‘comments on 
blog posts’, ‘hashtag culture’, ‘Facebook pages’, etc. This basically refers to the 
different ways people/users engage with one another in dialogue via digital 
media communication tools in the Nigerian digital public sphere.  
Agents and Agencies: This refers to people and organisations that are active in 
the Nigerian digital public sphere. The digital public sphere is made up of people 
and organisations who use digital media tools in their interactions and as part of 
their deliberative processes to varying degrees, strategically or just tactically. 
Hence, their activities do bear influence on the nature of the public sphere in 
Nigeria – both socio-politically and culturally. A definition of the Nigeria digital 
public sphere would be incomplete without acknowledging who these groups are, 
what they do and how they contribute to the digital public sphere.  
Dialogues and Issues: This element covers the intellectual or dialogic ‘content’ 
of the Nigerian digital public sphere. It answers the question: what are the 
people talking about? In Habermas’ public sphere, the issues under discussion 
were regarded as ‘public’ issues, formative of a co-extensive series of 
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viewpoints known as ‘public opinion’. Hence, in interrogating the digital public 
sphere in Nigeria, the researcher needs to examine the nature of the topics in 
relation to the debate and any general formation of consensus (whether on 
group level or societal).  
Impact and Interventions: just as there are agents and agencies made up of 
peoples and organisations, there are certain citizen-driven interventions and 
impacts that have come about in Nigeria as a result of the use of new digital 
media technologies. Indeed, a public sphere is grounded on the premise that its 
activities have a bearing on the state and its management of the country, region 
or city. These interventions are significant to the idea of the digital public sphere 
in Nigeria because they both validate and motivate participation, and in turn 
define the idea of ‘public good’.  
 
These components, as stated in Section One, will define the structure and 
parameters of the narrative formed from the interview data. The interviews were 
not prescriptive, and the interviewees were broad and liberal in their responses 
and reference points.  
Conclusion:  
In examining the nature of the embryonic digital public sphere, there is no better 
source than its users, who are also its producers, and daily observers. Candid 
discussion, viewpoints and information on the social dimension of digital media 
development, is important to our understanding on how this embryonic 
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phenomenon is developing. As my adopted methodology above representes, 
these users and producers were mainstream journalists, information technology 
experts, social activists, bloggers/citizen journalists, religious leaders, and 
cultural producers. In interviewing these NDPS participants, I was able to include 
reference to their own familiarity with digital media tools, their personal 
experience in using these tools in general public communication, and then more 
specifically, their contribution in contributing to political dialogue and debate. I 
was also attentive to their general views about digital media and its impact on 
Nigeria’s democratic culture, as they experience it from day-to-day.  I sought 
their thoughts on the future development of democratic culture in Nigeria through 
the use of digital media. I therefore attempted to breach the usual divisions of 
empirical and theoretical, objective data and subjective viewpoint. For as I hope 
will appear obvious in the next two chapters: the embryonic digital public sphere 
is embedded in (emerging from) the experience of citizens, and their spaces and 
places of personal life, work and social interaction.  
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Section Three: Chapter Eight 
An Embryonic Public Sphere in Nigeria: Participants’  
Perspective (1) 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, my research interview participants describe the digital public 
sphere in Nigeria in terms of (i) the new media platforms and spaces available, 
and (ii) the communication techniques they employ in using these media 
platforms. The next chapter will feature interview material on the subject of 
agents and agencies, dialogue and issues. The subject of impact and 
intervention, is endemic to all interviewees and topics. Indeed it is important to 
note that for the digital media sphere the production and distribution, creation 
and consumption, are closely related and often internally bound up. Throughout 
both these chapters I identify key persons, events and innovations that have 
played a role in cultivating a ‘culture’ of democratic behaviours, where through 
the adoption and use of digital media they further the sense of a ‘public’ realm, 
interest and ‘good’ in Nigeria. The interviewees also articulate significant detail 
on the challenges facing an embryonic public sphere.  
During the two following chapters the source of quotations is indicated by the 
name of the interviewee stated prior to quotation, identified in the appendix and 
cited in the references section under ‘Research Interviews’. 
	   190	  
New Media platforms and the ‘embryonic’ public sphere 
The questions guiding the inquiry here include: what new media platforms, 
applications and tools are available in Nigeria, and what are used for activities 
relevant within our theoretical construct of the digital public sphere? What are 
the current technological capabilities of the new platforms, applications and tools 
in Nigeria, and how reliable and consistent are these technologies? How far 
does online/digital coverage span in Nigeria, and how are these platforms 
integrated in socio-cultural and political life? Data on the precise number of 
Nigerians with access to new digital media is difficult to access – as I noted in 
Chapter Six of Section Two. The data below has been gathered from my field 
research, where I conducted semi-structured interviews with thirty-eight (38) 
active digital media users in Nigeria. It explains what digital platforms are 
available, for what (democratic) purposes they are used. It also highlights the 
perception of the structure/architecture of the platforms, user experience and so 
on. The data covers other themes such as reliability of available digital media 
services in Nigeria.  
 
At this juncture, it is important to call attention to the availability of what Alkassim 
Abdukadir (2013, journalist) calls “cheap smart phones” in Nigeria. Primarily, 
smart phones are not cheap in terms of pricing, however, these cheap smart 
phones are relatively low-priced. According to Abdukadir (2013), he describes 
such phones as those that:  
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…Give you access to receive your email…access to either 
Twitter or 2Go or Facebook, and you can get them for 
about N7000 (£25).  
They basically grant the user access to a limited array of social network sites or 
features. He further explains that popular brands that provide these cheap 
smartphones are the  
Regular Nokia phones, the Tecno ones from China and a 
lot of them are run on android devices. The Tecno phones 
are quite cheap. Nokia also has some cheap brands. 
Abdukadir (2013) also calls attention to the existing market for fairly-used smart 
phones as another avenue through which mobile media technology is spreading 
in Nigeria. In his words,  
A lot of people buy fairly used Blackberries – those who 
cannot afford [the high-end brand new smart phones] – for 
about $100 you would get a fairly used Blackberry or even 
less than that. So these are very popular devices. So the 
mobile phone is the most popular.  
Kole Shettima (2013) is also of the opinion that mobile phones are becoming 
much more affordable, as  
With N5,000 [approximately £20], you can actually do more 
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than what we used to do 5 months ago. 
The interview participants perceive the adoption of new media technology in 
Nigeria as a relatively new development. However, many of them emphasize 
that Nigerians who are active users are few compared to those who are not. 
According to Mbah (2013), while “Twitter is giving people information on-the-go” 
and Facebook is spurring interaction and “debates on issues”, not every 
Nigerian is on Twitter. He says even among those who are on Twitter, “some of 
them are just there for fancy…” Along the same vein, another journalist, Jon 
Gambrell (2013) says “some people [in Nigeria] cannot afford to look at this stuff” 
[stuff being new media tools such as smart phones, tablets etc.] However, he 
thinks that as data rates [internet service costs] “drop cheaper and cheaper” and 
“you’re seeing mobile networks being able to provide better services like 3G 
access”, more active users would emerge. Jon says that while he thinks that 
“there is a real presence of Nigerians on Twitter”, his perception is that the 
active users are the people he considers to middle upper class to upper class, 
economically.  
Another form of digital divide other than the gap between the ‘haves and have 
not’ in Nigeria, is the gap between those who use the digital media tools to its 
full capability, and those who do not. According to Segun Fodeke (2013),  
Even though everybody is almost digitised now because 
we all have mobile phones, many people are still not aware 
of the full capabilities of their devices.  
	   193	  
He says that  
There is still a seemingly wide gap between those who use 
it actively and those who have it but don't use it [or use it] 
just to make phone calls. 
There is another group who: 
Just use mobile phone for Facebook chat, then a group of 
people who are very notorious in Nigeria are the 
Blackberry users…[who] primarily use their phones for 
BBM chats and exchanging pictures and audio…” (Fodeke, 
2013).  
The generational divide is another gap the respondents brought attention to from 
diverse perspectives.  Active digital media use and adoption in Nigeria is seen 
as the domain of young people to the exclusion of the older generation. 
According to Yemi Adamolekun (2013),  
Because it [new media] is a space dominated by young 
people, it seems to be children of anger who are online”.  
Segun Fodeke (2013) buttresses this point when he says he has found that 
among older people, there are those who “would strictly not want to get to use 
the phone for more than just phone calls.” This group of people ‘are literate’ 
according to Fodeke (2013), “but they just don't want to go beyond that phone 
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call” - they are mostly in their 50s. Similarly, Jaiye Gaskia (2013), a social 
activist who had been actively involved in politics and social change during the 
military era, before digital media such as the mobile phone and Internet arrived 
in Nigeria, shared concerns about the divide between the older and younger 
Nigerian demographic in digital media adoption. He calls the tension between 
the two groups a “generational tension”. In his words, for the older group of 
social activists, their first introduction and knowledge of digital media has 
generated a “negative perception”. Gaskia (2013) says that for them,  
The digital media was the place where unserious youths 
hanged out, it was a place where gossip was being 
perpetuated. It was a place where people could make 
commentaries without any sense of responsibility 
Thus, the older generation “kind of then distanced itself from it” (Gaskia, 2013). 
On the generational gap, Fodeke (2013) highlights two specific social networks 
that he finds to be popular among young school leavers; the younger generation. 
They are 2Go and Eskimi. He opines that  
There’s a large number of them because they find a lot of 
solace in that environment where there is no adult 
monitoring them…so there’s a lot of freedom on that 
network.  
Bukola Ogunyemi (2013) also talks about the imbalance in age groups among 
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users. In his words,  
Using digital media limits you to certain age-groups, as 
some of our elder statesmen, elder citizens are still 
not…have still not gotten a grasp of these platform, these 
digital media platforms. So it cuts you off from a particular 
generation. 
Oguneymi (2013) states literacy as a challenge of engagement with digital 
media in Nigeria. Another challenge he raises is the affordability of the platforms. 
Ogunyemi (2013) is quick to point out that there is competition among Internet 
service providers, hence, “the competition is forcing the price down.” 
In terms of experience using digital media platforms, Ayeni (2013), a PR person 
says “I’ve made friends, I’ve made enemies, I’ve made money.” For Banky W 
(2013), a cultural producer (musician) on the other hand, he says that for him, 
Twitter is his number one platform because he gets instant feedback from his 
fans. In his words,  
It’s just a great way to engage…you know the people who 
are into what you are doing, or whatever, so I think for me, 
it's probably that, and I just enjoy the interaction. I think it’s 
fun, it’s entertainment – so it's fun for me, and it's fun for 
everybody! 
For other users, adopting digital media technologies is more than just enjoyment. 
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Rotimi Olawale (2013) talks about taxi drivers who are also active digital media 
users. He says, they argue political issues with him and tell him they read it on 
their phone:  
We discuss about politics and all of that, he watches some 
videos on his phones…he has this china mobile phone. 
Olawale (2013) says his taxi driver can pull up the Internet and watch live TV on 
his mobile.  
The mobile phone has revolutionised the way that we 
access information in Nigeria – combined with 
the Internet penetration and all of that, it has opened the 
eyes of Nigerians” (Olawale, 2013).  
In using digital media tools, Tolu Ogunlesi (2013), journalist, separates his 
“personal space” from spaces for his other activities. Here is how he explains it:  
BBM is a personal space, but Twitter is the one I use 
consistently and actively. Facebook, I’ve left it for a bit, but 
every now and then I just go back, because there is a huge 
community there as well, so it’s useful. 
According to Ogunlesi (2013), when he publishes a new article, he may 
occasionally go to Facebook and G+ to share the link. 
Tomi Oladipo (2013), journalist, says in his use of digital media tools, he is 
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careful not to let his social media connections impact how he practices his 
journalism. He says: 
There are people who don't know what Twitter is, so you 
need to be wary of that. 
Oladipo says his news reports for radio get translated into different languages as 
the BBC has different language services, and as such ‘a Fulani herdsman on his 
camel is listening on his transistor radio’ –  
If I wrote my story with the Twitter person in mind and not 
this man also in mind, then I have gone slightly off.  
To support Tomi Oladipo’s position towards digital media for journalism practice, 
Bankole Olufemi (2013), a tech blogger, also shares a similar perception: “I don’t 
have any illusions that the janitor for instance is reading my blog.’ 
Concerning user experience, Gbenga Olorunpomi (2013), public official (social 
media assistant to politician), says he is “addicted to online media”. In his words,  
I am addicted to consuming online media all the time, but 
there are a lot of things battling for my attention…  
In addition, basic power supply is a significant infrastructural challenge regarding 
the use of new digital media platforms in Nigeria and the experience. According 
to Abdukadir (2013), a journalist:  
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I would say I use BBM and Twitter almost every minute, as 
far as I have power supply on my devices… 
Similarly, another journalist, Seun Okinbaloye (2013) says,  
Power supply is never stable…so people want to go 
around with something that will take them. I want to buy a 
phone that can take me for a long time. 
He adds that this is especially so in a “metropolitan city of Nigeria like Lagos, 
where you can be in a traffic for several hours.” Okinbaloye says “mobility” is at 
the centre of his choice of the use of digital media. Tolu Ogunlesi (2013) also 
references how traffic forms a huge part of human behaviour in the use of 
technology in Nigeria. He says, “people spend a lot of time in traffic…to kill that 
time, a mobile phone comes in handy.” 
However, there are infrastructural challenges plaguing the intensive use of 
digital media in Nigeria, Segun Fodeke (2013), creator of a government 
expenditure monitoring initiative using digital media, explains that with regards to 
infrastructure, while Nigeria might be doing well macro-economically, in terms of 
aspects of the economy like data coverage, it is not doing well. He says,  
I've gone to some states where their data coverage doesn’t 
exist. In the states they have coverage, but in some parts 
of those states…no coverage. 
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Fodeke says, “we still have issues in terms of basic phone calls, when you have 
dropped calls, congestion…”. To counter this situation, photojournalist Sunday 
Alamba (2013) explains that he has multiple mobile lines with different networks. 
He says:  
Sometimes because network doesn't work here properly, 
that’s why people have more than one or two phones, so 
they can go to Etisalat or other networks. It depends on 
where you are… if this one fails, the other one will work. 
Soji Apampa (2013), founder of NGO Integrity Nigeria, says that poor bandwidth 
and reliability of service from Internet service providers have been a major 
challenge, “we couldn’t get anything that was reliable or reasonable, we were 
spending a lot of money…” Apampa opted to subscribe to fibre optic cables for 
his Internet connection. 
On reliability, Fidelis Mbah (2013) complains at the poor services available in the 
rural areas. He considers infrastructure to be a major challenge in the adoption 
of digital media in Nigeria because for instance, very few villages (rural areas), 
have phone masts and connection. Mbah (2013) says,  
Even where you have phone connections, they are very 
erratic. In most places you can't even use a service like 
Skype, even across the country… 
In addition, Fidelis Mbah mentions the power challenge –  
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People don't have light [power] to be able to power their 
systems or any (digital media) platforms. 
As for the affordability of digital media devices, Fidelis Mbah raises the 
questions,  
How many people can afford a smart phone, how many 
people can afford a laptop? 
The reasons why Nigerians (as reflected by the interviewees) make use of 
digital media tools revolve around educating people, keeping people informed, 
staying in touch with one another and seeing ‘what’s happening’. Amara for 
instance says that he uses digital media to  
Express strong views on national development” and to 
“participate in national dialogue.  
For journalists, citizen and freelance journalists, they use digital media to “get 
story ideas.” Chika Oduah (2013), a freelance journalist, says “Twitter is my 
number one news source”. She also says she uses blogging and blogs to 
“gauge people’s opinion.” 
For religious organisations, Ogidigbo (2013), a pastor, says he uses digital 
media to advertise church programs and events as his “church is very 
young…and cannot afford [to advertise on] traditional media.” Related to this 
use of digital media (social media platforms) for free advertisement Yemi 
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Adamolekun (2013), another respondent, also raises this issue. She says,  
Unlike in the past if you had to deal with traditional media, 
where you had to either pay for space as an advert or you 
needed to know somebody in the paper to maybe get 
an opinion piece printed.  
Digital media now makes it possible to for you to “suddenly have access to 
fifty different conversations”.  
Fidelis Mabah (2013), a journalist says he uses digital media to spread 
information, as “few people actually read the newspaper”. However, Ayeni 
(2013), a PR executive on the other hand says  
I still buy newspapers a lot…but I almost do not switch on 
my TV. Also radio, I probably listen to radio only when I am 
in the car…which is not a lot.  
Ayeni uses digital media “to be current”, and to stay abreast of what is being 
said online about his clients (as a PR man) and his business. He is interested in 
identifying what the “trending topics” online are. In addition to that, Ayeni uses 
digital media for “fun”. He says, “Instagram for me is more fun. I use Instagram 
90% for fun and 10% work.” 
Egghead Odewale (2013) says he uses digital media platforms to “pontificate on 
different political issues and development in Nigeria”. He has also used it for 
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real-time election tracking and monitoring activities. According to him, his first 
major use of digital media for political engagement was in 2009. He used Twitter 
to document a “real-time tracking of the election in Ekiti [a Nigerian state] when 
they had supplementary elections in February.” Odewale continues that activity 
of his formed the basis of evidence used to “present a formidable case during 
the court process.” In his words,  
It was that watertight and robust judicial brief that earned 
the present governor [now former] the victory at the court – 
these evidence were basically stored on Twitter platform. 
Many of the respondents give celebratory comments on the impact of new digital 
media on Nigeria’s democratic culture. However, there is equally feedback on 
the shortcomings of the new media in Nigeria. According to Yemi Adamolekun 
(2013), digital media “amplifies voices”. Bankole Olufemi (2013), a tech blogger, 
explains that digital media has given him access to fora he ordinarily would not 
have been able to be a part of:  
You’ve got people in danfos [commercial buses] become 
political pundits taking on the Rueben Abati’s [special 
adviser to the president of Nigeria on media] of this world. 
Olufemi (2013) says that while you may be on your Nokia (relatively affordable 
phone), the individual you are arguing with might be on “his iPad”. As such,  
Because you have access to the same platform that he 
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has, it doesn't matter that you are using some shady 
device, and you are in some Keke Marwa [commercial 
tricycle]. 
Olufemi (2013) points out that: 
Digital media allows people to engage on the strength of 
their ideas as opposed to what their political pedigree or 
social pedigree is,” and that for him is the “most profound 
thing. 
He says: 
I don’t exactly come from a wealthy background…Nobody 
knows me, I don’t have any sort of political background or 
pedigree…money…but somehow people like me have 
managed to interact in this conversations (Olufemi, 2013). 
Mbah (2013), journalist, says digital media “gives information on the go”, while 
for Omojuwa (2013), a social activist, it “dilutes the reach of tyranny.” Omojuwa 
(2013) further says:  
… Based on the things I write and the things I say, I should 
have been arrested by the government – but digital media 
is a kind of disincentive for things like that because you 
know that if you pick him up, he will start trending on 
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Twitter, before you know it, the whole world is going to 
hear. 
 Gbenga Sesan (2013), an ICT-developer and social activist says that, digital 
media has “really opened a space where people can express themselves.” He 
says that between 2010 and 2012, “people found their voice online”. Sesan 
(2013) further explains that digital media was “the only option” people had for 
communication and expression – particularly freedom of expression. Hence, for 
him: 
History of digital media in Nigeria is mostly political – and 
that's why you are not surprised that much of the 
conversation happening online is mostly around politics… 
Albeit that digital media has brought about many benefits to democratic culture 
in Nigeria, respondents also raise some concerns on its shortcomings. 
According to Oladipo (2013), a journalist with the BBC in Lagos, while digital 
media was effective in mobilising the Occupy Nigeria protest even before the 
labour union “could put themselves together to say let’s have a protest”, he finds 
that digital media is limited in terms of its impact on Nigerian democracy. For 
Oladipo (2013), the downside to digital media for democracy in Nigeria is that it 
gives “a false sense of we are legion” where “some people think they are bigger 
than they are because they are loud voices [online].” Furthermore, with regards 
to politicians and public officials who come online to engage, he says, “it’s no 
different from being offline.” To explain this statement, Oladipo (2013) gives the 
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instance of a finance minister who comes into the digital sphere to “post all this 
statistics” (essentially provide information), but “she won’t respond if you ask a 
question.” Here, he concludes that this: 
In itself is not good in that it’s not helpful for democratic 
culture, because digital media is supposed to open 
everybody up and connect people…  
In using digital media to promote democratic culture in Nigeria through, Alamba 
and Ogunyemi (2013) mention security as another challenge. According to 
Sunday, he says he does not engage in conversations online because: 
You never know who you are talking to, especially you 
being a journalist. You don’t know how many journalists 
been killed here. It could be political… 
 Bukola Ogunyemi in his interview, gave an account on how he started receiving 
death threats over a “sarcastic” tweet he posted using a “religious figure.” 
According to him, “I thought it was a joke and I had threats on my life on twitter, 
which I discounted…” 
The new media platforms central to the functioning of Nigeria’s embryonic public 
sphere formed the hub of this section. Available statistics and data from the ITU, 
Africa Practice organisation, Open Society Foundation, combined with insights 
from the research interview participants, revealed the following: the specific new 
media tools employed in the NDPS (Nigerian Digital Public Sphere), who is 
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using what platforms (that is, the rich vs. the poor, the older vs. the younger 
generation, religious organisations etc.), and observations as to why. 
Addressing new media platforms as a core element of the NDPS opened issues 
as to the wide gap between the digital media haves and have-nots, and the 
“generational divide” – that is, the chasm dividing those who perhaps may have 
access to these communication technologies, but would rather not engage in 
dialogue with predominantly “younger generation” online. Digital literacy and 
poor infrastructural facilities were equally flagged some of the core issues 
around new media platforms in the Nigerian digital public sphere.  
 
Communication techniques and the ‘embryonic’ public sphere 
The line of inquiry in this section refers to the online/digital communication 
techniques users may employ when communicating online in the Nigerian digital 
public sphere. This element broadly covers themes such as the communicative 
techniques used in engaging with new media platforms, the languages 
employed in communicating online, patterns of behaviour among Nigerian digital 
media users and their existing political or communication aims in online 
interaction in this public sphere. The major communication techniques adopted 
in the Nigerian digital sphere include facebook-ing, tweeting and blogging. 
Within each of these platforms, other techniques that take cognisance of the 
architecture and affordability (or capability) of the platform in passing online 
messages, include tweet-meets, twitter-townhalls, twe-minars etc. Sometimes 
the platforms are integrated and messages are shared simultaneously, for 
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instance, across Facebook, Twitter, blogs and more. Below are a few examples 
shared by interviewees:  
In the Occupy Nigeria protest, Azeernarh Mohammed (2013), a social activist, 
says that as part of strategies employed in mobilising the protest, 
We broke down the messages in short 140-characters 
[Twitter] and gave links [URL] to where you could find more 
details.  
She says Facebook was more “interesting” because people could “have a 
conversation with you”. In addition, they produced blog posts towards the 
Occupy Nigeria protest, and according to her, the aim was to “inform” and 
“convince” people. Mohammed (2013) describes engaging digital media in the 
Occupy Nigeria protest as “having a dialogue with the rest of Nigeria.”  
Specific techniques and behavioural patterns are also observed in how these 
respondents employ Twitter platform in online dialogue/communication. For 
instance, digital media campaigns are run on Twitter using the hash-tag feature 
(#). Mohammed (2013) says the techniques for using digital media [Twitter in 
this case] goes as follows: 
Get a hash tag, frame the issues, welcome people into the 
discussion, and you “state what the law is. 
The law here refers to the engagement rules guiding the online discussion for 
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decorum. Amara Nwankpa (2013) shares a similar technique when he 
advocates “[Nigerian] oil revenue tracking’ issues on social media. He drives this 
discussion campaign on both Twitter and Facebook, puts on information on 
selected themes on the subject and simplifies it. In his words,  
Oil is a very complex industry – and if you were to put 
certain information raw, people won’t be able to connect…  
Nwankpa (2013) says that in order to get more young people to understand 
what the key issues are [on oil revenue allocation in Nigeria], and to “make a 
stand and have an informed opinion and contribute to that conversation about 
what’s the way forward”, the message needs to be simplified.   
For Nwankpa (2013), the process of simplification of messages for online 
dialogue is as follows:  
• Planning goes into the topic selection.  
• Decisions are made on the hash-tag of choice #hash-tags. 
• The hash-tag is attached to each of the tweets going out. 
• ‘We’ solicit responses, and have got a network of followers who would 
retweet into other’s timelines. 
• After tweets are out, ‘we’ve got people who engage, and ask questions 
and talk a bit more about the topic as well’. 
• ‘We are going to put out facts that are already established’. 
 
Journalists and citizen journalists on the other hand employ other 
communication techniques on leveraging on digital media communication tools. 
Alkassim Abdulkadir (2013) for instance, uses digital media as a “crowdsourcing 
tool”. Here is his narrative: 
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 …two years ago where there were a spate of bombs in 
Nigeria – anytime there is an explosion, you discover that 
people immediately start putting pictures on BBM.  
Abdulkadir (2013) explains that sometimes these pictures may be broadcast, or 
shared as status messages. According to him, when the tweets go out 
announcing a bomb blast, it gives him the opportunity to timestamp the news 
event, verify its credibility, and enables him to identify potential eyewitnesses for 
his news report. He states, 
If there is an eyewitness account, you tweet at him 
immediately that “please where are you, are you close to 
this, what has happened?”  
As a journalist, Oduah (2013) also uses digital media in carrying out her 
responsibilities. She combines word-of-mouth with digital media tools. Oduah 
(2013) mentions that she has done some work in the Eastern region of Nigeria. 
She says she was able to communicate directly with the people. Giving an 
instance, Oduah (2013) says,  
if I get a Twitter message I communicate something that 
affects those people in Bonny Island. I’ll tell them what I’m 
getting and it will be kind of translated. I go to a traditional 
king, and tell them what’s happening, he alerts his people.  
The application of the aforementioned techniques is not limited to social activism 
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and journalism. Omojuwa (2013), although actively involved in social activism, 
uses digital media to promote businesses using the hash-tag technique, as a 
sort of social responsibility service online. He sometimes runs a “community-
service project”, #myBiz, where he advises people to write out the details of their 
business, address, and phone number, including the hashtag #Mybiz and post 
on Twitter. Omojuwa (2013) would then “go over” and retweet (thus amplifying) 
their tweets. He says,  
I have a far wider reach than these people, and then I 
retweet and I have people say thank you I got contacts… It 
helps you to reach more people than you would ordinarily 
reach… 
In addition, when Japheth had an altercation with a Nigerian airline company 
over the alleged mishandling of his iPad, he started a hashtag on Twitter as a 
means of fighting back. He reports, “I started in June, #Arik-where-is-my-ipad. 
As at september, I was still on it…”. On the hash-tag technique, Omojuwa says,  
The hash tag was a powerful tool for me when I was doing 
budget-scam [protest] for instance, the Occupy Movement 
started in Wall Street, and I was doing hash tags on why 
we should occupy … all of these things were trending on 
Twitter. 
In elections in Nigeria, the Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) has 
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equally devised techniques on leveraging on digital media platforms to spur 
conversation and achieve a free and fair election. In a research interview with 
the Chief Press Officer of the Commission, Kayode Idowu (2013), he reveals 
that Twitter and Facebook have been employed in engaging the public. In 
addition, a “Situation Room” was erected for the previous elections and currently 
“scaling that to be a daily affair in what we call the INEC Citizens Contact 
Centre.” The function of the Centre would be to respond in real-time to tweets 
and messages from citizens, as they make enquiries. Idowu (2013) says, 
We discover that because of that [the Situation Room], we 
get a lot of interaction with a lot of youths on the field in the 
course of elections, and I think it has increased their 
interest. 
Related to election activities in Nigeria, Odewale (2013) explains how he uses 
digital media in election monitoring. He says:  
The governorship elections in 2007 was the governorship 
election in Ekiti, in which then, what we were doing was to 
use Microsoft Access, to string together, to do independent 
tabulation of results  
 In 2009 however, was when Odewale (2013) incorporated social media as part 
of his election-monitoring routine. He says: 
 We started using video evidence, started having to take 
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picture evidence, telephone reports….We used Frontline 
SMS, Twitter, Facebook, email… a huge dependence on 
telephone calls in which people were able to call in. 
Gbenga Olorunpomi (2013) is a former journalist and currently social media 
manager for a Nigerian political party; coming from both perspectives, he 
explains the communication techniques he employs.  Olorunpomi (2013) says 
the Blackberry “created” the “citizen journalist - a lot of people wanting to really 
just share information with their friends, with people online.” With the 
introduction of the Blackberry to Nigeria, “people could type a short story on their 
phones”. Olorunpomi (2013) says that in NEXT newspapers, an online news 
website where he worked as a journalist, the idea was that: 
Everyone was meant to have a Blackberry – you get a 
story, if it’s a big story, you are sending snippets to the 
newsroom. 
…From the newsroom, the “snippets” are analysed, made into news copies and 
published on the website and social media according to Olorunpomi (2013).  
However, now as social media manager for a political party and a former 
governor, Olorunpomi (2013) sets up Google Alerts for all the principal members 
of the party. He also gives “members of the party advice on how to craft the 
messages that will resonate…[with youths online]”. Olorunpomi (2013)  gives an 
instance of a party member who is about to give a speech on a youth-related 
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issue, it is his responsibility to edit the text in a manner that it would resonate 
with youths. In terms of monitoring online comments about his principals, 
Olorunpomi (2013) uses tweet reach, hootsuite and tweet deck, “just to make 
sure I get the right, I get as much of a picture of what people are saying to what 
people want – and there is a feedback mechanism.” Some other communication 
techniques involve building a niche for one’s self online – as Mbah (2013) relays. 
Fidelis is formerly used to sending out ‘random tweets’ but he later realised that 
he needed to use the platform to build an area of specialisation for himself. So, 
“if someone is looking for information on Nigeria …he should go on my TL 
[timeline]…”.  
Yemi Adamolekun (2013), Executive Director of the social movement, Enough is 
Enough (EIE) Nigeria, says an effective communication technique in leveraging 
digital media for democracy is to bridge the offline and online “worlds”. In her 
words,  
I can rant all about Ikeja [a local government area in Lagos, 
Nigeria] all I want on Twitter…it doesn’t change anything. 
She says that however, if she “rants” on Twitter enough to get a hundred people 
who reside in Ikeja to go on the streets and demand a visit to their local 
government chairman, “that will get his attention.” 
Furthermore, the use of traditional media is also a part of EIE’s communication 
strategy. Adamolekun (2013) says,  
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Anybody can awake up and write a blog, it doesn't have to 
be factual, and there is in a sense, no consequence…  
With traditional media on the other hand, there is “greater responsibility” says 
Adamolekun (2013) - “because there is a fear of being sued, being shut down, 
there is a fear of adverts being withdrawn” if publications are not factual. Hence, 
Adamolekun (2013) opines that,  
If I write an article in Punch where I state the same facts, 
by Punch printing it, even though they print it as an opinion, 
there’s some certain weight that because it's in Punch… 
gives to it. 
 Punch is a printed newspaper in Nigeria.  
Jon Gambrell (2013) is a journalist with an international news organisation (‘AP’) 
with a base in Nigeria. His communication techniques in using digital media for 
journalism are somewhat different from his local colleagues. According to 
Gambrell (2013), there are very strict policies guiding “what to say or what not to 
say” and “how to handle certain situations”. He continues, that his organisation 
makes effort to “verify” the Twitter accounts of journalists who work with them, 
and encourages them to tweet. However, Gambrell (2013) says,  
Who I am on Twitter is not necessarily who I am in real 
life…there is a level of professionalism that you have adopt, 
a different tone.  
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The AP is “very good about using social media to gather news, to talk to people 
and I think that it allows a back and forth that typically wasn’t there before”, 
according to Gambrell (2013). He opines that the “back and forth” (interactivity) 
can “improve the news gathering process” and the story. However, Gambrell 
(2013) says he likes to conduct his interactions on his stories face to face. In his 
words, “one of the rules we have on AP is that as soon as you can, take it 
offline.” Gambrell (2013) explains that if one is trying to get a story, 
Don’t let the people tell the whole story online because 
maybe a competitor is going to read it… 
What he does then is to message the potential news source, “can we have your 
phone number, can I send you a direct message [twitter feature]” and I’ll say 
“here’s my phone number … I’ll call you right now”. So then you get in touch with 
that person face-to-face…”says Gambrell (2013).  
Segun Fodeke (2013) is another active digital media user and citizen, who set 
up an online project called iWatch Ng defined as to  
Take account of what government is doing with the money 
it purports to be spending on infrastructure and 
development in Nigeria 
 As part of his communication techniques, he manages a Facebook page for his 
project, as well as a Facebook Group, and is active on Twitter. He says he posts 
“mostly updates about what the government is doing, activities of the 
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government.” Upon posting these updates, he says some people would 
comment, but “Twitter gets a lot of quick responses.” Fodeke (2013) says  
People want to just quickly say something on Twitter 
because it is very simple, short – FB too has a lot of 
responses too. Twitter comes in as a very quick snap way 
to reply. 
As part of his techniques in using Twitter, Fodeke (2013) says he sometimes 
organises Tweet-meets. This is how he describes a Tweet-Meet as a “gathering 
on Twitter”, where he announces for instance, that “tomorrow 4pm we are 
having a series of tweets on power sector reforms in Nigeria.” Fodeke (2013) 
explains that he created an hashtag and “notified people, mentioned [a twitter 
feature], tweeted about it and when the time came up, spoke to them about it.” 
He says, “we make the notifications, people hear about it, then we start getting 
people to tweet about it…”  
For a cultural producer, musician, like Banky W. (2013), he uses digital media 
tools differently. According to him, digital media has 
 …Put a lot of power in the hands of the artist and in the 
hands of the fans, and its provided like a direct link 
between those two groups of people. 
 In terms of distributing and marketing his music, Welington (2013) says that 
digital media helps him “get the music out there.” Prior to this, he would have 
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needed to use an agency, solicit disk jockeys, and radio stations to publicise his 
music. On the contrary now, Welington (2013) says,  
When you are debuting new songs, and you are trying to 
get the music in the hands of fans, you just put it online 
immediately. 
 He adds that this shift “almost helps you kind of control or dictate what gets 
played on the radio” as opposed to the other way round - because if a song for 
instance trends on Twitter, it means it is popular and “radio stations don’t have a 
choice but to play it.” Another cultural producer, Sasha P. (2013), says she uses 
digital media to both communicate with fans and for business. She says,  
I post pictures, dates of concerts, images, music via Twitter, 
Reverbnation, iTunes, Facebook, instagram, Tumblr, the 
whole works. 
Gbenga Sesan (2013) is an ICT professional who was active during the Occupy 
Nigeria protest and gives a detailed account of the communication techniques 
applied during the protest and the 2011 general elections in Nigeria. He says in 
the period during the introduction of digital media in Nigeria, 2010 “became a 
series of protests people organised using BBM [Blackberry Messenger], 
particularly BBM and Facebook”. Sesan (2013) continues that in 2011 during the 
elections, Twitter, Facebook and BBM were being used to communicate, 
however, “much of what is done in terms of getting the real job done is by email.” 
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Sesan (2013) gives an example of someone who tweeted his location and asked 
Gbenga if anyone else was coming to protest. Sesan (2013) says, 
I tweeted back okay – then two of them met at 7am the 
next morning and by the time they got there, there were 
about 2,000 of them.  
He says the impression he got upon arrival at the venue was that “they were 
impressed that something that started with just a simple tweet…” Other 
techniques include the use of BBM status updates, BBM broadcasts”. 
Public officials employ particular communication techniques when interacting 
with citizens. The former governor of Ekiti (governor at the time of the interview), 
Kayode Fayemi (2013), explains that he uses Blackberry Messenger and also 
exchanges SMS with citizens who have his BBM pin or number. He explains 
that his state has a text messaging system installed on the website. Visitors to 
the website can “send free SMS directly to all the named elected or appointed 
state officials”, and “official individual emails are also published online for ease 
of direct contact by anybody.” Fayemi (2013) also gives an example of a 
question-and-answer session he participated in on Twitter and Google Plus. He 
also has a monthly programme on Ekiti State Broadcasting Service (radio and 
TV) called, Mr Governor Explains.  
Seun Okinbaloye (2013) is another journalist who explains that when he gets ‘a 
scoop’ (an exclusive story), he immediately tweets at his organisation. In his 
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words, “Twitter especially has been a major tool that has been much helpful”. In 
terms of how he uses it for communication, Okinbaloye (2013) says his Twitter 
account is significant to his professional life –  
I have sort of cut off my personal, my social life from my 
social media, because the way people now take me. I am 
being taken more seriously these days… 
 Okinbaloye (2013) says journalists “we are always at the centre of issues”, 
hence, his social life and “other aspects of life” are separated from his life on 
social media. 
Humour is a strong and important online communication technique for Apampa 
(2013). He says a factor that determines whether his “informational tweets” get 
traction or not is “humour”. He explains that you have to “attract people first” in 
order to pass across a message.  
What gets them attracted to your message is the humour; 
it’s showing something to be ridiculous, or…super-
interesting…now they are interested, you can start to come 
out with the detail… (Apampa, 2013) 
He further explains that if you start your message with the “hard facts” on social 
media, “people would walk away”. Humour for him, is one of the techniques to 
use in capturing audience attention online. In Apampa’s (2013) words: 
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A few stand-up jokes and then a few serious things, and 
once they are interested in the subject, they are ready to 
stand there for the next two hours…listen to your 
democratic message. 
In terms of Soji Apampa’s (2013) technique in using Twitter, he explains, “my 
experience on Twitter has been that I’ve evolved my own style.” His style is to 
“share information” he considers people do not have access to, and uses a 
“hashtag with lots of examples.” Apampa (2013) says,  
Usually, I see somebody who is ready to engage me — 
engage me critically, and then I use that as an opportunity 
to now go deeper and share a lot more. 
However, if on the contrary, he lets the conversation go. In otherwise, it is not 
every time that Apampa (2013) is able to find willing participants in a dialogue - 
“a conversation by yourself is a bit boring.” 
Another avenue through which Soji Apampa (2013) further infuses humour into 
his online communication content is the spreading of “animated cartoons on 
corruption”. He explains that he seeks to get the cartoons produced in a mobile-
friendly version such that they can easily be shared from “Blackberry to 
Blackberry”. Apampa (2013) says the goal is for his organisation’s message 
against corruption in Nigeria to spread as far as possible. Other ways through 
which digital media has been a part of Apampa (2013) democratic organisation 
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is the creation of a website where people can “report corruption safely” and his 
organisation in turn passes the report onto the ICPC – Independent Corrupt 
Practices and other related Practices Commission, Nigeria. He explains that 
because there is no “Whistleblower Protection Act” in Nigeria, people are usually 
“scared” to take on corruptions cases on their own.  
Other aspects of communications practice Soji Apampa (2013) mentions is the 
use of SMS before moving on to Twitter to conduct ‘twe-minars’. Speaking on 
the Twe-minars as opposed to ‘SMS blast’, Apampa (2013) explains when the 
expenditure of bringing people to the website via SMS could not be sustained, 
he opted for a more affordable alternative via Twitter. On the Twe-minars he 
explains how he had made initial plans to fill a class of twenty-two to “train 
young people” for free in his organisation. “We never were able to get more than 
9 volunteers” says Apampa (2013). He received a suggestion to go on Twitter 
and publicise his seminars, and he says, “then we had what we call Twe-minars.” 
Apampa (2013) explains that the four training modules on his course were 
broken down into tweets and published for other social media influencers to 
equally retweet onto their timelines. This was another area where digital media 
was significant to a democratic initiative.  
Sunday Alamba (2013), a photojournalist, uses social media to keep his 
followers or subscribers updated such as saying “I am going for a story here” or 
“watch out for my pictures afterwards”. Ishaya Bako (2013) on the other hand, a 
documentary producer, used YouTube and sidestepped a government ban 
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through the National Broadcasting Commission (of Nigeria) on the airing of his 
film, Fuelling Poverty. The documentary film was critical of the Nigerian 
government and raised questions on the fuel subsidy issues in the country that 
led to the Occupy Nigeria protest. Shettima (2013) also calls attention to political 
parties and their increasing use of social media and digital media tools generally 
as part of campaign tools.  
There are certain social media users, especially on Twitter, regarded as 
influencers. Mercy Abang (2013), journalist, explains that she gains ‘influence’ 
online through “responsible tweets”. She says her issues of interest as a 
journalist, reflect national issues in Nigeria, and as such “would lead 
personalities to follow”. Abang (2013) goes on to say that she has “twelve 
influencers” and for her, that is a “huge strength”.  
If I have one person that listens to one of my tweets, that 
gets to read it and tell the president “I think this is what 
these people are saying”, for me that is something (Abang, 
2013) 
 Mercy explains that there are different types of influencers. “Some people are in 
governance, I would categorise myself there, some are in 
entertainment…economics…so these are the categories of influencers on the 
social sphere” she opines. Abang (2013) concludes that she has enough 
influence, combined with her colleagues, to make an issue trend locally. In her 
words:  
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If I called all of them [her fellow influencers with huge 
following in her social network] and say this is a document, 
I want us to tweet about for today, and I want it to trend, 
these four people I just called would make it to trend 
including me. 
Rotimi Olawale (2013), active digital media user and president of Youth Hub 
Africa, explains communication techniques applied using Blackberry Messenger 
– especially so during the ‘Child Not Bride’ protest that took place in Nigeria in 
2013. He recalls that people defied the rain and came out to protest against the 
National Assembly, and this was possible “because we had digital tools”. 
Olawale (2013) says be received many BBM broadcasts to this effect, and many 
people created images to support the Child Not Bride campaign. He goes further 
to say that the text on some of the images were inaccurate in saying “we must 
fight against the bill”, as this issue was not about a bill but 
“a Constitution amendment process.”  
Twitter Conferences is another technique Olawale (2013) applies in fostering 
dialogue in the Nigerian digital sphere. He explains how he organises and 
executes Twitter conferences, under his network, Youth Alliance on Constitution. 
Firstly, Olawale (2013) seeks out a conference speaker(s) with the following 
criteria: “people with content or high number of followers.” He says this is 
because: 
We believe that if we had people who only had content and 
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don't have followers, the conversation would just be bland 
– so we specifically looked for people who had big number 
of followers, and people who had a specialised knowledge 
of the process” - being the constitution process (Olawale, 
2013) 
“Big number of followers” for Olawale (2013) is “ten thousand and above”. 
Secondly, he identified themes for each speaker. The speakers were equally 
assigned a “number of minutes” to speak. There was also a “moderator”, who 
once the stipulated time  (four to five minutes) elapsed, would “ picks questions 
from the hash tag” and direct them to the speaker. It is at this point that there 
can be dialogue, a “back and forth” as Olawale (2013) puts it.  
In communicating with public offices in government, Olawale (2013) attests to 
the fact that emails are not so effective. In his words, giving an example of a 
request made to the government by his Youth Alliance, he says:  
We did a physical letter. Email, you are deceiving yourself. 
Physical letter is getting missing… In my former office, we 
wrote to the Ministry of Education and our letters got 
missing five times 
According to Bukola Ogunyemi (2013), social activist, Twitter Townhall Meetings 
(TTMs) are another important communication technique for the digital public 
sphere. He explains that traditional town hall meetings are when “there is a 
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government representative coming into town, and they bring people, they talk 
and then he makes notes and go gives his boss.” In Ogunyemi’s (2013) opinion, 
“Without that official representation, there is no town hall.” Hence, Ogunyemi 
(2013) complains that on Twitter town hall meetings without government 
representation, “When people gather, they are making noise” He says this is 
“baffling, because Nigerian government do not seem to be ready to harness the 
potentials that digital media has to offer yet in terms of feedback.” According to 
him,  
The way an ideal Twitter Conference works is that the 
“government representative talks and explains, educates 
the people [via tweeting and posting on Facebook] 
Private and religious organisations use different communication techniques in 
the Nigerian digital sphere. According to Henry Okelue (2013) who has been 
involved in some “online publicity glitz”, “businesses are beginning to understand 
that they can actually reach farther on social media than they can maybe on 
mainstream media – on traditional media. These days you see banks have 
online presence, where they give customer service support. Telcos, bushiness, 
small business, big businesses…Twitter has become a form of advertising…it 
has become a form of…a cheap method to reach out to your customers. An 
instance of how Okelue (2013) works with private businesses is that a company 
may approach him saying they have identified him as someone with influence on 
social media, and would want him to tweet certain messages on their behalf. 
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Okelue (2013) says it is “because they know if Henry tweets once, there is the 
assumption that 9,000 people will see it…9000 is such a large number…”  
For churches, Okelue (2013) explains that “religious organisations actually go 
beyond Twitter and Facebook” to sending SMS. He says these churches 
“actually tweet sermons, the pastor tweets about himself - everybody uses social 
media…” Okelue (2013) further explains that as well as religious organisation, 
the “informal economy” is also a part of the Nigerian digital public sphere. 
According to him, he has a “bureau de change guy” on his Twitter timeline, “he 
sometimes talks about the going exchange rate in the black market.” Okelue 
(2013) says he has also noticed the existence of other small creative businesses 
trying to use social media to leverage on publicity: hairdressers, fashion 
designers, and more. In his words, “business get struck everyday” on social 
media just by linking one person to another.  
Okelue (2013) says that while he uses digital media to share his personal 
political and social opinions, he mentions that, 
 I don’t use BBM to share opinions because I don't want to 
disturb anybody, and SMS is not that cost-effective for 
sharing. So it’s basically my blog, those are my preferred 
tools 
 Okelue (2013) explains he believes he has built up his influence online by 
addressing issues “people are afraid of talking about.” He says, “I go where 
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people are afraid of going.” Okelue (2013) recalls that the one time he recorded 
the “highest number of followers” was during the Occupy Nigeria protest. He 
says, “it was like I was speaking the mind of the people.” Similar to the 
techniques of Soji Apampa’s (2013), Okelue (2013) mentions how he “garnishes” 
his online communication content with humour. 
Jaiye Gaskia (2013), the social activist who has been active since the pre-digital 
media era in Nigeria explains how new media has been integrated into the 
activities of his organisation presently. He says although they “still print cause 
leaflets, the banners, the posters…”, they are not a lot easier to distribute. 
Gaskia (2013) says, “you don’t have to travel by night – and you can actually 
send soft copies for people to print out there…” Prior to the uptake of digital 
media tools, Gaskia (2013) explains that: 
We always printed newsletters, periodicals, and funding all 
of those things was always a challenge…digital media 
makes that a lot easier. 
However, cost can now be kept minimal, by sending electronic copies, which the 
recipient may download and print out.  
Mark Amaza (2013) on the other hand, an active digital media user in Nigeria, 
explains that he has a Twitter Show called No Holds Barred Interactive. In his 
words: 
 It’s basically a twitter-show where you will just pick a topic 
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– people can come and talk about relationships and say 
whatever they have on their minds about that topic, relating 
to relationships. 
How it works is that, he picks a topic, invites a guest who would also be a Twitter 
user. The guest speaker tweets for forty-five minutes, whilst interaction on the 
tweets begin to take place simultaneously. This guest takes on a question and 
answer session after he or she is done with the initial set of tweets. Mark puts it 
this way,  
The most interesting thing is that it’s not just a one-
directional. Guest might even be tweeting and then people 
that are tuning in are also conversing among themselves. 
Amaza (2013) mentions that he has conducted an informal survey among the 
audience of his show as to whether they would prefer a different digital media 
platform such as Blackberry Messenger, but “many people chose Twitter 
because it gives them that anonymity they need…to talk about what they want to 
talk about…No Holds Barred I-interactive (NHBi).” 
The remediation of communication online assumes different formats that are 
mostly shaped by the specific new media tool in use. These formats or 
techniques are central to the NDPS because they provide insight into how 
messages get from Point A to Point B, and is reciprocated in the digital public 
sphere. Dialogue is a critical attribute of the public sphere. The main techniques 
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are Twitter Townhalls, Tweet-Meets, Twitter Conferences, Twe-minars, 
facebook-ing, blogging, all sometimes integrated across platforms. Journalists 
for instance, have developed creative practices in utilizing digital media for 
information gathering and sharing – so have religious institutions. Hashtags are 
highly significant to online communicative actions, more so, on Twitter.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
From the interviewee responses, above, certain points are worthy of note. First 
of all, there is an influx of digital media technology in Nigeria – mostly in the form 
of mobile telephony. The adoption of digital media is concentrated in urban 
centres, and less so in rural areas. The availability of cheap-smart-phones from 
China, and the option of buying fairly-used phones has facilitated the adoption of 
smart phones in Nigeria. Secondly, the use of digital media for communication in 
Nigeria, varies from political (e.g. protests) to social (networking, making new 
contacts), and public (journalism, political commentary) to private uses (private 
businesses & advertising). Religious organisations also adopt the tools to 
spread their respective messages to fellow digital media users. Thirdly, although 
there exists the digital divide between the haves and have-nots, there is also the 
divide between the ‘older’ and ‘younger’ generation. This appears to be the case, 
where the ‘older’ individual who despite (sometimes) being literate and 
possessing digital media technologies, refuse to publicly engage in dialogue 
online. It is open to further research to examine why this is perceived to be the 
case.  
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In this chapter and the next I indicate that where a formalized, institution-driven, 
public sphere is weak in Nigeria, actual live issue-based public dialogue and 
deliberation are emerging from the activities indicated above (everyday domestic, 
social and professional uses of standard retail media devices, like the cell 
phone) and this combined with an enterprising and improvisational approach on 
behalf of the users. This is what I call ‘a culture of democracy’, where the core of 
democratic life (dialogue and debate concerning issues of public interest, among 
other elements) is evolving through the emergence of digital media usage in 
Nigeria, and doing so facilitated by improvised communication techniques, styles 
of interlocution and new modes of address. These techniques vary from 
Facebook groups and forums for social protest, to Twitter-Conferences, and 
Twe-Minars aimed at informing and educating those who would engage. The 
limitations involved in utilising digital media as tools for democratic culture cut 
across poor user-behavior, where dialogue/interaction is not guaranteed unlike 
in face-to-face communication, and poor socio-legal framework to protect the 
citizens’ right to express themselves – as should be in a democracy.  
How digital media is evolving a culture of democracy in Nigeria is basically 
through providing the avenue for users (citizens) to come together and interact, 
and express their opinion (whether or not they do this maximally). Prior to this, 
traditional media was the primary source of public information, and dialogue was 
limited to gatherings in physical spaces such as homes, commercial businesses, 
offices, or occasional letters-to-the-editor of a newspaper and calling into 
radio/TV programmes. Other ways a culture of democracy is being spurred in 
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Nigeria through digital media is the rise of real-time election monitoring and 
tracking by citizens using their mobile phones and social network accounts. 
Furthermore, support services are being put in place by the Independent 
Electoral Commission (Nigeria’s electoral body) for citizens using digital media 
tools, to provide feedback on election malpractice, and generally facilitate the 
election process. Also, corrupt practices in the government and private sector 
are being monitored through digital media tools, and creative messages such as 
animated videos that support democratic causes are shared from one mobile 
phone to another.  
The complexity of a rapidly modernizing society, like Nigeria, (particularly in 
relation to the public sphere formations of European ‘bourgeois’ society of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries) make categorical distinctions between 
public and private difficult. In fact, the interactions on digital media often oscillate 
between both the private and the public spheres from time to time, depending on 
how the media device is used. This blurring of the strict divide between the 
private and public sphere should not however be a basis upon which to call for 
the irreparable collapse of the public sphere idea. I argue that its definition only 
needs to be amended to take cognisance of new realities. For Habermas, the 
central force in the ‘structural transformation’ of the public sphere was effectively 
commercialisation, and the collapse of private interests and public interests. 
Calhoun argues that the interpenetration of the private into the public is not fatal 
to a public sphere, given how this has (in relation to the emergence of mass 
media in the Twentieth Century, for example), extended the capabilities for 
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communication, agency and the dissemination of ideas – all of which are 
instrumental in the social formation of citizens that come together to promote 
matters pertaining to the public good. The rise of the mass media in Nigeria did 
indeed signify a general rise in societal education levels, mass communication 
and information dissemination regarding matters of law, public life and 
government. However, this in itself did not facilitate the social agency of 
interaction and deliberation we require for a public sphere. For this to take place, 
a media independent of the state was needed, along with citizen alliances and 
civil society spaces, places and a delimited space of dialogue, and particularly 
critical scrutiny of matters of state.  
In present day Nigeria, I am identifying a public sphere emerging through the 
(largely private, market driven, and socially improvised) ubiquitous availability of 
internet and digital media devices. A Nigerian digital public sphere is emerging 
as identifiable in the agglomeration and networked interconnection of blogs, 
social network sites, mobile phones, and the critical dialogic content that they 
are increasingly facilitating. Again, as digital media is largely generated from the 
ownership of private corporations, mostly concentrated in the West, and coopted 
by a state system whose financial management is less than transparent and 
entirely business like (where overt corruption is often visible), we find ourselves 
with a situation entirely the reverse of Habermas’s embryonic public sphere of 
England and France in the eighteenth century. The embryonic Nigerian public 
sphere is emerging from an entirely commercial realm, (where ‘commerce’ here 
is actually the kind of state-corporation alliance of interests identified by 
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Habermas as responsible for the ‘refeudalisation’ of the public sphere), and yet 
empowering ‘private’ individuals to build a capacity for, and capabilities intrinsic 
to, a new public sphere. For Habermas, this situation would be fatally 
compromised, as the lack of substantive commitment from the state as an 
interlocutor in emerging public deliberations would entail the lack of any 
possibility of a substantive public sphere – for rights, the rule of law, 
constitutional democratic procedures, and so on, are all conditions of a public 
sphere whatever dialogue and deliberations are taking place. While this, of 
course, is true historically for Habermas’ European states, in Nigeria there are 
two things to consider: (i) the presence of just these elements (intrinsic to 
procedural parliamentary democracy), in part as a legacy of the colonial era; and 
(ii) the power of certain kinds of dialogue and deliberations over time to provoke 
a change in the function of the state, depending on the social formations that 
facilitate them. My argument in this thesis, is that a ‘culture’ of democracy has 
emerged, largely through the interaction of citizens with a new emerging market 
(of digital media products). 
 
Of course, one could retort that the market of digital media goods was 
impossible without the state-driven industrial development of a communications 
infrastructure. This is factually true, though not in itself a significant ‘cultural’ 
phenomenon: and as noted above, there remain ongoing issues concerning the 
state’s management of the communications infrastructure in terms of 
surveillance, loss of privacy, and the use of algorithms to ‘manufacture consent’ 
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with Nigerian citizens’ use of the ‘world wide’ web. The Internet is global in reach, 
yet always delimited by state management of its communications infrastructure, 
particularly in relation to industrial policies designed in part to enrich those in 
power (government officials often have substantial private interests in the 
industries they manage as political representatives). One such industrial policy 
area is entertainment, and the huge range of taxation opportunities that emerge 
with entertainments, both online and broadcast.  
Dean (2003) makes a strong argument in her paper, why the net is not a public 
sphere. She says, ‘new media present themselves for and as a democratic 
public’, but what she finds is ‘communicative capitalism’, given the ‘expansion 
and intensification of communication and entertainment’ (Dean, 2003: 102). Yet, 
as noted by our interviewees, entertainment is not regarded as an inhibitor to the 
more serious matters of public communication. For Habermas, a public sphere 
would avoid exclusion of rank and social status, or in other words, be ‘popular’. 
The ubiquity of popular culture can stimulate forms of social interaction that are 
not in themselves hostile to the kinds of interaction required of public 
deliberations, as we shall see with interviewees in the next two chapters. The 
unemployed Nigerian student sitting in a rickety commercial bus in Lagos, and 
the Nigerian CEO on a business trip to New York, can both interact through 
digital media on Twitter about matters of public concern – and this 
unprecedented social interconnection was not in itself generated by public, 
political mechanisms of social order, but the ‘popular’ appeal of Twitter as a 
medium. The popular appeal of digital media is evident when one considers the 
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origins of digital media in marketable products and the user experience of 
consumers as facilitated by brand promotion and marketing.  
For Douglas Kellner, there can emerge a multiplicity of public spheres that may 
sometimes overlap or conflict. However, these are all at risk from the macro-
management capabilities of giant media corporations over the communications 
infrastructure. Of course, such could be said of Nigeria. The threat is more 
complex, given how Nigeria’s communications infrastructure is a complex web of 
foreign providers working under an equally complex web of government 
interests. Nigeria’s military history remains a present reality in terms of an 
assumption that remains – true freedom of speech will facilitate genuine threats 
to the integrity and stability of the democratic state. For so long, the country’s 
press suffers from what one of the interview participants called a ‘military 
hangover’. Although freedom of expression is enshrined in the Nigerian 
constitution, and the freedom of information bill was passed into law in 2011 to 
protect the press, in practice, citizens (including journalists) still somewhat 
feared retribution from the government of the day. Yet, digital media however, as 
Gbenga Sesan (2013) says, ‘really opened a space where people can express 
themselves.’ Kellner did indicate that new media technologies serve to open 
new public spaces for political ‘intervention’, as in Nigeria, and where 
intervention does not require a fully formed public sphere. This is surely evident 
in protests, such as the Occupy Nigeria.  
In this chapter, I set out to describe the digital public sphere in Nigeria, within the 
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frame of new media platforms available and the communication techniques 
users employed. I have found that although a new public sphere on digital media 
platforms is burgeoning in Nigeria, it is hampered by factors such as affordability 
of the devices, and reliable infrastructure. In addition, citizens still fear retribution 
when it comes to expressing public opinions online, reporting corruption (as is 
the case with Egunje.info), or simply interacting amongst themselves – for fear 
of being under surveillance. And yet, this is not inhibiting the exponential growth 
in the use of digital media for individual articulation of viewpoints, generating 
more and more communication traffic and content.  
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Section Three: Chapter Nine 
An Embryonic Public Sphere in Nigeria: Participants’ 
Perspective (2) 
 
Introduction 
This chapter again is comprised almost wholly of interview material, out of which 
I construct a narrative according to two of our stated component dimensions of a 
putative public sphere: first, agents and agencies, that is, the organisations and 
initiatives who are notably active in the digital sphere; these groups and 
individuals can be identified as catalysts, whether users or producers; secondly, 
is dialogue and issues, or the content of discussion and deliberation on digital 
media platforms in (or about) Nigeria. As noted in the last chapter, our remaining 
category of impact and intervention, is intrinsic (and often explicit) to each of our 
components.  
Agents and agencies and the ‘embryonic’ public sphere 
Preliminary field research identified the following organisations and their 
representatives as offering significant insights into the emergence of conditions 
for a digital public sphere:  
• Azeernah Mohammed, Occupy Nigeria  
• Amara Nwankpa, Light Up Nigeria & Oil Revenue Tracking  
• Kayode Idowu, Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) Citizens 
Contact Centre  
• Yemi Adamolekun, Enough is Enough Nigeria  
• Segun Fodeke, iWatchNg  
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• Zubair & Bayo, Nigerian Constitution for Blackberry  
• Bukola Ogunyemi, Policy Ng  
• Seun Onigbinde, BudgIt 
 
Azeenarh Mohammed, Occupy Nigeria Protest: Mohammed (2013) was an 
active player in the Occupy Nigeria protest movement using both digital media 
and offline techniques in the form of street protests. Other players in the 
Nigerian online domain include public officials, though as Mohammed (2013) 
suggests, there are only a few of them actually active. She opines that “as much 
as they want to engage on it, they are scared of it”. Mohammed (2013) says she 
has observed that among the few public officials who first came on social media, 
“because there was just so much pent up anger and distrust for so long”, there 
was “a bit of a backlash” or “attack.” She says some stayed on the platforms 
despite verbal attacks online and now “they can have civilized conversations on 
the issues.” She explains that public officials not yet online perpetuate a 
skepticism as to its proper political function, as they maintain that “it’s just a lot 
of angry Nigerians trying to have a go at me personally”. However, for 
Mohammed (2013), this is not really the case.  
If you can get past the few miscreants that will come with 
personal issues, policies is actually being discussed, 
debated – minds are being changed, decisions are being 
taken, because of the mood of social media (Mohammed, 
2013). 
Amara Nwankpa, Light Up Nigeria and Oil Revenue Tracking Initiative: Nwankpa 
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(2013) is a digital media user who has actively promoted different social and 
political causes and discussions around them. Two prominent initiatives have 
been Light Up Nigeria and Oil Revenue Tracking. He explains that his Oil 
Revenue Tracking initiative “Is about natural resource governance in Nigeria”, 
and his public statements on the subject revolves around questions about use of 
oil resources, and opportunities that are being forgone in favour of the focus on 
oil in Nigeria. On Light Up Nigeria, an initiative Nwankpa (2013) set up to 
discuss the situation of poor electricity in Nigeria, he explains that it began in 
July 2009 “when young Nigerians were just gone on to Twitter.” Nwankpa (2013) 
says, “we were all outspoken people who were keen on Nigeria to improve.” He 
then came up with an idea “during one of those discussions early in the 
morning”, asking “why don't we have a hash tag.” For Nwankpa (2013), 
“Electricity became the rallying point.” Through Light Up Nigeria, Nwankpa 
(2013) says: 
We were successful in establishing a constituency that was 
vocal, that was relevant and opinions that became 
respected in the Nigerian polity.  
According to him, youths then became factored into government policy-making. 
The campaign got a lot of publicity and foreign awareness. 
Yemi Adamolekun, Executive Director, Enough is Enough Nigeria (EIE): 
According to a conference report, New Media & Governance: Tool and Trends,  
an event organised by the Shehu Musa Yar’adua Foundation and Enough is 
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Enough Nigeria in May 2012, Enough is Enough organisation is described as a 
‘coalition of individuals and youth-led organisations’ who are committed to a 
‘culture of public accountability’ in Nigeria. The conference was organised 
alongside international and local development partners and civil society 
organisations. The aim was to bring government policy makers, academic 
institutions, private sector and youths together to discuss how new media can be 
deployed to facilitate governance, transparency, and accountability.  
In the report, there is an account of how EiE created the RSVP initiative (register, 
selected, vote, protect) campaign that leveraged on digital media technology 
(especially social media) to mobilise a significant group of citizens from age 18-
35 to go out and vote during the 2011 elections in Nigeria. The report says, ‘EiE 
continues to focus on voter education, awareness and the use of technology to 
drive good governance and accountability’. In the research interview, Executive 
Director Yemi Adamolekun (2013), explains that the organisation “came out of a 
protest that wasn't planned, so now we call it a child of necessity”. She says that 
a lot of work is needed in “re-orientating” how people think about the 
government and governance - especially so, as the Nigerian demography is 
mostly young people. Adamolekun (2013) says it is important to “get that 
demographic interested in government, interested in governance, not only voting, 
but also being active citizens”.  
Segun Fodeke, iWatchNg: Here is Fodeke’s (2013) narrative on what iWatchNg 
is about and how it started stimulating discourse online. He says his iWatchNg 
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project was focused on tracking how the government spent money purported for 
infrastructure and development in Nigeria.  
We started off with a concept where we needed to track, at 
least have a record of what projects the government is 
executing (Fodeke, 2013). 
 However, he “couldn't find any form of record in terms of details of what is going 
on in my [local] area or in Nigeria.” This led Fodeke (2013) to set up iWatchNg, 
in order to keep track of infrastructure projects, as it was “worrisome” to him that 
there were failed projects, and no one was taking action or responsibility. 
Fodeke (2013) says,  
At least if someone could put a track record in place so 
that we can see all these things, see if there is a trend 
there and figure it out somehow. 
He was also interested in getting people to “talk about these things” – this was 
why he founded iWatchNg.  
He says in terms of engagement with his platform, “we haven’t reached where 
we would want to be”, hence, as part of improvement he is “creating the kind of 
platform social media channels that allows for easy communication”. An 
example of a project that Fodeke’s (2013) iWatchng has taken on is the Lagos-
Apapa Expressway repair project. He explains that once there was a portal 
where projects approved for execution by the government were published. That 
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is, the Federal Executive council meeting approvals were published online as 
“PDF documents”, containing details such as the “contractor, the budget and the 
allocation.” IWatchNg would then pick projects from this portal and publish on 
their social media channels in order to “track development.” Fodeke (2013) says, 
“we got people commenting”, especially when there was a time the contractors 
stopped working on the project. According to him, “people commented that “hey 
these people have stopped working.” Fodeke (2013) himself claims he went to 
the project site to take pictures to publish on his platform.  
To join iWatchNg and participate in the initiative, Fodeke (2013) says, ’it's a 
simple registration process” with name and email address. He goes on 
Then we would communicate with you regularly with 
updates via e-mails and on our site you can also come and 
see the updates there… 
Fodeke (2013) mentions that social media is very important to his project, 
because subscribers equally get updates on those platforms, Twitter and 
Facebook.  
Zubair & Bayo, Nigerian Constitution for Blackberry: Zubair & Bayo created the 
Nigerian constitution app out of ‘gut-feeling’ that Nigerians would need it. The 
download-rate began to increase towards the 2011 national presidential election, 
and the following year as well, during the Occupy Nigeria protest, which 
according to the developers: 
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...got people for some reason to be more patriotic and say, 
you know, maybe I should actually know my rights, let me 
go download the constitution (Zubair & Bayo, 2013) 
They have created the app to adapt it to various platforms besides the 
Blackberry. There is also the Nokia and Samsung version. As at the interview 
date, they were close to arriving at 800,000 downloads.  
On the functionality of the app, it has a search feature that allows the user to go 
directly to the needed information from the constitution. Zubair and Bayo (2013) 
explain that, “rather than go through the whole thing, you may just be looking for 
specific terms.” The search feature allows the user go through the constitution in 
sections. “It’s a very simple application” they say. The limitation of the app is 
that: 
Even for people who are educated or enlightened, 
interpretation is still subject to having some sort of legal 
background” (Zubair & Bayo, 2013) 
 He says, even he himself misinterprets certain parts of the constitution, 
because he does not fully “understand the implications according to law.” There 
is also the barrier of language to consider, hence, Zubair and Bayo (2013) say 
they have considered updating the app to encapsulate other local languages, 
however, they consider it more effective to: 
...Take what already exists and provide it in a format that 
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people can easily relate to, because even in the translation’ 
the complexity of the legal terms would still exist (Zubair & 
Bayo, 2013) 
Soji Apampa, Egunje.info: Egunje Info is an initiative of Soji Apampa (2013) 
under his Integrity Organisation. It is published on the Egunje.info (2014) 
website that identifies itself in terms of an ‘anti-corruption, research and 
advocacy organisation with the vision of reducing the tolerance to corruption in 
Nigeria’. Hence, through egunje.info, Apampa uses research to engage in 
“constructive dialogue with the government, even during the military [rule]”. 
Egunje is a Nigerian slang for ‘bribe’. In terms of application of digital media 
tools, Apampa says the idea behind his initiative is to take the message about 
corruption from Blackberry to Blackberry. He says, 
We’ve created a site where you can report corruption 
safely and we would pass on the details to the ICPC, so if 
you are scared.  
The ICPC is the corruption monitoring body in Nigeria. Apampa (2013) explains 
that the app works on non-smart phones through SMS. It is possible to 
download the symbian version or the Blackberry app. Hence, users can “report 
from your phone”, or alternatively, walk into their offices to report a case of 
corruption.  
To use the SMS function, Apampa (2013) says “you just have to say the name 
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of the institution or type of complaint upfront, and then free text.” Apampa (2013) 
and his team then work with the call centre to “make sense of the SMS” and 
update their data base. Alternatively, people call in to their office to report cases, 
which they then also update on their records.  
Apampa (2013) says the reason why most people prefer to make phone calls 
rather than register their complaint on the website, is because “there is still the 
fear of retribution.” He explains that people are unsure as to whether “they can 
be traced”, hence, they prefer to call in or report. Based on Google Analytics, a 
web tool that generates detailed statistics on a website’s traffic, Apampa (2013) 
says the majority of the visitors have been “the more affluent in the society.” In 
his words, “they’ve been coming [to the site] on Apple, Blackberries and so on. 
But the people who have been reporting are not the people who can afford 
Blackberries.” This led him to the conclusion that his organisation reaches two 
separate audiences - “those who are checking “I hope my name is not there yet” 
vs, those who are reporting “this is what is affecting my life” says Apampa 
(2013). He says that while the “140 reports are the timid reports”, the “10,000 
[visits] are the big boys and girls going to check out the stories on the site” to 
ensure “nothing is linking them.” Apampa’s (2013) corruption monitoring website 
has been the victims of hackers who tried to breach his security “a few times.” 
Bukola Ogunyemi, Policy Ng: Bukola Ogunyemi describes Policy Ng as his effort 
at correcting problems, ‘ethnic and religious sentiments’, and it does so in online 
public discussions. According to him, on Policy Ng, the focus is not on “people, 
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ethnicity, religion.” Rather, it is on “issues, policies, debate institutions.” Bukola 
describes PolicyNg as his “effort at correcting all these anomalies I've seen in 
discussions in Nigeria's public sphere, especially on digital media.” PolicyNg is a 
platform “where people can voice their opinions and they can debate objectively 
and holistically without bringing sentiments in”, says Bukola.  
Policy Ng works through a Facebook page, YouTube account, Storify account  
and a blog. On the blog, Ogunyemi (2013) explains that “we bring in writers and 
we are very careful about the writers we bring in.” His criteria for the writers are 
that:	  
They are people who have outgrown the normal Nigerian 
sentimental phase of life, who can look into issues, and 
write about them.	  
Their main responsibilities according to Ogunyemi (2013) is to “educate us 
about policies of government that affect the people” - policies in “education, 
health, infrastructure, works, security.” These writers “read up government 
policies”, and analyse them. Bukola says the writers are not encouraged to 
make “recommendations”, as he wants “recommendations to come from the 
people who these policies affect.” Therefore, all the writers do is to say, “if this 
policy comes into play, this is how it will affect you”, says Bukola.  
 
For the readers, Ogunyemi (2013) says: 
We encourage them [readers] to read our analysis on the 
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blog, and then we ask them, how do these policies affect 
you?  
He opines that when the government puts out policies, “they don’t care about 
people’s reaction or feedback”, and the contrary is what he is advocating 
through PolicyNg. The next step after getting reader feedback is to “storify” their 
accounts. Storify is a social network tool that makes it possible to curate 
comments online on a page. Ogunyemi (2013) says, 
We have a Storify account...to bring all these comments 
together into a single page instead of being scattered 
around.  
From the Storify page, “people can read from comment to comment...and then 
get an idea of what the [other] people are saying.” At this point, Ogunyemi 
(2013) says he carries out an opinion poll on the policy in focus, as to whether a 
policy should be sustained or modified. Lastly, 
The comments on the blog and social media are collated 
and sent to the relevant government agencies with the 
expectation that they be acted upon (Bukola Ogunyemi, 
2013) 
Ogunyemi (2013) says he and his Policy Ng correspondents also reach out to 
the: 
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...generations of Nigerians who are not on social media, 
but whom certain policies also affect and would ‘want to 
talk’ but only have access to traditional media 
He says: 
We go to their homes and get their thoughts...we get their 
feedbacks as video recordings and we put it on our 
YouTube page (Ogunyemi, 2013). 
 PolicyNg also forwards the links of these videos to relevant agencies in the 
Nigerian government. Examples of policies tackled by Policy NG include the 
National Youth Service Corps reforms, and the UTME (Unified Tertiary 
Matriculation Examination) scheme. 
Seun Onigbinde, BudgIt: BudgIT, according to the official website is ‘a creative 
startup driven to retell the Nigerian budget and public data in a finer detail 
across every literary span’. The tagline for the organisation is ‘the Nigerian 
budget made simple – using creative technology to intersect civic engagement 
and institutional reform’ and ‘giving every citizen access to budgets and public 
data.’ Onigbinde (2013) explains that BudgIT is about public data and budget. 
He opines that the literacy level in society makes it difficult to understand the 
budget, hence, “a lot of people are making misjudgments”, and “saying wrong 
things” [online]. Thus, BudgIT is: 
About giving data to people, empowering them with data, 
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making it accessible, simple and transparent and possibly 
amplifying the voices and making them heard. 
In other words, “driving institutional reform” through making the national budget 
highly accessible. Still on literacy as a challenge, Onigbinde (2013) raises 
important questions such as: 
 If people don't understand these things so how do you 
simplify it, how do you make it of common understanding, 
how do you take it from that niche knowledge of the public 
finance expert and economists, to something that is of 
common understanding to all? (Onigbinde, 2013) 
On the digital media technologies used to simplify the message of BudgIT, they 
achieve this through the use of info graphics, interactive applications, prints 
(leaflets etc.), radio broadcast, SMS and “as many tools as could connect to that 
literacy set of society”. By “set”, Onigbinde (2013) says: 
We have dimensioned our users, we have an actively 
literate set, we have a grassroots set, so most of what we 
work now is the active literate set which I presume are 
mostly on social media, Facebook, Twitter, it's strictly 
interested in governance 
Onigbinde (2013) says he wants BudgIT to be the neutral voice in the midst of 
dialogue on public and political issues. He says: 
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The governance discussion [on social media] is an high-
octave one, so we want to be just like the neutral voice in 
the room. 
Onigbinde (2013) in his interview argues that except someone provides the facts, 
arguments on online fora would be ill-balanced and debates will not be informed. 
In his words, “government can’t, nobody can argue with the facts or the data that 
is self-revealing". BudgIT sources data from both “primary and secondary 
sources”. A primary source would be the government budget office, the office of 
the Account-General, while a secondary source may be the CBN website 
[Central Bank of Nigeria]. Data from these sources are taken and verified, before 
being sent to the visualisation and development team “where we say how can 
we bring a story out of this data”, according to Onigbinde (2013). He adds that: 
We build graphics to ensure that it is interesting, a bit more 
appealing and people can connect with it. 
For circulation of the data, Onigbinde (2013) says it’s all public, on website, in 
print, “civil society networks”, and others “downloaded and printed 
independently.” He continues: 
We usually have this non-attribution stance, so you can 
pick it up and use it for yourself, it's all good – because the 
end goal is not about – it's not a competitive stuff – the end 
goal is let's collaborate more, let's amplify the voices and 
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the solutions…(Onigbinde, 2013) 
For Twitter, Onigbinde (2013) explains that he shares “small flashcards” with 
budget information as a means of linking up to his website. Facebook is another 
tool he uses, combined with civil society groups on social networks, SMS, and 
“google groups of people.” Onigbinde (2013) says “more of them use these data 
to also make their own judgements – those are just the digital tools we use.” For 
SMS, he says perhaps one can send a text message requesting for some data 
from the budget, for instance, “you want monthly allocation for Anambra for this 
period, you just get it.” Lastly, BudgIT is working with Maliyo games, an online 
gaming company to develop a web app. Onigbinde (2013) says: 
We have apps. We don't have a mobile app yet, but we 
have a web app. We have a mobile site, but we have a 
web app. And the web app, we are working with one with 
Maliyo games. They are building an android budget app for 
us. 
Actors in the Nigerian digital public sphere are diverse from organisations or 
initiatives to individuals – private citizens and public officials. Examples of these 
actors discussed above are Enough is Enough Nigeria, PolicyNg, BudgIT, to 
mention a few. These groups are actively involved in civic and political dialogue 
online on issues ranging from fuel subsidy, oil, to the national budget, power 
infrastructure (electricity), corruption, and so on. This section has detailed in 
practical terms how these individuals serve as agents and agencies in the NDPS. 
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More succinctly put, it answers the questions: who are these agents and 
agencies, what activities do they carry out, to whom are their activities targeted, 
and with what effect.  
Dialogue and issues in the ‘embryonic’ public sphere 
In this section, I draw from the field research interview to identify the content of 
dialogue, debate and deliberation, as well as how the issues or subjects being 
discussed are organised, what is trending and who is setting the agenda for 
discussion. The interviewees here shared their experiences in online dialogue 
on public issues, challenges they found with engaging as well as benefits.  
  
Amara Nwankpa (2013), Light Up Nigeria, says in online dialogue, he gets 
involved in “conversations that have to do with issues that affect society” but he 
also “has time for banter too, because it’s social”. In his words:  
If you focus only on discussing politics and development 
and so on, then it gets boring very quickly (Nwankpa, 
2013). 
In Nwankpa’s (2013) opinion, relationships [online] thrive on “frank social 
exchanges between people”, and for him, that is what what “builds trust” and 
“makes people pay attention to what you say.” For Nwankpa (2013), what 
triggers his contribution to the “public sphere of discussion” could be a “new item” 
on traditional media, or “an occurrence.” He says that when debates are ongoing 
online, they come from different perspectives, namely: “religious angles, cultural 
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angles, historical angles, legal and political implications as well.” Hence, when 
he engages, he tends to “participate by exploring all the angles most people are 
not looking at.” In addition, Nwankpa (2013) says he sometimes has to 
“research the subject, ask questions, pay attention to people who know a lot 
about the sector… the historical facts…” 
Alkassim Abdukadir (2013), a journalist on a citizen platform, says that for him, 
dialogue has to do with comments on the news stories he shares as a journalist. 
He explains that because he shares his stories on multiple platforms, comments 
span his website/blog to the Facebook posts and those on Twitter where:	  	  
People just retweet, quote tweet and then add their 
comments on. So you are having conversations going 
across multiple platforms, not only on your website	  
 	  
Abdukadir (2013) adds that you are also “having conversations on BBM.” He 
says: 	  
What you have done is you have provided a platform, and 
you’ve given them content, and those people are talking 
around it – your Facebook wall, Twitter, your website, they 
are talking about it (Abdukadir, 2013)	  	  
Abdukadir (2013) raises some interesting points about his observation of 
publicly held debates online. He says, “they are vibrant, people are really 
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interested, but sometimes, their prejudices come to fore.” By prejudices, 
Abdukadir (2013) refers to ethnicism – 	  
Everything, especially if it has to do with governance or the 
general society, it has a way of turning into to an ethnic 
socio-religious issue...all the comments tend to at the end 
of the day trickle down to religious issues, social issues, 
ethnic issues and all that  (Abdukadir, 2013)  
 
The challenges Azeenarh Mohammed (2013) finds with dialoguing in the 
Nigerian digital public sphere are: misinformation, poor engagement and 
reluctance to engage among public officials and policy makers, relatively poor 
access to social media (issues with affordability) and ‘distraction’ online. On 
misinformation she says	  
…there is a mob-mentality – you take one story which is 
not the truth, and people run with it.	  
She describes this as “one of the dangers of digital media.” In her words, “if the 
wrong story goes out first, and there's madness about it, it continues to rise”. 
Also, regarding distraction:	  
There is just so much to distract you – the internet is as 
much a good thing as it is a bad thing – it depends on how 
you wish to use it – it's just so much distraction out there – 
there is entertainment news etc. (Mohammed, 2013) 
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Amara Nwankpa (2013) had an experience of getting harassed online. Nwankpa 
(2013) says:	  
If Nigeria is going to move forward, people need to be 
open to other ideas, learn from them, you also need to 
listen	  
He says he was ‘attacked’ online when he agreed to be a part of the youth lunch 
organized by the president just after he was elected.  The lunch event was 
organised to “thank young people for the role that they played in the elections”, 
but according to Nwankpa (2013):	  
A lot of young people didn't feel that someone like me 
should be involved with those kind of characters and I 
disagree.	  
For being a part of the presidential lunch meeting, he was harassed online by 
his account. Abdukadir (2013) finds that online dialogue in the Nigerian public 
sphere is not productive because “our petty prejudices have not allowed us see 
beyond our nose…” He says that the “petty prejudices” are borne out of ethnic, 
social factors. In his words, for instance, 	  
Why should someone think I shouldn’t be able to speak or 
write good English because I am Northern? (Abdukadir, 
2013)	  
For Abdukadir (2013), when he is approached online for dialogue by someone 
who already harbours prejudices against him, he is put in the “defensive stage” 
while the other party is coming from a “deficient stage.” Abdukadir (2013) gives 
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the instance that “some people have a problem with Goodluck Jonathan 
because he is from the South-South, because he is Christian.” He criticises this 
group of people by saying:	  
...Anybody that should have problem with Jonathan should 
come from his incompetence, his skill set, his policies, not 
the fact that he is Christian.	  
Abdukadir (2013) opines that online dialogue among Nigerians would improve 
“once we see beyond this” and “begin to have a common conversation.” 
 
Religion is an important subject in the Nigerian digital public sphere. To this, 
Abdukadir (2013) says he has observed that people are cautious as to how they 
discuss religion online. He says: 
You’ll find that even if the person is Christian and he 
makes a political incorrect statement about Islam for 
example, you find that the correction would come from 
Christians first (Abdukadir, 2013) 
However, in times of insurgency, “there is a lot of hate speech against Islam” 
online, says Abdukadir (2013). Another perspective Abdukadir (2013) shares is 
about how “cool” it is to “belong to certain Christian circle because they are 
young and upwardly mobile.” In other words, “cool” tribes are formed online 
around religious organisations. Abdukadir (2013) gives an example of a church 
in Abuja, Nigeria, Coza church. He says: 
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Coza is a very popular church in Abuja, has a very huge 
youth following in Abuja – so this tends to translate online 
and it has become sort of a status symbol to go to Coza 
and talk about it online.  
Abdukadir (2013) describes it as a “a blend of being trendy and spiritual at the 
same time.” He calls attention to the fact that on Twitter, people also retweet 
their pastors (religious leaders). However, not everyone online is okay with 
religious content being shared on their timelines. Abdukadir (2013) mentions 
that there are people in his network whose dispositions are “that you cannot put 
your church in my face.” 
Harassment and insults (to some degree, hate speech) is a challenge in the 
Nigerian digital sphere. From the interviews, it is evident that public officials for 
instance, are sometimes recipients of this. Omojuwa (2013) says: 
If people insult you as a public official on digital media, it is 
because they insult you in their houses, and in their 
schools… 
It is his opinion that digital media has only given these groups of people: 
...A microphone that amplified it for you to hear… all the 
insults does to them is to show them a picture of their 
performances (Omojuwa, 2013)  
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How Chika Oduah (2013), a freelance journalist decides on who to interact with 
or not online depends on the person’s content she says “I interact with anyone 
who is interesting” and tends to “unfollow” anyone who is simply publishing 
posts on entertainment. In her words, “I really appreciate people who are giving 
me source, information – it's credible sources.” On her part, she says she tweets 
a lot of quotes from other journalists as they tend to get retweeted (i.e. 
engagement). She said this is because: 
People need facts, Nigeria we lack facts, we lack data – so 
if we are help filter that and provide it for you right there on 
your phone (Oduah, 2013) 
The challenges she finds with online media for public dialogue are that:	  
It's not always credible. Sometimes people tweet the 
wrong facts, the percentages may be slightly off.	  
She gives the instance of the spread of false pictures during a crisis. Oduah 
(2013) says:	  
Social media tends to kind of go with the flow, no one is 
checking, so people are tweeting and putting on Blackberry 
things that they saw thinking its real	  
 Omojuwa (2013) is an active digital media user who was a huge contributor to 
the Occupy Nigeria protest. He says he has been a part of different kinds of 
discussions online - from “politics, religion, relationships, gay rights issues, 
sports, culture, music, entertainment, fashion.” The reason he gives for this is 
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that he views his presence on online platforms as a “cable channel”, hence, it 
should appeal to anyone. His idea of political discussions online is that “it’s a 
marketplace.” Omojuwa (2013) mentions that there are participants in the 
debate who “just wait for you to say something, and they go with what you said”; 
he calls it “herd-culture”. In his opinion:	  
The debate is not deep enough, it is not intellectual enough, 
it is much more about noise. 
 
Kayode Idowu (2013), the chief press secretary to INEC, shares his experience 
of online dialogue from the perspective of how his organisation manages 
communication during elections in Nigeria. He says,  
...During elections, there is real-time dialogue, people raise 
issues we respond to them. 
Idowu (2013) explains that because his organisation deals with politicians, 
diverse interests get represented. Sometimes, he says:  
Some are outright abusive, some are outright malicious, 
but some are also genuinely concerned. 
Idowu (2013) says in INEC engagement with social media, where they publish 
press statements on their Facebook or Twitter accounts, “some respond to 
commend the commission, some respond to attack the commission” - the 
response is usually diverse. Social media has kept the electoral commission in 
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touch with the public says Idowu (2013).  
We've had people who posted abusive queries and we 
responded civilly to them, to explain – to give the 
information that we think they don't have (Idowu, 2013). 
Gbenga Olorunpomi (2013), a social media manager for a political party and 
former governor says that dialogue online is impacted by certain influential users. 
In his words,  
The debates have been fuelled by not enough information, 
not enough proper information (Olorunpomi, 2013).  
Olorunpomi (2013) also mentions that some people contribute to discussions 
“for the recognition”, for “oh he said it first.” When he or the public officials he 
works for are criticised in an online discourse, Olorunpomi (2013) says he gets 
very “emotional”. He says when someone who is critical of his principals is 
“adamant”, sometimes he messages them online asking if he can have their 
phone numbers. In his words: 
I don't think I can calculate how much I have spent 
debating on the phone (with strangers) on purely 
innocuous situations. 
Fidelis Mbah (2013), journalist, says digital media has given Nigerians the 
opportunity to network:  
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People now can start up debate about an issue without 
going on radio or television, many people would join the 
debate and it would resonate across the country and even 
beyond. This was something that before now could not 
happen (Mbah, 2013) 
However, his observation of political debate online reveals challenges around 
engagement with stakeholders such as politicians. Mbah (2013) says, 
“politicians do not actually have time to come online”, and as for people debating,  
...Some of them get so carried away by emotions that 
rather than discuss objectively, they end up trading insults 
(Mbah, 2013) 
Mbah (2013) sees this as a “big challenge” for “an objective and straightforward 
political discourse.” He says he is not in support of arguments that are based on 
emotions and sentiments.” Mbah (2013) finds that “illiteracy is another big 
problem”; for some others,  
...All they are after is to share pictures of their boyfriend 
and girlfriend on Facebook, which is why many of them are 
not on Twitter (Mbah, 2013) 
He says “even those who are on Twitter are just there for record purposes, like 
"okay I have a Twitter account" which is actually non-functional most times”. 
These groups of people, Mbah (2013) says  “they are not bothered about what 
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happens in government”, rather they are more concerned with “ Kim Kardashian 
getting pregnant.” To Mbah (2013), the advantages that come with the potential 
of digital media to spur debates among citizens resides in the fact that it 
“broadens people understanding of certain issues.” The downside to this for 
Mbah (2013) is that participants in the online forum could be miseducated – that 
is, “if they are not sound enough they get confused by people whom they also 
meet on online forums.” However, he says that the more people get involved in 
this political discourse, “the more they see themselves, they see the need to 
hold government accountable.”  
Yemi Adamolekun (2013), director of ‘Enough is Enough Nigeria’, says that 
while dialogue and discussions online is a “great way to educate”… “the fact that 
it is uncensored makes it an easy place for young Nigerians to vent.” She says 
“there's a lot of anger” among Nigerians online, hence, it may sometimes get 
“quite abusive” and “insulting”. Adamolekun (2013) portends that an online 
public forum is “not necessarily a friendly place to be if you're on the wrong side 
of the divide”; by this she refers to public officials who come online to engage 
with citizens. However, she still argues that the “biggest advantage” of digital 
media is that it is largely “uncensored.” Other problems she finds with engaging 
in public discussions online is that “a lot of it is assumption,” and misinformation, 
where digital media users “take a line off a piece, or an article or headline and 
you blow it up to conclude what it didn't really say.”   
For dialogue via digital media to be effective, Adamolekun (2013) opines that 
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online community needs to be linked to the “offline world’”. In her words 
Online is fantastic, it's a wonderful tool to share information, 
harness resources, meet like-minds, but you 
have to connect the online community with the offline world 
– unless nothing will happen (Afamolekun, 2013) 
Adamolekun (2013) also draws attention to the significance of anonymity online 
and how it affects dialogue in the Nigerian digital public sphere. She says: 
Online allows you to hide. If I am looking at a man who is 
60, and I am a well brought up Yoruba girl, it would take 
the spirit of the devil for me to tell the man to his face he is 
saying utter nonsense (Adamolekun, 2013) 
She says that however, on Twitter, contrary is the case. Adamolekun (2013) 
says: 
I love the boldness, I love the challenge. But I think we can 
do it with a bit of respect (Adamolekun, 2013) 
She opines that in lacking respect in online communication, “sometimes your 
message gets lost”. Adamolekun (2013) is in support of challenging public 
officials online with facts, as opposed to rudeness. She says it is better to 
interact with facts rather than “reacting out of emotion” - hence people need to 
understand “their rights and responsibilities.”  She continues by giving an 
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illustration:  
According to the 2013 budget, there's supposed to be four 
primary health care services in my local government, none 
of them have been built – why? So it's factual 
(Adamlolekun, 2013) 
 She goes on to give an account of a public official, former Minister of Youths, 
who came on Twitter for Tweet-Meets. This is her account based on her 
observation:  
I remember 2011 after the elections, Twitter was the new 
baby of elected officials, and Minister of Youth was 
planning monthly tweet-meets, this person was coming – 
but by the time they dealt with Bolaji Abdulaahi in 
December, the man didn't come back. I mean, first of all, 
from his NYSC reform, they tore it to shreds. (Adamolekun, 
2013) 
Adamolekun (2013) describes young people on digital media platforms as the 
“microwave generation” saying, “we are slightly lazy” in that people want 
information quickly, the Twitter 140-character style, rather than read a “long 
story” that would leave them better informed in her opinion. Her suggestion 
towards tackling this challenge is that there is need for more capacity-building 
and education about politics and governance online. She says: 
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There are lots of different tweet meets and hash tags, 
different things happening, but I think it's sort of in that line, 
but I think it needs to be a bit deeper (Adamolekun, 2013) 
Jon Gambrell (2013), journalist with an international organization (Associated 
Press), refers to dialogue in online forums as “noisemaking”. He says,  
There are some people who are on twitter who just post 
messages, tweets all day long…I call them “noise makers” 
because some of these people are just generally trying to 
get people’s attention.  
Gambrell (2013) likens this group of people to “the guy who plays the drum while 
others walk by, trying to get money thrown at him.” He says it is still the case 
now, “but it’s in the digital age.” Gambrell (2013) says the discourse in his 
opinion is infused with anger and passion. In his words, “there is a lot of passion, 
a lot of people who are very upset and very angry.” He opines that because 
Nigeria “is still a young democracy, the people are still trying to understand what 
the limits are of free speech.” Gambrell (2013) suggests that the Nigerian 
society is grappling with “a free speech culture” and “trying to understand what 
that means”. For instance, “you still see journalists getting arrested, you see 
people harassed for what they say on Twitter” he says.  
Gambrell (2013) calls attention to the use of digital media and dialogue on these 
platforms in “rehabilitating” the public images of politicians. He says:  
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Also it’s interesting enough that people are using Twitter to 
rehabilitate their image, to change themselves and to allow 
themselves be looked at as something different (Gambrell, 
2013)  
He gives the example of a politician he opines was “not necessarily viewed 
positively by a lot of people in Nigeria.” Gambrell (2013) comments that this 
politician is being “humanised” when he posts tweets such as "Oh I was playing 
Xbox with my son and my fingers are tired”. He perceives this as “a direct 
attempt to try to humanise people and to change the message, and try and 
change history” and also mentions instances of “passive aggression” online and 
public relations stunts in online dialogue:  
There is another fella, Reno Omokri, who also puts up a lot 
of stuff… and it's also this kind of passive 
aggressive…kind of never naming names but insulting 
people after they say anything…and also manipulating 
facts in order to suit their agenda, and that's what PR is. It 
is interesting (Gambrell, 2013).  
At the time of writing this thesis, Reno Omokri was the “Special Assistant to the 
President on New Media.” In addition, Jon proposes that so-called dialogue in 
the Nigerian digital sphere gives the “illusion of transparency”. He explains his 
point in that, having a Facebook account or website does not make for 
transparency. In his words: 
	   267	  
It's just like saying ‘oh we are the most transparent 
government because we signed the Freedom of 
Information act into law’. Yeah you did, but no you can't 
enforce the law and nobody follows any of the rules and 
you can't actually get any information – it's just a piece of 
paper (Gambrell, 2013) 
As a journalist, Gambrell (2013) has also been attacked online because of his 
stories. He says,  
I think that sometimes people don't know how to handle 
context in a story where you explain what's happening… 
He states that people would call him an “idiot” who does not “know anything 
about Nigeria.” It is important to note at this juncture that Gambrell (2013) is an 
American national who was practising journalism in Nigeria as an international 
correspondent. He goes on to opine that political dialogue online is about 
‘personality’ not ‘policy’. In his words, “there is no discussion on platforms, there 
is no discussion of issues.” Jon mentions that there are people in his networks 
who try to push the agenda of discussing policies; he says this is a sign of a 
“developing democracy.” However, he insists that the discussions online are 
personality driven and allude to the “oga-at-the-top”  [i.e. Reverence for a top 
dog, or boss] behaviour.  
Gbenga Sesan (2013) says he may be conversational and non-conversational 
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when it comes to dialogue online sometimes. He says: 
I am not the best person when it comes to having 
conversations, I say things, people reply, and sometimes I 
am asking myself, why am I supposed to reply this person 
again? (Sesan, 2013) 
However, Sesan (2013) says he has noticed that many times, he publishes 
posts on his social media account, and “many people take it, retweet” or seek 
his “permission to retweet.” For Facebook on the other hand, he says he mostly 
uses it to “follow up on conversation.” His Twitter account is integrated into his 
Facebook account, hence: 
When I post a tweet, it goes live on Facebook and people 
start making comments, I get it by email and I reply them 
by email. I hardly go on Facebook these days, except 
when I want to check a picture and smile (Sesan, 2013) 
Sesan (2013) shares his observation and experience of dialogue in the Nigerian 
digital sphere. He says that there was a time when online, “everybody abused 
(insulted) government.” This later shifted “50-50”, as another group arose that 
“supported the government.” In recent times, Sesan (2013) says, “it's getting 
more balanced…[but] people have to get a lot more civil in their conversations." 
He also emphasises the need for online discussants to engage one another in 
arguments based on “facts and not with emotions.” In defence, Sesan (2013) 
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says: 
Of course government also uses emotions, so you can't 
rule out emotions, but people need to come with facts to 
the table, people need to come with a genuine argument. 
There are active digital media users who do not engage in political dialogue 
online. Musician, Sasha P for instance says, “I just don't think that it is of any 
use talking.” She says if she’s invited to speak on radio, “that makes sense”; 
however, to engage people on Twitter, in her words, “ I don't really see how 
useful that is to anybody.” Sasha says this is because it is never a “win-win 
situation”, “it's your opinion against mine – so there is no point.” Sunday Alamba 
(2013), a photojournalist also says he never engages in political dialogue online 
because being a journalist puts him in a precarious situation. He says in not too 
clear terms: 
 …Especially you being a journalist. You don't know how 
many journalists been killed here. It could be political, 
sometimes they say its armed robbery cases or something 
– but you, because you don't know who you are stepping 
on his toes – because it may turn back on you. But this is 
Nigeria. 
For Kole Shettima (2013): 
A lot of people think that social media is the solution to the 
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problems of our country – “Reality is that social media 
doesn’t change the world.” They spend all these hours 
venting their anger and frustration. 
To him, users “need to appreciate the limitations of what we can do with social 
media.” Shettima (2013) says that while social media “can mobilize people”, he 
is concerned about the “short span attention” it promotes. “ I don’t think it can 
really educate people in terms of knowledge.” However, Shettima (2013) agrees 
that dialogue online is equally “critical and very important... it opens the political 
space... it enables people to participate in a much more broader level. He adds 
that digital media is also an “equaliser”, in that “the president could write, the 
man from the village could write…. It equalises our status in the society in some 
ways...” Other advantages he enumerates on digital media for democratic 
dialogue are that: 
It enriches our political discussions and enables us to have 
wider information, wider knowledge from various sectors of 
our society (Shettima, 2013) 
 
Shettima (2013) says this is especially so for people in far-flung regions that one 
may have never come in personal contact with. Talking about an interaction he 
observed online, Ishaya Bako, documentary producer, says “Tweet-fights” are a 
huge part of interactions online. He says, “…reading the comments, it got tribal.” 
Bako (2013) calls debates online that are based on tribe and ethnicity, “poor 
thinking.”  He says, “its always just sad when people go to religious ethnic but 
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you can’t blame them, because they don't have any other point to look at it.” 
 
Rotimi Olawale (2013) on online debates in the Nigerian digital public sphere 
says they are rife with “insults, anger and emotions”. He says:  
I think that what has happened over the years is that the 
level of anger has grown. Young people have become 
more angry at government (Olawale, 2013) 
He says, because in the digital media “everyone has almost all the facts”, by this 
he refers to the spread of public information, “people have become more angry.” 
Olawale’s (2013) perception is that the government does not listen to the voices 
of the people, and this has led to social movement protests such as the “fuel 
subsidy protest.” He says, “It was until the protest started that they reconvened.” 
Olawale (2013) offers further explanation about his perception of dialogue online 
in Nigeria  - he focuses on the architecture of platforms in his next comment. He 
says dialogue initially took place in less publicly accessible groups such as 
“Google groups” or “Yahoo groups”, unlike a “Twitter discussion”, you needed to 
“subscribe” or be “added” by someone. At this point, Olawale (2013) opines that 
some form of caution is observed, as “there is a sense of family within an online 
group, and if you misbehave, there is an opportunity for someone to block you.” 
On a Twitter discussion on the other hand, “you cannot block anybody, anybody 
can say whatever it is that they want to say.” 
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Based on Tolu Ogunlesi’s (2013) observation of online dialogue, and his 
experience, he describes the communicative environment thus: 	  
The fact is that we don’t have a long history of political 
culture behind us, so there’s novelty and excitement of 
people actually being able to talk, say whatever they want 
(Ogunlesi, 2013)	  
Ogunlesi (2013) says there is also the “excitement of being able to engage with 
some of the powerful politicians.” He considers the Nigerian digital public sphere 
to be in its beginning stages as opposed to for instance, the UK pre-social-
media period. According to Ogunlesi (2013), he believes the UK already had “an 
established political space…” with citizens in support of “Conservatives and 
Labour.” Hence, he says, “people would come online with those beliefs.” This is 
non-existent in Nigeria Ogunlesi (2013) explains in his words: 	  
...So people are coming almost as virgins… ideological 
virgins, so people are just coming, so it’s just a mad house 
in one sense…	  
He expounds that this means:	  
A lot of the debate that you find in the political space here 
[in Nigeria], will not be about that ideology of conservatism 
or liberalism, but more about that vague “good governance 
(Ogunlesi, 2013)	  
- because this is what he perceives as the immediate challenge of the people. 
Ogunlesi (2013) says:	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It’s almost a luxury to be thinking are you in the centre or to 
the right or to the left, when there is power, no schools and 
all that. So it’s for people, a way to make noise about those 
basic things, power supply, police corruption and that kind 
of stuff. I can’t say it’s the most sophisticated.” 	  	  
To him, the biggest challenge to a robust dialogue in the Nigerian digital public 
sphere is illiteracy, political as well as linguistic.  
Ogunlesi’s (2013) interview also reveals his perception of Nigerian public 
officials and how they conduct themselves online in interactions with citizens. He 
opines that Nigerian public officials have poor citizen engagement strategies. In 
his words, “many of them came to this space with the same mentality in which 
they did old media.” For him, old media for “adverts” and “press statements”, but 
“social media to a large extent doesn't work like that.” Ogunlesi’s (2013) reaction 
is this:	  
You can’t come and impose things on people, they will ask 
you questions, they want to know more, they want to – the 
things you will get away with, you can’t get away with it on 
social media	  
In other words, social media is being used to hold public officials accountable. 
He says that for the public officials, “Twitter is just like another newspaper, 
where you just push information.” 
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Ogunlesi (2013), speaking from experience also mentions the Youth Minister 
who came on Twitter to engage with youths. Similar to statements made in Yemi 
Adamolekun’s (2013) account, she says,  
I think the most active government official on Twitter once 
was the Sports minister, then youth minister – came on 
Twitter, but eventually, even he kind of left after 
complaining that it was too abusive and too poisonous...  
In his opinion, Ogunlesi (2013) said this case “was just a misunderstanding how 
social media works.” He is of the opinion that as a public official, when you come 
online, “you need to come with a genuine intention to engage.” There are 
challenges/downsides of digital media for democratic communication in Nigeria 
according to Tolu Ogunlesi (based on experience). First is misinformation. 
Ogunlesi (2013) says, “because of the scope and the reach of social media”, 
inaccurate information spreads fast, and is “self-reinforcing.” By this he means 
that once information is posted on Twitter for instance, it is easily reinforced to 
other platforms such as Facebook and Blackberry Messenger. Ogunlesi (2013) 
goes on to say that: 
...Facts gets distorted and people make assumptions 
without checking them, so it can allow a lot of 
irresponsibility in information management...  
On observing ethnic and religious sentiments invoked in online dialogue, Tolu 
	   275	  
Ogunlesi (2013) says that: 
When you come online and you see debates where ethnic 
and religious sentiments take the lead, it tells you 
essentially that that is what we are as a people. 
Here, he refers to how dialogue on social media reflects the state of society 
where “people have no trust in established institutions.” In Ogunlesi’s words,  
When the institutions that should stand for you as a 
Nigerian have failed you, you have to then find solace in 
ethnicity. 
Hence, he says he is not concerned about ethnicity influencing public 
discussions online, “but it’s about what those things are telling us about where 
our society is.” Succinctly put, he says, “social media is an excellent window into 
the condition of our society at this time.” 
Tomi Oladipo’s (2013) impression of the digital sphere in Nigeria is that of a 
“market square”. In his words: 
 ...It’s no different from a town square, so it’s very difficult if 
you're in a crowd…when you are in a big crowd, people 
tend to agree. 
Oladipo (2013) explains his point thus: 
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The way I see public debate…you very rarely find a third 
opinion…you get for and against, it’s very rare you get 
someone giving another opinion – and even if you do, that 
person is a minority (Oladipo, 2013)  
In other words, minority points of view in an online discussion sometimes get 
stifled. Oladipo (2013) perceives that the anonymity digital media offers is a 
factor. He says, “I just think that people would probably say things that they 
would not say to you up front because they are hidden behind a device.” Oladipo 
(2013) also makes an important observation about dialogue and performance of 
self. He says that by and large, participants are “trying to create a persona” and 
in doing so, they are “trying to boost their own CV as well, they are trying to 
boost themselves.” To further explain his point, Oladipo (2013) goes thus:  
...Because this is a public platform and people from 
everywhere are seeing you, so people, as much as they 
come out as expressive, they are also conscious that they 
don't want to ruin that public image 
 Oladipo (2013) says that posting something perceived as “controversial” online 
may “ruin that reputation”. He makes it clear in the interview that he is referring 
here to “those who put their online personality and don’t hide behind 
pseudonyms.” 
In his experience, Oladipo (2013) conveys that attempting to dialogue with 
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public officials via digital media has not been fruitful. He says,  
It’s frustrating working with the government, getting 
anything from the government, hearing from them, talking 
to them because information dissemination is not natural to 
Nigeria… 
Oladipo (2013) goes on to make an interesting statement about Nigerian public 
officials and his experience with them as a journalist. He continues: 
Nigerian officials are not used to being questioned, not 
used to being asked questions. I think they hide behind the 
culture, just like any Nigerian parent. 
According to him, “if a Nigerian parent is doing something wrong and a child 
questions them…’how dare you question me’ - this is the culture…” 
Mark Amaza (2013), a blogger, shares his observation of dialogue online and 
how the system works. He says in his experience, there are different 
types/groups of participants in online dialogue in Nigeria. His observation is 
limited to Twitter. Amaza (2013) says there are the “cool kids crew” and the 
“clowns of the class”. Seun Fakuade (2013), social activist, on the other hand, 
has this to say about dialogue in Nigeria: “sometimes you find some very 
interesting points of view, but you get to discover that because of the ethno-
religious divide across Nigeria today, a lot of options are clouded beyond issues.” 
Fakuade (2013) says he has found the discussions pleasant, but “sometimes 
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they've been so bitter and acrimonious.” Overall however, he says it is 
“encouraging”, as prior to the influx of digital media, it was rare to “have young 
people rising up to governance, or aggravate their concerns on a larger scale.” 
In his opinion: 
The discussions online have been able to change 
opinion…perspectives…thoughts patterns that have 
eventually influenced how the discussions fell out 
eventually (Fakuade, 2013).  
Fakuade (2013) also draws attention to bullying and death threats in online 
dialogue. He says:  
People also bully one another – because you have a 
wealth of information does not mean you should be a lord 
over another person. 
 Fakuade (2013) opines that, “there’s a level of tolerance that we should have 
one for another and also for governance.” Fakuade (2013) terms this lack of 
tolerance for opposing views, “social media harassment.” At times he says, 
“people were driven off Twitter…”. On people being driven off Twitter based on 
interactions they had on the platform Fakuade (2013) says, “we have different 
levels of tolerance”. Fakuade (2013) gives an instance where: 
You may say something that I don't like, or I might say 
something in my naiveté or ignorance. There’s this attack 
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coming up from all angles…[in terms of mentions on 
Twitter].” People have left social media, and deleted their 
respective accounts because of situations like these –  
(Fakuade, 2013).  
Seun Onigbinde (2013), founder of BudgIT also commented on online dialogue 
in Nigeria. He says the space is not controlled hence, “you might need some 
level of intelligence to sift reason out from it .” In his opinion, not everyone 
contributing to a debate or discussion is informed, “some are spun out of ethnic 
mindsets.” Onigbinde (2013) describes discussions in the Nigerian digital public 
sphere as “very rowdy”. Hence, he advocates that there is a need for 
independent personalities to say, ‘these are the facts, if you wanna argue, you 
argue better from this standpoint’.” “You also need people who would engage 
institutions” says Onigbinde (2013). He further comments on Nigerian public 
officials and how citizens engage with them on digital communicative platforms. 
In his words: 
Sometimes you find government officials coming to social 
media, abusing them, bringing them down, it's a turn off 
(Onigbinde, 2013) 
Onigbinde (2013) recommends that although one might be emotional about 
governance issues, “just a bit of civility, a bit of understanding to get your point 
across to them.”  
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There are examples of where digital communication in the Nigerian digital public 
sphere have been found to intervene in matters of public concern and 
sometimes clear-cut political situations. While the Occupy Nigeria event in 
protest of the removal of fuel subsidy by Nigeria is regarded as a popular 
example of the impact of digital media in Nigeria, below are a few other case 
studies extracted from the research interview and others from more recent 
events reported in mainstream newspapers (post-field research): 
The Save Bagega Campaign:  According to Mercy Abang (2013), a journalist, 
Save Bagega (SB) is a campaign against lead-poisoning in Zamfara State, 
which she and other colleagues (also interviewed) made to trend as an issue 
online. Her account of how she and “friends” used digital media tools to secure 
the government-allocated funds to tackle the problem in the state goes thus: 
 Save Bagega (SB) is a lead poisoning issue in Zamfara State, Nigera, which 
Mercy Abang and a few other members of her online network made to trend 
online till it was flagged as a matter for attention by the Nigerian government. 
“We were just small, just I, Japheth, and Azeernarh Mohamed” Mercy says 
about her network. According to her account, due to illegal mining in Zamfara, 
the lead poisoninng was killing the kids, and “Médecins Sans Frontiers [MSF] 
came to Nigeria to help to treat”. MSF decided to remediate [clean] the 
environment but needed funds from the government to execute the exercise. 
Mercy says, “MSF contacted me and Japheth and Azeernarh, ‘guys we are in 
trouble, the government has promised to issue this money’ and…they’ve been 
following up through the who-knows-who style and how and sending letters and 
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it hasn’t worked.’ According to her, MSF needed her and friends to use social 
media to get the attention of the government. Mercy says “we decided on a date, 
and guess what, we tweeted until SB trended.” She explains that the then 
“chairman of the committee on environment [a public official]”, Bukola Saraki, 
noticed their tweets and “went to Bagega to see for himself what was happening 
there." The Zamafara environment was successfully cleaned, according to 
Mercy.  
Bring Back Our Girls vs Bringback Goodluck Jonathan: In September 2014, the 
electoral campaign team of the incumbent Nigerian president, Goodluck 
Jonathan released a poster citing the slogan ‘Bring Back Goodluck Jonathan 
2015’. This led to much fury on the online public sphere, especially Twitter, 
where many citizens (active digital media users) lamented how the slogan made 
a mockery of the original campaign Bring-Back-Our-Girls. The Bring Back Our 
Girls campaign was developed to raise awareness of the missing schoolgirls of 
Chibok, Nigeria, who were kidnapped by Islamic Sect, Boko Haram. At the time 
of Jonathan’s political campaign, the girls still had not been found.  
 
The Washington Post picked up on the social media reaction to the new 
campaign poster and published an article, ‘This May Be the Most Inappropriate 
Political Hashtag of the Year’ (Tharoor, 2014), stating that ‘the backlash in 
Nigeria, at least on Twitter, has been swift.’ In the article, the author cited tweets 
from aggrieved Nigerians. An example is one from Gbenga Sesan [who was 
also an interviewee for this thesis]. His tweet goes thus: “the morally bankrupt 
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adaptation of the Bringbackourgirls hashtag, towards the campaign of a coward 
who has failed at his task, says it all.” Shortly after the Washington Post article, 
the President announced the withdrawal of the ‘controversial slogan’ from his 
campaign.  
 
On September 10, 2014, the Special Adviser to the Nigerian President on Media 
and Publicity, Reuben Abati, published on his website, that “president Jonathan 
orders removal of offensive bring back signs”. The article on his webpage goes 
thus: “while President Jonathan appreciates the enthusiastic show of support for 
his administration by a broad range of stakeholders, he condemns the Bring 
Back Jonathan 2015 signs which appear to make light of the very serious 
national and global concern for the abducted Chibok girls.” The call for the 
removal of these signage is debatably as a result of the impact of social media 
reactions, combined with coverage from the international media - Washington 
Post in this case.  
Beacons Light Ng, Seun Fakuade: Beacons is an organisation set up by social 
activist, Seun Fakuade, that relies heavily on digital media tools to have impact 
on the Nigerian society. In his words: 
Beacons has a website, has constant blogging materials, 
then we had structure of team that worked on the project, 
raising hashtags. We used hashtags heavily on 
#thekalmajijiproject. 
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He explains that Twitter has been very useful on the projects run by his 
organisation. Examples of public projects to which he applied Twitter are: ‘Karu 
Clean UP, the environmental sanitation first conducted in March 2012’; ‘Bariga 
project’, an health advocacy to which his organisation used Twitter to 
crowdsource funds as well as ‘raise volunteers’ for the projects (Fakuade, 2013). 
Another major project to which Twitter for crowdsourcing has been impactful is 
the Karmajiji project, which at the time of the interview was still ongoing. 
Fakuade (2013) says, “we've been able to reconstruct 2 secondary school 
classrooms for the less privileged in Karmajiji.” In his account, he mentions a 
lack of educational infrastructure, “no teachers, no texts to teach” and “young 
people on the streets.” To this end, he and his team took to Twitter to raise 
funds for the project –  
...We resolved to using Twitter to help them reconstruct the 
classroom, provide amenities, provide reading and learning 
materials and then recruit teachers. So we raised 333,000 
Naira on Twitter crowdsourcing [funds] (Fakuade, 2013) 
Fakuade (2013) says he is able to promote accountability by publishing 
expenditure online as well. In his words: 
 All that we used the money for was accounted for. If we 
were buying N800 nails, you had a receipt for it and it was 
posted on the website…as detailed as possible, everything 
on our website… 
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Save-xxx [Medical Interventions]: In the research interview, Rotimi Olawale 
(2013) mentions that one of the major interventions of digital media in the 
Nigerian society have been ‘Save’ campaigns. He says: 
One of the best part of it [digital media] is the fact that the 
citizens have come together to provide support for 
themselves (Olawale, 2013) 
 Olawale (2013) accounts that “in so many “Save so-so” campaigns on Twitter… 
people online were chipping in N100,000, N1,000, N1,500…” Olawale (2013) 
says that for him this is “one of the best success stories”, and he thinks that a 
“specialised website will blow up for donating cash to such citizens…” 
Examples of ‘Save’ campaigns that have been published on the internet include 
Save Yakubu Yusuf. This campaign was published on BBC Trending news 
under the heading ‘Save Yakubu Yusuf - Using Twitter to raise money in 
Nigeria.’ The report states: “If you encounter a tweet or Facebook post that 
comes complete with a plea for help, an emotive image…and bank details, you 
could be forgiven for raising a sceptical eyebrow.” The report goes on in its 
account that Yusuf’s friends have “made a video” and “lobbied influential figures 
on Twitter to try to get support.” This is just another of many examples. [BBC 
Trending, 2014]. On the other hand, the disadvantage of these Save 
interventions have been the tendency for fraudsters to scam unsuspecting 
individuals of funds. There was a story of a particular Twitter user, Royal Amebo, 
that was widely discussed in the Nigerian blogosphere when it was discovered 
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that the person behind the account was allegedly a fraud. The Royal Amebo 
story on a blog, TechCabal, opens with the following lines: 
‘On 11th December 2013, Ifeoluwa Ojikutu, who tweeted with the handle 
@royalamebo, died in the United States. She described herself as a business 
strategist, a US Certified Life Coach, a UN Youth Ambassador and a Real 
Madrid fan. Her friends said she was witty, fun, active and full of life. This is all 
very sad, except that @royalamebo was not a real person…’ (Article Title: How 
Royal Amebo Catfished Twitter, 2013 by Seyi Taylor).’  
More generally, in terms of impact and intervention, Mercy Abang (2013), a 
journalist and interviewee on this project, perceives the impact of digital media 
on democracy in Nigeria to have affected governance and more precisely been 
instrumental in mobilising voters to actively go out and vote as well as monitor 
elections. In her words: 
Over the years, trust me, young people are not interested 
in the polls. Young people don’t care…so when there are 
elections, people just stay home and let them do their thing.  
However, Abang (2013) says the rise of social media may have reversed that 
trend. In her words:  
We are telling ourselves no we should have time, no that’s 
our future, those are issues that concern us…it [digital 
media] has helped to redirect our attitude and our thoughts 
	   286	  
towards the electoral process.  
This section addressed the subject of the content of the Nigerian digital public 
sphere (NDPS). We identified what constituted dialogue in the NDPS, and from 
the perspective of the interview participants, highlighted what might be 
democratic or undemocratic about the dialogue. Of significance in this second 
section, was also the need to identify who set the agenda for public discussion 
online. Overall, public deliberations online were described as vibrant – which is a 
trait supportive of democratic culture. However, several challenges with online 
dialogue in the NDPS were equally flagged. A recurring example was prejudice 
spurred by ethnicism. Other challenges were the spread of inaccurate 
information, online harassments, bullying, and so on. It is safe to definitively 
state that dialogue on matters of (Nigerian) public concern is taking place online. 
However, what is open for debate is the extent to which the nature of this 
dialogue is aligned to the fostering of a culture of democracy. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter comprised two sections – the agents and agencies (individuals, 
groups and organisations) whom I identified as catalysts in cultivating a culture 
of democracy in Nigeria through digital media; and the dialogue and issues that 
have emerged as formative for public debate. For the former, examples were 
those involved in the peaceful Occupy Nigeria protest to challenge the 
government on the removal of fuel subsidy, those who use social network to 
monitor that the government follows through on infrastructure projects, then the 
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creators of the Blackberry app for the Nigerian constitution, to ensure every 
citizen is more aware of their rights, and so on. The second section was 
concerned with shared feedback from respondents on the nature of dialogue – 
from the perspective of their personal experiences, observations, as well as 
perceptions of how things work. These discussions threw up several issues as 
to the challenges facing the use of digital media for democracy – especially in a 
society argued not to be wholly democratic.  
In terms of the organisations, groups and individuals who are actively involved in 
using digital media in Nigeria, it is evident that digital media technologies have 
served a fundamental role in the processes of organisation and consolidation of 
collective activity, as well as the dissemination of essential information on a 
rapid and substantial scale – something that could not be envisaged before the 
era of digital media. For instance, the Nigerian Constitution for Blackberry app 
grants one access to a portable version of the constitution, as well as, ease in 
navigating it through the “search” feature. BudgIT is also able to share 
information on the Nigerian budget in easy-to-understand language, simply 
through digital media platforms such as Twitter. A further function is simply the 
promotion of social causes for public good – the identification, definition, and 
attention-stimulation functions of digital media simply serve to bring public 
interests to collective notice without the requirements of institutional 
endorsement, state validation or mass media broadcasting. Examples are Save 
Medical campaigns and the crowdsourcing of funds on social networks to 
provide education infrastructure amenities to lesser developed communities, for 
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instance, the Kalamijiri project by Beacons Light Ng.  
Secondly, Digital media has allowed agents and agencies to track government’s 
activities through crowdsourcing information. This has been the case of 
iWatchNg. Another organisation, Egunje.info on the other hand, uses digital 
media to track corrupt practices and report to the appropriate regulatory body in 
Nigeria, ICPC. Both organisations claim that digital media is central to how they 
gather their information – whether by visits to their websites, or people calling in 
on mobile phone. Thirdly, the promotion of political discussions around specific 
subjects of concern has been important. A good example of this is PolicyNG, 
that is focused on taking a government policy and analysing it in simple enough 
terms for a regular digital media user to understand. Communication techniques 
such as “Twitter Conferences” are usually employed here. Digital media 
connects citizens across geographical boundaries, such that they can share 
ideas and options on political issues and matters that concern them.  
 
Fourth and lastly, digital media in Nigeria has been significant in the mobilisation 
of citizens to actively participate in official national political processes, such as 
the electoral process – especially with regard young people. Through creative 
campaigns such as Enough is Enough’s RSVP (register, select, vote, protect), 
they have been able to increase the otherwise apolitical youths’ awareness of 
political issues. Suffice to say that digital media tools are equally useful in 
facilitating the election management process. A good example of this is the 
Nigeria’s Independent Election Commission, that set up a “Situation Room” to 
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monitor the Internet during the elections, co-ordinate the spread of crucial 
information for citizens, and curb the spread of false information.  
Challenges to the effective use of digital media in promoting democratic culture 
in Nigeria are diverse but somewhat inter-related. One challenge that kept 
resonating among the respondents was the fact that anger, insults, and 
harassment are prevalent in public dialogue online. To them, this distracts from 
any form of rational critical discussions that may have held in its stead. The lack 
of a coordinated state censorship apparatus for digital media makes it a 
productive platform for open discussion. However, this openness allows for 
undemocratic behaviours such as hate speech and racism at the extreme. 
Public officials are not spared from these “aggressive interactions.” 
Respondents mentioned that public officials in particular, have been victims of 
backlashes from digital media users, in times when they have come online to 
interact with the people. Ethnic and religious factors often spill over into online 
conversations.     
 
Nigerian public officials who are ready to engage with citizens online, are few 
compared to those who are not. As in Habermas’ original account of the public 
sphere, the dimension of ‘reciprocity’ between state actors and public sphere–
generated proposals or views was required: it was not “talk for talks sake.” An 
exchange of ideas and feedback between those in power is only identifiable in 
Nigeria with regard to specific politicians – it is not a structural feature of the 
state apparatus.  
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Many Nigerians do not have access to online communications. This may not 
necessarily be a direct challenge, but the fundamental democratic principle of 
universal suffrage, while not intrinsic to Habermas’s bourgeois public sphere 
(where women did not have the vote, for instance) is nonetheless an indicator in 
our own era of the pervasiveness of democratic rights and, a genuinely 
representative public realm. This is a complex matter in a country like Nigeria, 
where a huge and complex land mass requires a proportionate investment in 
communications infrastructure. Yet, even if this emerges, language or literacy 
levels would prohibit full online access and interaction. For instance, the 
Nigerian Constitution app developers stated that they were considering updating 
the app to feature local languages, not just English language. Yet, for a small 
enterprise, this is a huge ambition. Following from this, however, is the basic 
challenge of intelligibility – where the Constitution and its legal clauses may be 
too complex for general cognizance and any ensuing detailed discussion could 
(or should) exceed social media’s ‘simplistic’ modes of communication and the 
inherent limitations on communication as determined by the architecture of its 
digital platforms.  
The digital sphere, of course, more easily lends itself to the spread of inaccurate 
information. The ability to sift accurate informant from the inaccurate in the 
online sphere is a skill that requires a level of literacy not universally possessed.  
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Section Three: Chapter Ten 
Discussion of Findings: Challenges and Constraints of 
the Digital Public Sphere in Nigeria 
Introduction 
At the beginning of this thesis, I set out to construct a concept of the digital 
public sphere, extrapolating from Habermas’ classical theory, his observations 
on the cultural dimension of the public sphere, then the critical comments of key 
interlocutors Calhoun, Fraser and Kellner, I devised a series of ‘components’. 
These components were dimensions of a developed public sphere, which 
serves as an heuristic for generating the criteria for our empirical analysis of the 
changes in public debate in Nigeria’s democracy. I posited that the ‘public 
sphere’ in Nigeria was ‘embryonic’ in that it exhibited these many characteristics, 
even if the public sphere in Nigeria was unstable, provisional in many of its 
dynamics, politically vulnerable, and still evolving.  
The opening theoretical inquiry into the historical concept of the public sphere 
was not an attempt to construct a more integrated or ideal concept of public 
sphere, but rather to open the concept to its application into another, developing, 
country, whose colonial history exhibited different (if not ‘reverse’) characteristics 
from the development of European democracies. For instance, in Europe, 
industrialization, social modernity, parliamentary democracy and a fully 
functioning public sphere all emerged simultaneously (many aspects of which 
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were, evidently, co-dependent). The situation in Nigeria, as subsequent chapters 
have revealed, is more disjointed and disconnected, if not stalled in its 
development. Nigeria possesses an advanced communications infrastructure, 
yet is unreliable and covers only some parts of the country; it possesses a 
presidential democracy with a liberal constitution, and yet whose functioning is 
mired in stronger ethnic, religious and commercial allegiances; Nigeria 
possesses a capable broadcast media, along with supporting legislation 
protecting freedom of speech, and yet is stalled in a culture of fear and 
intimidation; Nigeria is economically wealthy and with great untapped resources 
for central government to exploit for national advancement, and yet it is out of 
the private, small-scale markets for digital media products (and not the public 
institutions or political parties) that the conditions for actual political dialogue and 
deliberations are emerging.  
The conditions I identified in the basic components of the historic public sphere, 
that Habermas so often ignored as subjects of inquiry – here, from my field 
research, I have found them to be sources of public sphere development. These 
components are: new media platforms, communication techniques, agents & 
agencies, dialogue & issues, and impact and intervention. However, I have 
defined them in part, (and so remained sensitive to such in the course of my 
interviews), as Habermas’ observations on the cultural-literary public sphere and 
of the ‘cultural’ dimension of the mainstream public sphere allows us to consider 
other characteristics. These other characteristics, as outlined at the concluding 
section of Chapter One, are (i) the realms of experience, emotion and 
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expression – where individuals, otherwise unconnected to the realms of political 
decision making, reflection on their social conditions and derive from them 
issues of concern and frame these issues in broader, more general or ‘universal’ 
dimensions, and so engage in cultural production (Habermas, 1962:28-9 and 
passim); (ii) The social dynamics of communication – where informal groups can 
generate strong public-sphere type activities and deliberations or debates, yet 
remain largely detached from the realms of power and political decision making 
(Calhoun, 1992: 453; Habermas, 1996 358-9); and (iii) The ubiquitous use of 
media, which however, does not belong to the mainstream ‘mass media’ or state 
media apparatus (Habermas, 2006: 423). The ubiquitous use of media forms 
other than mass media, can, Habermas notes, generate many different powers 
of influence on the political realm. Digital media can create a sense of ‘mass’ 
communication while remaining detached from the formal, official and 
institutional dimensions of the public sphere as facilitated by mainstream mass 
media.     
These above characteristics form content for our observations on the embryonic 
public sphere as derived from my interviews, and are also significant when 
situated within the framework of the above components, where both in turn 
facilitate a substantial response to my original research questions (reiterated 
below): 
• What is the new digital public sphere and how has it been constituted by 
technology and new discursive practices?  
• What organisations, media platforms, and communication methods 
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participate in this new public sphere and supply its discursive content?  
• How has the Internet and digital media facilitated national and 
international democracy, and how, specifically in Nigeria?  
• What new cultural, social, and political changes have been effected by 
this new public sphere (or have the potential to be)?  
• What are the forces (cultural, social, political and religious) prohibitive to 
the development of a fully effective digital public sphere?  
• What political and media strategies can we identify that may be 
instrumental in developing a fully effective digital public sphere in Nigeria 
(and as a model for developing democracies)?  
 
In this chapter, therefore, I open with a summary of my findings on the 
embryonic Nigerian digital public sphere [NDPS henceforth], and then proceed 
to assess this by way of the categorization implied by my original research 
questions (stated in the Introduction). A discussion on the current factors that 
oppose a fully effective digital public sphere in Nigeria will follow this analysis; 
entwined with this discussion is another, on the possible strategies that may be 
employed using existing public policy frameworks to enhance and promote the 
development of a digital public sphere in Nigeria. This chapter ends with 
possible suggestions for further study, thus acknowledging the limitations of my 
research.  
New media platforms and spaces 
The digital public sphere is the realm of communication that exists on and 
through new media platforms, stimulated and often motivated by cultural factors, 
where issues are deliberated on by agents and agencies made up of active 
citizens, who employ a wide range of communication techniques that result in 
impact and interventions. These interventions usually have socio-cultural, 
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political and sometimes economic implications, and the degree of impact may 
vary from very significant to somewhat significant, depending on the actions and 
activities that result from these online discussions, mostly outside of digital 
media spaces. The components extracted from my original theoretical definition 
are new media platforms, communication techniques, agents & agencies, issues 
(via dialogue), and impact and intervention.  
Before my assessment, we must consider the obvious semantic point: what can 
be termed Nigerian about a digital public sphere?1 Does this amount to a 
discrete realm where issues affecting Nigeria as a country are articulated (be it 
by Nigerian or non-Nigerians – internal to expressions of national identity); or 
are we referring to a more nebulous ‘space’ where Nigerians issue 
communications on subjects and issues that are part of general phenomenon or 
trends in social or cultural globalization, and to that extent may or may not 
directly address the apparatus of the state and the prospect of a national public 
sphere? Can the diaspora be considered a part of such a national public 
sphere? The name Nigerian digital public sphere throws up so many questions; 
therefore a definition of the term for the purpose of this thesis becomes 
necessary. Habermas paid little attention to what would have been the voices of 
‘others’ outside the parameters of nation state citizenship (such as nationals 
domiciled abroad for business interests, or workers in the nations ‘empire’ who 
were not citizens): and the bourgeois public sphere as define by Habermas did 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Fink	  et	  al	  (2012)	  attempt	  to	  map	  Nigeria’s	  Twitterverse	  by	  using	  a	  methodology	  that	  provides	  them	  with	  data	  on	  the	  geographic	  distribution	  of	  Twitter	  users	  in	  Nigeria,	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  mobile	  phones	  are	  used	  to	  engage	  on	  Twitter,	  and	  an	  “estimated	  ethnic	  makeup”	  of	  these	  Twitter	  users	  (2012:	  164).	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not account for the colonial interests that became powerful, if not formative, 
forces in public sphere alliances, deliberations, and the commercial interests 
that spanned the borders of many nations not least of Britain or France’s global 
empires.  
The ‘Nigerian digital public sphere’ in this thesis has generally referred to the 
hybrid and multi-facetted space of communicative action located online via 
digital media tools (such as mobile phones), where issues considered to be in 
the interest of Nigerians and issues about Nigeria as a political state are 
deliberated upon (using the term ‘deliberation’ in as expansive a sense as 
possible). Given the de-territorialising nature of digital media technologies, and 
(as Castells has consistently argued) the growing global character of even 
national public debates using digital media, it can be argued the Nigerians in the 
diaspora are equally participants in this digital public sphere, as their 
interjections are formative of the modes, methods and content of communication 
that makes for public debate. An example would be the duplication of the 
Occupy Nigeria protests (against the Federal Government’s removal of fuel 
subsidy) that emerged online and carried unto the streets in Nigeria, the 
Nigerian High Commission in London UK and New York, USA to mention a few 
countries.  
The Nigerian digital public sphere is therefore not equivalent to a network of 
physical spaces, associations and institutions, and prominent individual 
representatives of such, as it was in the bourgeois public sphere. Or where even 
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for Kellner, where the public sphere was dominated by representative ‘lobby 
groups’ of large media corporations and other corporate entities. Rather, a 
digital public sphere contains an agglomeration of multiple interventions and 
actors who have no representative function (or often even identity), but more 
importantly, the open nature of the digital sphere has enabled even 
organisations to assume the flexibility and mobility of individual actors. The 
digital public sphere is sited in and through the multiple spaces accessible to the 
communication channels themselves, which overlap, especially when content is 
deliberately syndicated across platforms. For instance, a digital media user may 
employ an integration function on his/her blog, where content published is 
posted to Twitter, LinkedIn, and Facebook simultaneously. Hence, the digital 
public sphere in this case is highly fragmented. There is no one digital media 
space where Nigerians come together for the sole purpose of deliberation – from 
the webpages, to blogs, Facebook, Twitter, Nairaland, it is an all-platform-
inclusive type of public sphere. The Nigerian digital public sphere is constituted 
by technology through the tools for engagement, which is mostly the mobile 
phone, given the state of infrastructural development in the country.  
New media platforms or tools are essential to the digital public sphere because 
they enable communicative spaces, albeit abstract (unlike physical saloons and 
coffee houses), where public opinion may be engendered. Although new digital 
media tools may be employed for undemocratic purposes (such as terrorism, 
limitation of freedoms by repressive regimes etc.), as Rheingold says, it is 
‘dangerously nihilistic’ to equally abandon the democratic potentialities of the 
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technology and label it ‘irredeemably destructive’ (Rheingold, 2012:3). Digital 
public spheres are formed to the extent to which the agents and agencies, that 
is, the ‘users’, render it so – and in the case of Nigeria, there have been 
sufficient examples to portend that a digital public sphere is burgeoning, albeit 
hampered by various challenges. One challenge for instance, would be the 
commercial nature of the online space. The platform upon which the Nigerian 
digital public sphere is based is equally commercial – Facebook, Twitter, 
Instagram, Blackberry and the likes do not belong to the public, they belong to 
private people who want to make a profit. Do these present conditions determine 
the public character of deliberation or debate? (I will discuss this matter under 
‘dialogue and issues’).  
The interview respondents cited a range of dominant new media tools: 
Facebook (social network: webpage & mobile app); Twitter (social network: 
webpage & mobile app); Wikipedia (webpage); Blackberry Messenger (mobile 
device and app); Short Message Service (SMS); Whatsapp (mobile app); 
Instagram (webpage & mobile app); YouTube (webpage & mobile app); Email; 
Mobile Telephone devices  (smart phones and “cheap smartphones”. Brands: 
Tecno, Blackberry, android devices etc.); LinkedIn (webpage & app); Google+ 
(social network); Tablet PC (device); 2Go (social network); Eskimi (social 
network); RSS Readers; Google (Reader, Doc, Alert, Map); Flipboard; 
Wordpress (blogging platform); Reverbnantion (music app); Tumblr (social 
network); and ITunes. 
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The new media of public communication are technologically diverse, and 
furthermore, their production as technological devices emerge from new 
responsive design methods whereby manufacturing and marketing are so 
integrated that the users’ demands and experiences are factored into the 
structure of the device. We are therefore not to conceive of digital media devices 
as “receiver-transmitter” machines as the old media of the past. They are, rather, 
adaptive communication tools, open to innovation and improvisation. The ways 
in which users adapted the architecture of the digital media platforms to heir 
communication needs was a subject of the research interviews. Respondents 
also, of course, called attention to how the design of the new media technology 
impacts how they use the tools and how the architecture influences the 
communicative purpose to which they apply them.  Mbah (2013) says that unlike 
Facebook ‘where you post something’ and ‘people can just air their opinion’, 
Twitter’s 140-character limit ‘has been a serious inhibition for many people who 
can’t edit properly or people who cannot put their words across in a concise 
form.’ And yet, as any Twitter user knows, this limitation is also a factor in its use 
in rapid response and spontaneous information sharing.  
Chika Oduah (2013), a freelance journalist, prefers Twitter to Facebook in that 
Twitter grants the kind of direct access that Facebook does not offer [except 
friends requests are sent and accepted by the parties involved]. In her words, 
‘the beauty about Twitter that Facebook may not have is that you can interact 
directly with newsmakers…’. Omojuwa (2013), social activist, also prefers 
Twitter because of ‘the ease of usage’. He says that for his blog, he needs to 
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‘create something a bit longer’ so ‘it’s a lot more work.’ Also, Omojuwa (2013) 
explains his preference for Twitter thus: ‘ for Twitter, the work ends where I am 
able to create a sentence that is impactful…’, as ‘some people would never ever 
read blogs…more than 500 words.’ He says, Twitter is his ‘primary tool’ because 
‘lazy people would read what you have to say’. Omojuwa (2013) however 
acknowledges that he ‘cannot ignore Facebook because of its longevity, and the 
fact that much more older people are there’ who he needs to connect with. It is 
interesting to observe how Omojuwa (2013) is conscious about his message (as 
impactful), digital audience in his public discussions, and considerations as to 
their age discrepancy. It is not possible to tell if Omojuwa’s assumption that 
older people are on Facebook and not on Twitter is from credible statistical data 
or simple “educated guess” based on his experience.  
Seun Fakuade (2013), social activist and founder, Beacons Ng, explains why 
the structure of Twitter is more suited to what he does than Facebook. In his 
words, ‘I temporarily left Facebook 2011, because I consider most of the things 
done there as too childish for me.’ Fakuade (2013) says he had to return to 
Facebook because it was less restrictive compared to Twitter. He continues the 
comparison between both social network sites thus: ‘for me Twitter has much 
more impact because of the kind of interactions that can emanate from what 
you're doing, it's not only your friends unlike Facebook, who would be involved 
in your discussion.’ Fakuade (2013) says, ‘people can see, they can find your 
retweets in different countries, or in different spheres in which people would 
have interactions or something to say.’ He calls attention to the point that with 
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Twitter, posts from ‘2 years or 6 months ago’ may inform current discussions 
online. Fakuade (2013) explains that he revisited Facebook during the Occupy 
Nigeria protest because there was a need to ‘galvanise resources, mobilise 
people and make them understand why we were against the outright removal of 
the fuel subsidy, so it was important that one would not be discriminatory in the 
usage of social media because you’re trying to reach a large audience and you 
are trying to pass your message across board.’ 
Remaining on the subject of communication behaviours, Seun Onigbinde (2013), 
founder, BudgIT Ng, explains thus:  
Twitter is like the biggest opposition party to government, 
because you hear people like Christine Amanpour (CNN anchor) 
say oh mr president you've said the power situation has 
improved, but you have people on Twitter who would keep 
saying ‘no…’. The conversation style, the layout, it makes you to 
express yourself quickly and just move on. So you have this 
whole thing that it is buzzing like a megacity at night and 
everyone is just talking, everyone is just moving around – and 
you find out there's always a thread pattern to the talk. 
 
He says ‘Twitter's conversations style helps it [communication] more.’  The 
architecture of the spaces of digital media often determine or shape the initial 
communication method adopted for effective dialogue and communication. 
Instagram, for example, as an online photo-sharing and 15-second video 
sharing space functions both on the web and as an app on (smart) mobile 
devices, and is structured to allow the user post a picture, add a caption with 
hashtags and “followers” can “like” and “comment” on the photograph or short 
video clip. To include this space in the Nigerian digital (political) public sphere, 
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the technique would be to creatively capture a political message in video or 
image format and post on the platform – a discussion could be stimulated in the 
comment section of the post and dialogue ensues. 
It is important to emphasise that the architecture of the platform may sometimes 
restrain the vibrant dialogue a public issue may require in the digital public 
sphere. For instance, on Twitter, a tweet is limited to 140-characters, and where 
you send out over a hundred tweets per hour or a thousand per day, you (your 
account) are sent to Twitter Jail. Hence, it takes some degree of fluency and 
knowledge of (English) language to be able to compress what one intends to 
contribute to a public discussion online in just 140 characters. On blogs and 
Facebook, there are no such limitations, but in comparison to Twitter, they are 
limited in other areas. For instance, digital media users from the research 
interviews are more likely to read a tweet than visit a blog with a long post 
published. Hence, bloggers with something to say explained how they would 
compress their blog post into a number of tweets and send them out with links to 
their blogs for those interested in reading more to visit.  
It is worth noting that restraining communication on these platforms through how 
they are built, may lead to certain issues being discarded due to their complexity 
and the perceived inability of the platform to justifiably spur the discussion. For 
instance, a television program analysing a policy may be better suited for the 
discussion than a mere Twitter chat. Some public policies or issues would need 
more than a few tweets to be explained or challenged. If the architecture of the 
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digital medium is not capable of effectively hosting complex public/political 
issues, it is a challenge for the idea of a digital public sphere. Many of the 
interview respondents lauded Twitter as their preferred mode of public 
communication, but the architecture is not necessarily suited to robust dialogue 
– it is punchy, quick, and transient. One way perhaps to navigate this challenge 
would be to primarily use Twitter to share hyperlinks that take the user to a more 
dialogue-friendly online space, such as a blog. This leads me to discuss 
communication techniques.  
Communication techniques  
Certain discursive practices have arisen from the use of information 
technologies for the purpose of participating in the digital public sphere. Through 
the use of information and communication technologies, I have therefore argued 
that ‘users’ have transcended the status of digital media consumers and have 
become producers of culture. Hence, these discursive practices are located in 
the cultures that have arisen from the adoption of digital media tools – digital 
media culture. These practices are Facebook-ing, Tweeting (@-ing), hashtaging, 
Twitter Townhall Meetings, Twitter Shows (e.g. NHBi), Twe-minars, Liking, 
Following, etc. They represent the semblance of an organised space that the 
digital public sphere may take for the purpose of having dialogue – in this case, 
defeating the critique of fragmentation. 
Dialogue takes place in the Nigerian digital public sphere through organised 
Twitter-meetings, comments on a Facebook post on a group or page, comments 
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on blogs and news webpages. Conversations on Blackberry messenger may be 
termed private, but they may also be regarded as mini-public spheres in that the 
app allows for the formation of groups (just like a Facebook group) and the 
recently added feature of BBM Channels, which in Facebook-terms would be the 
equivalent of a ‘page’ to which one may subscribe and follow updates without 
necessarily sharing personal/private Blackberry Pins (contact number).  
Public dialogue in the Nigerian digital public sphere is mostly organised around 
hashtags. Hashtags are very common on Twitter. On Facebook on the other 
hand, having a hashtag is not considered necessary because the architecture 
already organises the ‘group’ in one place – groups/pages can be created based 
on the registration of an interest. However, on Twitter, a variety of issues 
spanning diverse interests can be discussed without a form of organisation that 
would enhance effective dialogue. Hence, to have the semblance of meeting in 
a room on a ‘market square’ as one of the interviewees described Twitter to me, 
the hashtag is a very useful function of the platform. See Chang (2012)2.  
The hashtag has led to communication methods that have now somewhat 
become a culture. A good example is the Twitter-Townhall-Meeting (TTM). A 
TTM is organised for instance, for other users to have an interaction with a 
politician, public official or person of interest to the subject up for discussion. A 
time and date is set, and a hashtag designed, e.g. #MeetAtiku. This ‘event’ is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Chang	  (2012)	  investigated	  the	  potential	  of	  Twitter	  to	  support	  an	  individual	  in	  being	  exposed	  to	  diverging	  political	  views.	  Chang	  concludes	  that	  the	  political	  role	  Twitter	  may	  play	  should	  be	  linked	  to	  the	  motivation	  of	  the	  user	  who	  actively	  seeks	  out	  these	  views,	  rather	  than	  to	  the	  technology	  itself.	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publicised days to the event, with the ‘guest speaker’ equally endorsing the 
advert with a few tweets of his/her own. A TTM usually has a moderator who 
would spell out the ‘rules of engagement’, before the question and answer time 
begins. Ideally, the ‘guest speaker’ would field questions from other Twitter 
users who may be following the discussion via the hash tag. The hashtag 
curates the tweets into a page. Hence, every tweet that includes the #MeetAtiku 
would be visible to other users whether or not they are following the tweeter 
(person tweeting). The Enough is Enough Nigeria social movement group is an 
example of a TTM organiser in the Nigerian digital public sphere.  
Discursive content in the Nigerian digital public sphere takes on a variety of 
forms besides plain text, signalling another technique. Note that digital media is 
multi-modal; therefore, other forms of media products can be ‘remediated’, 
shared and discussed. An example of a form of discursive content in the digital 
public sphere is animation/cartoons. This format is used to pass across political 
or public messages for social good in the digital public sphere. Soji Apampa 
(2013), founder Egunje.info revealed this on his project. Also, as a participant-
observer in the digital public sphere, I have observed the use of such formats. 
They are shared from mobile phone to mobile phone through services such as 
Whatsapp and published on YouTube where viewers can comment and have a 
dialogue. Many of these animations employ comedic values mixed with serious 
messages to make them interesting and increase their potential to go viral. As 
Soji Apapa (2013) and a few other interviewees mentioned, humour is a huge 
part of the Nigerian public sphere. Through videos, the limitation of literacy as a 
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barrier to participating in the public sphere is somewhat reduced.  
Another form of discursive content popular in the Nigerian digital public sphere is, 
of course, imagery. It is so important to acknowledge this form because they 
occupy a significant position when it comes to social movement projects or 
activities emanating from a discussion in the public sphere. In addition, images, 
in the form of infographics are used to educate people. Infographics are visual 
images that carry specific information or data. A good example is the group 
BudgIt, headed by Seun Onigbinde (2013), one of the interviewees for this 
thesis. BudgIt makes use of the infographic technique to spread information on 
the Nigerian budget in very simple terms, thus spurring public debate in the 
process – even among those who ordinarily may not have understood the 
national budget due to its relative complexity. 
Other forms of images used in the digital public sphere include memes and 
logos. Logos are especially relevant because they are employed during social 
protests where they become symbolic of the movement. These logo images may 
be used as display pictures on Facebook and Twitter profiles, or even 
Blackberries, and shared on Instagram. For many, it is an avenue to identify with 
a cause in the little way they can – perhaps even an expression of nationalism. 
Logos were employed in campaigns and movements such as Occupy Nigeria, 
Child Not Bride and Bring Back Our Girls. By putting up these images on their 
profiles or sharing them, symbolic markers of a public sphere can appear and 
register the character of the space within the broader media realm. Memes on 
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the other hand are images accompanied with a caption inset. It is a creative 
practice in that the same picture can have several memes created out of it 
through carrying different messages. Memes are becoming a part of digital 
culture not just in the arena of politics, but also entertainment and culture; they 
are popularly found on Instagram. They also can be used as symbolic markers, 
sometimes re-directing ‘traffic’ (users) from entertainment to ‘public’ spheres.  
Agents & Agencies.  
Agents and agency refers to participants in the NDPS. The agents and agencies 
in Habermas’ public sphere were the ‘reasoning public’, the private people, 
industrialists, merchants, ‘educated classes’, the ‘highly literate’ etc. In the 
Nigerian digital public sphere, the active participants are equally not so far-
fetched. Where literacy for instance consolidated one’s admission into the 
bourgeois public sphere (despite the ideal of popular inclusion), this same 
literacy, this time coupled with digital literacy and other factors such as the gap 
between the technology haves and haves-not creates a new kind of barrier. 
Hence, once again, participation in the digital public sphere might appear limited 
to the ‘educated classes’ and ‘highly literate’. During the field research, a 
recurrent perception of digital media in Nigeria was that it is an elitist platform – 
the reserve of the financially buoyant and working class. Rotimi Olawale (2013) 
for instance, comments on some sort of class stratification on choice of social 
network sites. He says,  
I think that the reason why 2go is attractive to people who are 
not middle class is that they can use it with just a simple feature 
phone. N3000 [£12] Nokia phone, you are on 2Go. You might 
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not enjoy the user experience of Facebook, or Twitter on such a 
phone…people on Instagram are happy people on Blackberry 
cannot join them there, so it’s more like an elitist platform, a 
status symbol...  
 
In the same vein, Mark Amaza (2013) considers certain digital media platforms 
such as Twitter, elitist. He says that while digital media is ‘widely accepted 
among young people in Nigeria’, 2Go platform is more for ‘mass usage’ while 
Twitter ‘is somewhat elitist’. This is because according to him, for Twitter, ‘there 
is a higher learning curve for it’ and to express yourself in 140-characters could 
be difficult. He also mentions that ‘older people… have been slower to get a 
hang of it, of social media generally.’ 
However, it is of significance that while there is a huge gap between Nigerians 
active online and otherwise, the influence of activities on the digital public 
sphere spreads to both the ‘haves’ and ‘haves-nots’ through various channels. A 
significant actor that serves as a bridge between the two is traditional mass 
media. As a result of the fact that many Nigerian news media organisations (and 
practitioners) are active online through ownership of webpages, social media 
accounts, and otherwise, there is a way in which communicative activities on the 
Nigerian digital public sphere informs their news reports thus reaching a wider 
audience (who may not have otherwise had access to digital media) and vice 
versa. I will explore this further in the discussion on the discursive content of the 
Nigerian digital public sphere and who supplies this content.  
Private individuals, public officials, politicians, social (activist) groups, religious 
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organisations and corporate businesses make up the active participants in the 
Nigerian digital public sphere. These groups are not exclusive, nor as cohesive 
in terms of group allegiance and identity as they would have been in 
Habermas’s classical public sphere. This is because, as noted, the realm of 
digital media communication tends to prioritise individuality and the identities or 
profiles of individuals. An online social activist, moreover, may take up the role 
of a private individual/citizen when interacting with others online. One 
interviewee, Omojuwa (2013), may tweet to support a social cause such as 
Bring Back Our Girls, and later in the day, send out tweet ‘adverts’ for a private 
company that has paid him to push their messages to his numerous followers. In 
the case of the latter, he assumes the role of a private individual conducting his 
business, not a social activist. The same applies to a journalist who has a 
functioning social media account outside of his organisation’s official account, 
e.g. @Eric_BBCLagos. Assuming Eric is a BBC Lagos reporter, he can be seen 
as tweeting in a private capacity, despite representing a corporate (news) 
business. The roles of an active participant in the digital public sphere are 
transient and not mutually exclusive. Private individuals may also be citizen 
journalists, bloggers, school students etc.  
Public officials and politicians (aspiring political office holders), as mentioned 
earlier are a category of people active in the NDPS. From the interviews, it was 
evident that there is a need for more Nigerian public officials to become active in 
the online sphere, in order to promote citizen engagement. On the other hand, 
the interviews also reveal an awareness of the use of digital media for image 
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management and public relations by politicians. Jon Gambrell (2013), journalist 
with Associated Press in Nigeria at the time says, ‘people are using Twitter to 
rehabilitate their image, to change themselves and to allow themselves be 
looked at as something different…you see that especially now with Atiku 
Abubarkar [former Nigerian vice president] who is viewed not necessarily 
positively by a lot of people in Nigeria, and he has a sort of 
reputation...corruption and things like that – someone is professionally managing 
his Twitter account, you can tell – because they are trying to humanise him like 
“oh I was playing xbox with my son and my fingers are tired’ [referring to a 
tweet]…’ 
In addition, private corporations also play roles in the Nigerian digital public 
sphere, through sponsored adverts, contracting brand ambassadors (e.g. every 
day-Twitter-Users) who spread messages to their social networks on behalf of 
the company. Sometimes, individuals who have taken up active roles in the 
furthering of a social cause for public good and built a vibrant following, equally 
become ‘brand ambassadors’ for private interests. Where Habermas argued that 
the bourgeois public sphere transformed and collapsed due to the blurring lines 
between public and private interests, it is evident that the conflation and 
dissolution of the categories of private/public remain with us. The public sphere 
of contemporary society, in Nigeria, admits public relations, advertising, 
corporate interests, and as such, is to a large extent, ‘commercialised’. But does 
this reduce the power or function of public debate? In the interview, Henry 
Okelue (2013) mentions the idea of “buying followers” online. He says: 
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 “…even though Twitter sees it as wrong, Twitter kicks against it, 
but people buy followers. Somebody somewhere has managed 
to have a nursery of followers, so if you say want a hundred. He 
has a way he will carve out a hundred… existing human 
beings… they have gone so granular to the point where you can 
actually tell the person, I want 200 followers from Jamaica. They 
will carve you 200 followers… a hundred followers who live in 
Lagos. They have a way of doing it, I don’t know how they do it, 
but they have mastered it. That’s why you wake up, some guy 
who had just 10 followers yesterday, you wake up he has 
20,000….”.  
From Okelue’s (2013) perspective, the importance of having influence online is 
related to ‘feeling important’. ‘It gives a feeling of, I wont say that applies to me, 
but when you have plenty followers, it gives you that feeling of “people know me” 
- it’s bragging rights. Those people might not know you, but people look at it like, 
if you have many followers, then you are a “twitter celeb” or something. Then for 
some other people, it’s business…’ he says.  
Apart from the intentional democracy-fostering agents and agencies such as 
social activists, corruption-monitoring organisations and so on, the activities of 
“internet warriors” should not be ignored. Their role in the NDPS impacts public 
and political discussions, and we will see how. In a BBC online article, Adaeze 
Tricia Nwabuani (2014) gives an account of how she finds that ‘political thuggery 
has gone digital’. In her words, ‘…rather than supplying them [being the “internet 
warriors”] with machetes, missiles and matches, Nigerian politicians are now 
arming their hirelings with laptops, smart phones and internet connections’. She 
observes that young people are being recruited all over Nigeria to ‘harass, 
intimidate, and persecute their employer’s opponents or those that oppose his 
[political] ambitions. For many Nigerians, being an Internet warrior is a full-time 
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job’. Nwabuani (2014) goes on to cite her encounter with a 28-year old 
Chemistry graduate who gave his job description thus ‘distort public opinion’ - 
hence, impact the public sphere.   
Nwabuani’s (2014) claim in her BBC article is backed by some findings from the 
fieldwork for this study. A social media manager of a Nigerian public official 
hinted that as part of ‘how things work’ he sometimes uses his Twitter handle 
and news website to ‘counter the oppression of the opposition media’. In 
addition, he says, it is not out of place in government to buy phone recharge 
cards and pay for Blackberry services in order to equip some people to advocate 
for the government online. In his words, “I can’t go ahead and start arguing with 
my handle [Twitter account], they will just know me as this guy works with the 
government. But let others who see the good work also speak”. 
To further buttress this claim as to ‘internet warriors’ being actors in the NDPS, 
the Chief Press Office of the Independent Electoral Commission Nigeria, 
Kayode Idowu (2013), called attention to the activities of these ‘internet warriors’ 
although he did not label them in those exact words. Idowu (2013) talking about 
election conduct in Nigeria said, “we had a Situation Room (online) where we 
receive information real-time and we respond real-time. We discovered that the 
downside of that is also that we received a lot of red herrings, maybe to divert 
attention”. He explained that there was nothing that could have been done about 
these false alarms during the elections because “you can never ignore any 
alarm”. Hence, we can conclude that there are dimensions of the new ‘culture’ of 
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democracy emanating from the adoption of digital media in Nigeria that is 
detrimental to the clarity and coherency expected of deliberation, and openness 
and honesty of dialogue, the transparency of sources and identities, and the 
constructive character of speech acts themselves (which seek to open up 
debate and enlighten the addressees – not mislead, distort or deceive.  
Given the discussion on who the actors in the NDPS are, what new media 
platforms they use, and what communication techniques they employ, it is now 
important to examine the nature of their dialogue and the issues that arise. To 
briefly draw from Habermas’ account of the public sphere in comparison to the 
NDPS, dialogue in the public sphere was not just ‘talk for the sake of talk’. It was 
deliberate rational argument to produce a decision or consensus. One may then 
ask, is this the case in Nigeria’s digital public sphere? To what extent do the 
talks on the Nigerian digital public sphere lead to decision and action? Does this 
sphere of communicative action compel the state to legitimise its actions before 
the people (as was the case in the bourgeois society of early Europe)? These 
are important questions to ask in this thesis. 
The issue of status equality and how it affects dialogue is another point worth 
considering in the digital public sphere. For Habermas, this was an important 
ideal for any public deliberation to be regarded as a public sphere – the idea that 
status and ranks of individuals be put aside and arguments won on the basis of 
their strength rather than on grounds of socio-economic and political ranks. 
Fraser (1990) did criticise this ideal on the basis of other markers of status 
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inequality in public discourse such as style, language and decorum of 
communication in the sphere, which may render the presentation of one 
argument strong than the other.  
Albeit that digital media and its attendant democratic potentialities have been 
lauded as creating a horizontal communicative environment (as opposed to top-
to-bottom) for participants, Fraser’s critique of the old public sphere calls 
attention to hidden devices of inequality that may still be found to surface in this 
new digital public sphere. From the field research, interviews conducted, it is 
evident that markers of inequality (not an exhaustive list) would be language 
used, individual popularity, and perception of intelligence quotient (I.Q) by fellow 
digital media users. In addition, a person’s position or rank in society is often 
carried over to his/her persona on social media for instance, through the 
creation of a profile (“about me”) or use of the display picture online. For 
instance, where a professor of Political Science is a Twitter user and his profile 
status says ‘professor of Political Science’, including a display picture of him in 
an academic gown – where discussions in the public sphere are on politics, his 
arguments would be perceived as more “authoritative” than if it were coming 
from another member of society. A person’s position and rank in society is 
visible online because people actively put forth a representation of self, build 
public personas (false or otherwise), hence, there is no guarantee that these 
statuses do not influence dialogue in the Nigerian public sphere. 
In terms of language, English is the dominant language of the Internet. Thus, a 
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Nigerian local language speaker who possesses a mobile phone, and has a 
Facebook or Twitter account, but is not as fluent in English may have a difficult 
time putting his arguments across or challenging the arguments of a better 
English speaker in the digital public sphere. For instance, Kole Shettima (2013), 
Director at the MacArthur Foundation, explains that there are local language 
discussions taking place on social media. He says, ‘there is a large number of 
people who are in the Hausa community who are using Facebook, Twitter and 
other things which are really not part of the English language use of social 
media itself’. This brings one to question the ideal just like Nancy Fraser, and 
the question is not one that can be answered decisively: is status equality really 
a necessity for participatory parity in the Nigerian digital public sphere? If it is, 
how may it be guaranteed?    
 
Dialogue and Issues 
A diversity of organisations, groups and individuals supply the discursive content 
in the Nigeria digital public sphere. Religious groups are a particular example. 
From our interviews we can understand how religion is a part of the digital public 
sphere in three ways: religious actors routinely comment on political issues; 
religious inferences endure in popular online political/public discourse; and there 
are continuing explicit public discussions about specific religious issues and their 
advocates or representatives. Religion has a long history with politics in Nigeria 
hence, it is not out of place to find that religious undertones often accompany 
the everyday political dialogue in the Nigerian digital public sphere. Sunday 
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Ogidigbo (2013), a Christian pastor, suggests in the research interview that 
Nigeria is a very religious state, and “even the politicians too are to be blamed 
because when they are seeking votes, they throw in one or two religious 
sentiments, it’s done everywhere.” The issue of religion, and the range of 
religious issues (and how religious issues are often synonymous with social and 
political issues, particularly when they are articulated through ethics or the 
discourses of morality and ethics) is a singularly significant yet specific 
dimension of the digital public sphere. This is particularly true given the 
availability and popularity of religious media (such as American evangelical TV 
stations, or Roman Catholic television), and the way religious media has been 
very effective in coopting social media into their marketing and broadcast 
strategies. How religion per se, and religion’s affect on deliberation in the NDPS, 
can only stands here as a suggestion for further research given the parameters 
of our investigation.  
Issues discussed in the Nigerian digital public sphere are often explicit, 
spontaneous, and even dissipate as quick as they appeared, whether a 
consensus has been reached or not. There is perhaps a general case for 
arguing that digital media behaviour is broadly influenced by the rapid and 
individual-centred patterns of consumption that characterise the retail market 
and its trends, but it is difficult to argue that the ‘private’ ownership that 
predominates in the digital media technology realm provides specific conditions 
that impact on the content of communication itself. Who or what sets the agenda 
for public discussion is not as clear-cut as the case is on mainstream media – 
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which would be the gatekeepers in this case. From interviews conducted with 
active participants in the Nigerian digital public sphere and web-observation over 
the course of this project, the agenda for what makes popular dialogue ranges 
from a news story on mainstream media, to information shared by an influential 
social media user such as a celebrity, an individual who has amassed a huge 
number of followers online etc. or an event that has gone viral. The agenda for 
public dialogue can be set deliberately, such as Amara Nwankpa and his Oil 
Revenue Tracking project, or it could arise spontaneously. Olawale (2013) and 
Ogunlesi (2013) comment on who sets the agenda for discourse on the Nigerian 
digital public sphere in their interviews.  
Olawlae (2013) considers sources of discursive content on the NDPS as 
‘spontaneous’. In his words, 
I think that the conversations that elicit a lot of anger many times 
are spontaneous. Like the ‘Child not Bride’ [campaign], nobody 
expected that conversation to start. Yerima didn't address a 
press conference…It is more reactive. You will see fuel subsidy, 
who is talking about fuel subsidy now? It’s forgotten, we’ve 
moved on. How many people went to jail on fuel subsidy, till 
date none, zero. We are talking about trillions of Naira, nobody 
went to jail and it’s finished.  
Olawale (2013) says the norm in online dialogue in the Nigerian digital public 
sphere is for an issue to be topical and “…in another 2 weeks, we will get 
something else to catch our fancy…Kim Kardashian will say Black Africans are 
dirty and we will be in a rage… I think they feel a sense of participation when 
there is something that comes up and everybody talks and then another 2 or 3 
weeks it’s gone’ with no significant impact”. 
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Tolu Ogunlesi (2013), freelance journalist/writer, comments in his research 
interview, “sometimes its me and people like me who start a discussion on 
Twitter and it just takes off, and sometimes… at the end of the day I think it’s 
always people who are setting the agenda. Twitter is just then a good tool for 
highlighting those things…when you look at a trending hash tag, then that tells 
you that lots of people are talking about this.’ He says,  ‘at the end of the day, 
social media is still about the people…platforms will change, but it is the people 
that are still at the heart of it…’.  Ogunelsi (2013) considers Twitter specifically, 
‘a more efficient way of pooling those voices together.’ He says that in 
amalgamating voices, Twitter is ‘much more efficient than the days of phone-in 
TV or phone-in radio where there was still an editor who could decide what calls 
or opinions to pick.’ Twitter he says, ‘is almost like equal opportunity…because 
of the way that it can analyse or pool things together, then you can get a sense 
of what people are talking about.’ On the issue about who sets the discursive 
agenda in the NDPS, Ogunelsi’s (2013) conclusion is that  ‘it is the people who 
are still choosing what to talk about, and setting the agenda on social media - 
but…sometimes the agenda doesn't originate on social media. Sometimes it 
comes from the old media. The Snowden incident… but it’s still human beings 
that are setting the agenda somehow.’ 
As we can now see, the discursive content of the Nigerian digital public sphere 
is indeed diverse, and supplied by active participants in the form of private 
individuals, journalists, citizen journalists, bloggers, corporations, public officials, 
religious organisations and more. The communication methods employed in 
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these spaces are technically determined by the architecture of the platform in 
use, but the content, spontaneity and duration of the communication and initial 
stimulus or agenda from which it emerges, are not so determined. Content is 
shaped and formed by a variety of sources, and can be so shaped and formed 
by the remediation or use of mainstream media products or even just a post by 
an influential digital media user. We must also note that within the hybrid 
character of communication ‘content’, the individual ejaculation predominates, 
and where ‘dialogue’ itself is transient and continuous, and in terms of 
‘deliberation’ in the Habermasian sense, there is no form of organisation or 
framework to ensure that a particular public issue is systematically analysed, 
refined and concluded in terms of a consensus before another matter is 
considered. Many times an issue may be addressed and then abandoned for 
another more topical event, before then being taken up once again. For instance, 
the Bring Back Our Girls is a campaign that has enjoyed international attention, 
and although the girls have still not been found at this time, the agenda in the 
Nigerian digital public sphere has shifted to other matters.  
Impact and Intervention 
Digital media as a public phenomenon, principally demonstrate an enhancing of 
individuals’ participatory capacities through network technology, supplanting a 
once passive audience of mainstream media with a more interactive and 
participatory one, and creating a space where marginalised groups from the 
mainstream public sphere can champion issues that concern them as well. Now 
common theoretical phrases, such as ‘decentring the very act of communicating’, 
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‘absence of boundaries’, and so on have heralded discussions of the potentials 
of this new digital public sphere for democracy, as I outlined in Chapter Two. 
And yet the question of government and governance has remained unresolved 
(in part of course, because each nation state is quite different). 
In Nigeria, digital media has facilitated the development of a public sphere that 
functions in a democracy that does not quite fit any singular model. The practice 
of democratic culture in Nigeria is a hybrid of representative (as election of 
representatives are conducted), deliberatory and participatory democracy – 
perhaps infused with some undemocratic but practical behaviours such as 
‘zoning the presidency’ due to Nigeria’s multi-ethnic nature. Being that Nigeria is 
home to over two hundred and fifty ethnic groups, it is often argued that the 
practice of rotating the seat of the presidency to reflect diverse ethnic groups is 
necessary towards the sustenance of peace. For Nigeria, this is a peculiar 
arrangement that does not directly subscribe to the basic ideals of democracy. 
However, in many other ways Nigeria’s democracy is developing. For instance, 
the Freedom of Information Bill, a bill crucial to the development and sustenance 
of any vibrant public sphere was passed into law in 2011. Freedom House 
(2014) ranks Nigeria a ‘partly free’ society, and coming from a heavily militarised 
history until 1999, Nigeria’s democracy has great room for improvement, hence 
the relevance of a burgeoning public sphere.  
The contribution of the digital public sphere to Nigeria’s democracy has indeed 
been evident in the springing up of a number of online-based initiatives, 
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reactions of the government to criticisms from the online sphere as well as the 
growth of a more informed citizenry due to increased access to public 
information. This has in turn, from data gathered, further sensitised citizens to 
their civic responsibilities, such as electoral voting – especially young people.  
Here are a few of the online initiatives that have contributed to facilitating a 
public sphere in Nigeria, which in turn promotes a culture of democracy in 
Nigeria:  
• The development of a Nigerian Constitution app for Blackberry (now on 
android phones as well). 
• The founding of the BudgIt group dedicated to spreading information on 
the national budget in simple everyday language through the web, apps, 
and online gaming. 
• Save Campaigns and medical interventions initiated by citizens to support 
fellow citizens online through crowd-sourcing funds online via Twitter & 
blogs. 
• Beacons Light Nigeria and the kalamajiri project among others, where 
funds were equally sourced online to develop classrooms for 
underprivileged students.  
• The founding of Policy Ng, a website dedicated to taking up government 
public policies and analysing them, whilst encouraging feedback and 
interaction from the readers. 
• The founding of Egunje.info that is dedicated to anti-corruption in Nigeria 
through setting up a website where one can whistle blow on corruption 
safely, piggy-backing on the anonymity the internet provides to users – 
corruption may be in government or in the private sector. 
• The founding of iWatchNg, another initiative dedicated to monitoring the 
award of contracts by the government to national infrastructure and 
development in Nigeria, and overseeing its implementation through 
crowdsourcing evidence e.g. from road users of a newly commissioned 
road-project.  
 
[The above initiatives were discussed in the previous chapters of this thesis]. On 
a broader level, the uptake of digital media technologies in Nigeria have opened 
up avenues for citizens to further exercise their freedom of expression – and 
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despite any explicit governance or government dimension to this, this must 
surely in itself be defined as ‘democratic’ behaviour. My general argument has 
maintained that the digital public sphere in Nigeria has been cultivating a ‘culture’ 
of democracy, where the explicit cooperation and structural features of 
government and governance do not altogether facilitate or assimilate the full 
range of public debate and deliberations. Evidence of this is the lessening of 
political antagonism or ‘backlash’ against bloggers or active digital media users 
on account of their criticism of government. One of the research interviewees, 
Ishaya Bako, spoke of his documentary film on Nigeria’s political affairs, Fuelling 
Poverty: it was banned for television broadcast, and yet he was able to bypass 
the ban and publish the film for free on YouTube, exposing, without political 
interference, his work to a Nigerian and a global audience. There remains no 
record of him being harassed on this account, by the time of submission of this 
thesis.  
So far in this chapter, we have established what is regarded as the digital public 
sphere in Nigeria, how it operates, through what communication methods, who 
supplies its discursive content, the nature/style of the discursive content and 
practical ways digital media have been used to facilitate a ‘culture’ of democracy 
in Nigeria. However, it is equally important to acknowledge what new cultural, 
political and social changes are impacted in Nigeria by the development of this 
new public sphere, as well as forces that may be prohibitive to its development – 
be they cultural, social or political.  
The use of technology births new cultures, and in the same vein culture and 
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behaviour may birth the need for a form of information technology. In Nigeria, 
the adoption of digital media technology, which has led to the development of a 
form of public sphere, has culminated into new cultures in the following areas:  
• Diverse forms of social and political behaviours – in activism, 
communications & interaction. 
• New means of advertising and public relations by private corporate 
organisations. 
• New approaches to reporting and disseminating news among journalists 
& news organisations.  
• More flexible social structures and social class identities. 
• More interactive forms of personal/public interactions.  
• New means of artistic and cultural expressions. 
• New approaches to sharing, spreading and advertising religion. 
 
Social and political activism has been prevalent in Nigeria before the influx of 
new media technologies, most common of which is the mobile phone. By the 
account of social activist Jaiye Gaskia, an interviewee in this study, activism 
involved going through the rigorous process of printing leaflets and posters, to 
be transported to locations around Nigeria under risky circumstances (given that 
the military was in power at the said time). Gaskia said his movement built 
relationships with commercial transporters so that the media products could 
move from one city to the next. They would then paste the posters in public 
places and distribute the leaflets by hand. According to Gaskia, where logistics, 
organising meetings and transporting people from one place to the other was a 
challenge of old social movements, today, meetings are easily coordinated 
online. In addition, one can now upload a leaflet online and distribute it through 
the same channel, without incurring the once exorbitant cost of printing.  
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However, there are still other means by which social activism in Nigeria has 
adopted new ways of conducting itself, new cultures. They are found for 
instance in the use of logos (that represent a particular social cause) as display 
picture on public social media profiles, the use of memes that make strong 
political statements and similarly, the use of creative animation or short drama 
clips uploaded on YouTube, Instagram and other video-sharing websites. Many 
a times, you would find a protester carrying a hand printed placard supporting a 
cause in the comfort of her home, and publishing the image on Instagram. In 
that situation, the said person can be recognised as identifying with the cause. 
This was quite prevalent in the recent #BringBackOurGirls movement that went 
global when Boko Haram, an Islamic Sect abducted over 200 girls from their 
secondary school in Nigeria. Michelle Obama, the First Lady of the United 
States, identified with the Bringbackourgirls cause using this method, and so did 
a host of international celebrities.  
This culture of activism has been branded ‘clictivism’, and in some quarters, has 
been branded ‘slactivism’. Clicktivism is of course derived from the word ‘click’, 
whereby people can support a social cause by the mere clicking of the mouse; 
in other words, joining a social cause is made easy through mediated actions, 
without the personal commitments of a ‘boots-on-soil’ approach. In a Guardian 
UK article by Emma Howard (2014), Change.Org and 38 Degrees are put 
forward as champions of online activism, accompanied with the question, ‘do 
they encourage people to passively click in support of a cause rather than taking 
action?’  
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This brings us to the idea of ‘slacktivism’, which is very similar to ‘clicktivism’. 
According to Oxford Dictionaries online, slacktivism is ‘actions performed via the 
internet in support of a political or social cause but regarded as requiring little 
time or involvement, e.g. signing an online petition or joining a campaign group 
on a social media website. A Huffington Post article talks about the shortcoming 
of clicktivism/slacktivism using the Bring Back Our Girls Campaign as an 
example. It reads: 
#BringBackOurGirls began to encourage political leaders both in 
the US and Nigeria to put resources into finding the 300 
schoolgirls who were kidnapped by the Boko Harama, an 
Islamist militant groups. Though the movement gained support 
from civilians across the globe through the support of celebrities, 
and even the First Lady, Michelle Obama, it was largely 
forgotten within a few weeks…activism should not be an 
isolating experience. Activism should be rallying, speeches, 
emotion. So let’s step away from the computer, put down the 
cell phone, and reconnect with the real world in order to take 
and help solve its problems (Robertson, 2014) 
These new cultures of activism are therefore not peculiar to Nigeria, they have 
been adopted in the world over and impact has been felt to varying degrees – a 
common example being the Arab Spring.  
In the advertising and the public relations (PR) industry, new cultures of 
engagement are being propagated in manners that affect how the digital public 
sphere in Nigeria operates, although the impact is not quantitatively measured in 
this thesis. There are two ways that have been observed by the researcher, in 
terms of how advertising and public relations activities by private corporations 
form part of the digital public sphere in Nigeria. Firstly, there is evidence that 
private corporation such as banks sponsor creative (entertainment) media 
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content online that can inform public discourse. A prominent example is 
Guaranty Trust Bank that sponsors Ndani TV on YouTube. There is also the 
somewhat traditional method of paying for advert space online within private or 
public sites; and lastly, the recruitment of active social media users to push out 
advert content to their respective social network connections as a paid job.  
New avenues of citizen interaction with public officials and politicians online is a 
significant development in Nigeria. Digitally mediated interchanges take place 
through direct interaction such as sending Twitter messages, emails, SMS etc. 
or via organised Twitter Town Hall Meetings or a Facebook group, such as has 
been described above. There is also the emerging culture of a Twitter celebrity – 
in our research interviews these groups of influential users were referred to as 
“overlords”, “cabals”, and their perceived subordinates, “voltrons”. In his 
interview, Okelue (2013), an active digital media user and social activist, 
described the idea thus: “It’s all a figment of people’s imaginations…Voltron is – 
you say something about someone, a group of people come and defend him 
through tweets. They might just like the person (hence, not necessarily paid). 
The cabals are…they take people who have the strongest opinion, who have the 
furthest reaching opinions on Twitter and say they are in a cabal…If I am cabal-
ian, I won’t tweet at lowly people”. These “lowly people” are weighted by “how 
much people take their opinion [as] important.”.  
In a blog post by another Nigeria digital media user, Blossom Nnodim (2013), 
she further explains this culture based on her personal experience being a part 
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of it. The title of her article is ‘Voltron or Famzer – Knowing your place in the 
Caste System of Social Media’. Nnodim (2013) explains that there are class and 
groups of users in the Nigerian digital public sphere, and they are as follows:  
• Offline superstar; online superstar: This is a person that has an instant 
name and recognition offline as well as online. People who usually fall 
into this category include footballers, comedians and religious leaders..  
• Offline superstar; online regular user: This person has always been 
recognised as a celebrity before the advent of Twitter, e.g. former political 
figures, past beauty queens, retired athletes.  
• Offline random person; online superstar: Nnodim (2013) calls this group 
“Twitter Celebrities”. She says, “take away their Twitter account and they 
become inconsequential”, as he/she uses Twitter to “amplify his/her 
thoughts, becoming an online superstar”.  
• Offline regular folk; online regular folk: Nnodim (2013) says this is where 
majority of Nigerians on Twitter fall. This group “go further to elevate, 
revere seemingly worthy folks or celebrity on Twitter”.  
 
While her hypotheses have not necessarily been subjected to any empirical 
verification, it is clear that her claims resonate to a large extent with the 
experiences shared by the interviewees in this research. The word Voltron is 
originally an animated television series that was popular in the 80s, and the 
character, Voltron, was ‘defender of the universe’. Hence, digital/social media 
users who defend an “overlord” are informally referred to as voltrons, that is, 
defenders. The colloquial word “famzer” is derived from “familiar”. To famz 
online is to associate oneself with a celebrity or a user considered to be of 
celebrity status through for instance tweeting at the user in a manner that 
suggests you are a fan. Please note that these terms are mentioned as 
developed by these Nigerian digital media users to define and explain their 
experiences in online interactions. These attitudes, although not empirically 
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articulated yet, cannot be ignored because they represent the inner workings of 
the Nigerian digital public sphere that influence the dynamics of how dialogue 
and deliberation take place in these spaces. 
Furthermore, the culture of public exchange is also spurred by the adoption of 
new media technologies evident between religious organisations, cultural 
producers (musicians, film makers etc.) and news organisations. Regarding 
religion in the Nigerian digital public sphere, new means of sharing religious 
messages open new avenues for dialogue and inquiry. Henry Okelue (2013) 
mentions in his research interview, that he receives invitations to church events 
by short message services (SMS). In addition, Alkassim Abdukadir (2013) 
mentions how, as a Muslim, he has observed how ‘cool’ it has become among 
his networks to “belong to certain Christian circles, because they are young and 
upwardly mobile”. This “belonging” is consolidated in for instance “retweeting 
Pastor Adeboye, Pastor Bakare.”  
Among cultural producers, there are shifting patterns and practices in how 
media products are distributed, changing the nature of engagements between 
producers and fans. For instance, Banky W (2013) mentions how in distributing 
and marketing his music, he can now by-pass the middleman being disk jockeys 
and radio houses and communicate or interact directly with his listeners via 
social media networks. This is not merely of economic significance, but it 
maintains an impact on potential relationships between musicians and social 
political movements. An example of this is the Register Select Vote Participate 
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campaign (RSVP) by ‘Enough is Enough Nigeria’, where Nigerian celebrities 
recorded voice-over clips encouraging the youths to vote. This campaign ran 
across online and traditional media platforms, picked up by consumers now 
educated and skilled in accessing the new fluid flows of music media distribution. 
For Tunde Kelani (2013), a film producer, the adoption of new digital media in 
Nigeria has led to new modes of archiving his media content, as well as 
providing an alternative and cost-effective space to broadcast content to his 
audiences. He recounts, “before… you make a programme, you have to beg the 
broadcast owners to give you space or sell you a space, and usually you 
become a slave to them because you can’t afford them”. For others, like Ishaya 
Bako (2013), it is an alternate space to spread media content along with 
messages that are muzzled in the mainstream Nigerian public sphere.  
Among news organisations in Nigeria, the shifting patterns of communication are 
evident in how news agenda is set, news gathered, spread and discussed – this 
is across both local and global news organisations. During the research 
interviews, many respondents alluded to how their social network sites had 
become their primary news source, as opposed to the traditional newspaper, 
radio and TV. Likewise, journalists interviewed also explained how they source 
for potential news stories on social network sites, develop news verification 
methods (e.g. calling a potential news source on the mobile), and employ 
linguistic devices in positioning themselves (their social media accounts) as the 
go-to source for news. Hence, news organisations contribute to what forms the 
agenda for discussion on the Nigerian digital public sphere and issues 
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discussed on the Nigerian digital public sphere have an outlet to go mainstream 
through these journalists active online – thus bridging the widely argued digital 
divide in Nigeria.  
These new ways of sourcing news by the public, and sourcing stories by 
journalists, is evidence of new patterns of production in journalism. Where the 
gatekeeper once had majority control over what was published/broadcast or not, 
the ‘audience’ increasingly have a stake in influencing what airs or is published 
through setting an issue as an agenda and “tweeting” or “facebooking” until the 
issue trends and can no longer be ignored. The cultural producer, singer, Banky 
W (2013), alluded to this point when he mentioned that his fans get his music on 
air (broadcast media), because once the people want to listen to a song, radio 
announcers cannot but play his song. In his words, “if something trends on 
Twitter, that’s the way to know that everyone is talking about this one song or 
particular topic…then DJs and radio stations don’t have a choice but to play it”. 
The same can be said for news journalism now, where the public sphere is agog 
with a particular issue, it becomes conspicuous when a news media 
organisation disregards a subject on mainstream media.  
Lastly, in concluding this section, there is also the forging of new relationships 
between active participants in the Nigerian digital public sphere and global 
media organisations. Through avenues for crowdsourcing news from around the 
world put in place by these organisations, such as iReporters at CNN or 
GuardianWitness ‘the home of user-generated content’ at Guardian UK. An 
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opportunity to contributing to setting the news agenda on a global media 
platform is thus opened up to members of the Nigeria digital public sphere. 
Social media accounts of global media accounts such as @BBC-have-your-say 
equally provide access to digital media users to suggests what issues of the day 
should become an agenda for public discourse on a global platform. 
As the adoption of digital media technologies become more ubiquitous in Nigeria, 
new relationships between the technologies, organisations, content production 
and audiences are forged, in turn steadily shaping the structure of social 
interaction and professional expectations. It is evident that new patterns of 
audience integration, responsiveness and a need to engage with popular 
communication flows are becoming absorbed into mainstream media and 
political spheres. New communication methods for the representation of views, 
identities and positions on public issues are emerging, whether to solicit votes, 
subvert the character or course of general dialogue or opinion, or for social and 
religious bodies to spread their beliefs and invitations to public events. This rise 
in activity and consequent change is not insubstantial even though we return to 
the questions of government and governance and the structural role of public 
deliberation in the systems of national democracy. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I critically assessed the NDPS using the criteria extracted from 
the review of literature on the public sphere in earlier chapters. These elements I 
found significant to public sphere development in Nigeria are – new media 
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platforms, communication techniques, agents and agencies, dialogue and 
issues, and impact and intervention. They are equally closely linked to the 
research questions that guide this study. In this chapter conclusion, I put forth 
that the NDPS in Nigeria is evolving and has the potentials to promote a culture 
of democracy in the country, but not without challenges and constraints, as we 
will see in the next and final chapter of this thesis, where I will discuss the final 
outcomes of this whole research investigation.   
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Conclusion 
Factors prohibitive to the development of the digital public 
sphere in Nigeria 
 
As argued in the previous and last chapter of this thesis, a digital public sphere 
in Nigeria is emerging through the new ‘culture’ of deliberation, dialogue and 
communication, but remains in an embryonic state of development insofar as it 
has not become a stable, consistent, substantive feature of the state apparatus 
or the procedural activities of state decision-making. This is evident from the 
rapid pace of change, spontaneous responses to events and lack of sustained 
debate, intense dialogue, without an evolving structure of deliberation, and a 
political sphere that is taking note and engaging with the digital realm and yet 
not fully integrating the content of public communications systematically into the 
processes and procedures of government and governance. The subject of this 
section is the way the growth of a digital public sphere is hampered by various 
social, political and cultural factors.  
First, the technological function of digital media is adversely affected by the 
economic factors of a poor telecommunications infrastructure in terms of the 
spread and reliability of service. In Nigeria, the infrastructure to support digital 
media technologies, such as the mobile phone ownership, support and networks, 
is concentrated in urban areas to the neglect of many rural communities. Hence, 
members of the grassroots are excluded from participating in the digital public 
sphere. On the other hand, even in the urban areas where access to the 
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information technologies is more common, there is the barrier of relatively 
expensive data rates, which makes connecting an internet-enabled mobile 
phone to the Internet difficult. Erratic power supply also makes it difficult to stay 
connected to the digital public sphere where mobile phones, laptops and other 
devices cannot have their batteries recharged despite having access to the 
Internet. Situations like these often call for the use of power-generators that run 
on petrol or diesel, which is in itself a costly venture to sustain. In terms of 
reliability of service, a respondent, Alamba (2013), mentioned having to possess 
more than one mobile phone to host sim cards from various telecoms providers 
in Nigeria, in case one fails in providing satisfactory service, he can try the other. 
Many Nigerians cannot afford the luxury of owning more than one mobile phone.  
Secondly, a main hindrance to the vibrancy of a digital public sphere is 
motivation – the representation of public officials who are active online and 
willing to engage with citizens are slight. There is so much potential for 
interaction between citizens and the state in the Nigerian digital public sphere 
that would facilitate a growing sense of participation. On the experience of 
journalists interviewed in this study, there are claims that for public officials, 
being active online gives an illusion of the democratic criterion of transparency 
because it is indeed in actual fact absent. Digital media is a space for strategic 
deception. To illustrate this point, a BBC Lagos Journalist, Tomi Oladipo (2013) 
observes that “it’s frustrating working with the government, getting anything from 
the government… Nigerian officials are not used to being questioned. They are 
used to a media that would take anything they say without questioning them. I’d 
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been called “rude” by Nigerian officials just because I asked him questions”. 
Another journalist, Jon Gambrell (2013), echoes this observation when he said 
that interacting with public officials online rather than face-to-face limits the 
conversation as they (officials) have control of the message and do not have to 
answer the questions posed to them on Facebook, for instance.  
Thirdly, there are social and behavioural inhibitors to the development of an 
effective digital public sphere in Nigeria. From research interviews conducted 
with active digital media users in the Nigerian public sphere, recurring themes 
included:  
• Prevalence of harassment online, cyber-bullying & (sometimes) hate-
speech or death threats. 
• Mechanisms of self-censorship. 
• Direct relationship between poor literacy & lack of digital skills.  
• The “generational” digital divide. 
• Ethnic and religious bias, colonising areas of the digital media sphere 
exclusively for their adherents.  
• Inaccurate or misinformation going viral. 
• Anonymity – the lack of transparent identity in digital dialogue. 
• ‘Petty’, ‘insulting’ and ‘emotional’ behaviours in the digital public sphere.  
• A crowded space – an echo-chamber that de-motivates genuine users. 
 
Harassment, cyber-bullying and hate-speech are common factors at play in any 
online interaction in Nigeria, and this also pertains to public sphere 
communications. I have observed instances where death threats are extended 
to a fellow digital media user for simply disagreeing with a point of view. 
Respondent, Bukola Ogunyemi (2013) also shared his experience where he 
made a religion-related comment on Twitter, which led to death threats online 
and via SMS. This is an undemocratic attitude, as it suggests that 
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dissenting/subaltern views may not be tolerated in the digital public sphere 
despite the perception of high democratising potential of digital media. For a 
robust debate to take place online, participants in the digital public sphere need 
to accept to be exposed to dissenting views to theirs and tolerate them.  
In the light of this, it is no surprise that self-censorship is a common challenge 
with engaging in dialogue in the digital public sphere. It is strongly related to 
cyber-bullying, where digital media users refrain from expressing their views on 
a subject being debated for fear of potential consequences. The passive-
repressive attitude of the state (or representative) is another trigger-factor to 
self-censorship in online discourse. For instance, some respondents (e.g. 
Alamba) mentioned how they would rather not comment on political issues 
online as “you never know who you are talking to…you don’t know who you are 
stepping on his toes – because it may turn back on you”. After the interview with 
Omojuwa took place in 2013, sometime in 2014 the Nigerian State Security 
Service arrested him.  
Going forward, the impression that the digital public sphere is an ‘echo chamber’ 
(no one is listening to the other hence there is no dialogue of which to speak), is 
not a problem limited to the Nigerian digital public sphere. Voices easily get lost 
in a ‘mass’ of atomised ejaculations, especially where the conversation/debate is 
not structured or coordinated. The fragmented nature of the digital public sphere 
communication thus indicates the need for socio-political conditions for ‘public’ 
communication. Where with digital media there is no single or delimited 
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collective space where active participants gather to discuss public matters as 
affects them, the function of such past manifestations of ‘space’ needs to be 
revised.   
Poor literacy and a consequent poor digital literacy is a significant barrier to the 
development of the Nigerian digital public sphere not easily broached. Education 
is a systemic feature of any society and intrinsic to social welfare provision. If 
one is not familiar with how to use basic information and communication 
technologies, such as the mobile phone, becoming an active participant in the 
digital public sphere becomes a difficult task. Moreover, some basic level of 
literacy is required to participate in the digital public sphere in terms of ability to 
read posts online, as well as publish and comment on posts. Although it is a 
given that not every digital communication platform is text-based, it is still 
important to posses basic reading and writing skills to maximally participate in 
the digital public sphere.  
The digital divide is a concept that has often dominated scholarly discourse on 
the Internet and its increasingly important social and economic functions. The 
claim that digital media has actually exacerbated social divisions and class 
stratification, is commonplace. The implication maintains that in the context of a 
pervasive and chronic digital divide across Nigeria, a putative digital public 
sphere could never claim democratic legitimacy given its lack of popular 
representation. While this is an important issue, however, our concept of the 
digital public sphere, like Habermas’s eighteenth century European public 
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sphere, does not require full representation of a national population to begin its 
work. Even so, it is important that any critical research study of this subject 
acknowledge the depth of the issue at stake:  
• There exist prohibitive high data rates (internet service costs), which can 
render a mobile phone user bereft of any mode of Internet access as a 
result of private corporate pricing strategies along with insensitive 
government regulation of such.  
• The education system is not altogether cognisant of the need to stimulate 
general literacy so as to increase public participation and thus digital 
literacy.  
• The expense associated with various levels of digital media device (such 
as smart phones), increasing the communication capability of the wealthy.  
 
The immersion of digital media communications in the spheres of entertainment 
and the retail or consumer culture of younger people, sets up a symbolic gap 
between the ‘older’ and ‘younger’ generation in terms of how digital media 
devices are used. This ‘generational’ tension is reflected in perception both 
groups have of digital media and its place as a potential space for public 
discussion. It is evident from data gathered on this research that there is a 
tendency to perceive digital media as the domain of the youths, such that the 
‘older generation’ (in Nigeria, from their late fifties), may not be impressed with 
the necessity for commitment for an emerging Nigerian digital public sphere.  
Ethnic and religious bias is another strong challenge of the Nigerian digital 
public sphere, which pervaded basic social values, social allegiances and 
identities, and the willingness to engage in social intercourse with others on the 
basis of ‘public’ issues. Ethnic and religious sub-cultures are so strong as to 
generate their own terminologies and rhetoric, as well as their own intra-
	   339	  
communal debates on issues specific to their own welfare or interests. In the era 
of Habermas’ classical public sphere there indeed existed a diversity of beliefs 
and allegiances, but these were politically not as strong as the interests 
emerging from the collective welfare of civil society systems of social and market 
economy. For the classical public sphere to emerge, a period of abstraction of 
community and religion from economy and market needed to occur, where the 
interests of the latter could be conceptually separated out and debated and 
independent of the former. In Nigeria, this is only partially the case: the 
significance of community and belief systems are so often evident in blogs, 
Facebook comments, tweets and other forms of digital communication. Where a 
news story shared on a social media platform appears it is not uncommon to see, 
“prejudices come to fore” as the story is quickly revised as “an ethnic socio-
religious issue”. Abdukadir (2013), our interviewee journalist calls attention to 
this behaviour. In this context there are also many inadvertent forms of exclusion 
– where there is a lack of national public culture, local languages or protocols 
are preferred and so limiting both participants and potential participants to a full 
public sphere hearing. Interviewee Kole Shettima (2013) mentions this 
phenomenon among Nigerian Hausa-speakers, whom he observes are more 
active on Facebook, as opposed to Twitter, but in their local language.  
Lastly, a significant prohibitive factor to the development of a digital public 
sphere in Nigeria is the anonymity granted to a digital media user. As 
interviewee Bukola Ogunyemi (2013) puts it, anonymity poses a security risk to 
him personally: “with digital media, you can’t be too sure you are speaking with 
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the person you are speaking with…” The anonymous users of digital media are 
not often harmful, but the possibility is always present. More subtle is the impact 
of the lack of transparency and consequent lack of a demand to take 
responsibility for one’s own contribution or participation For instance, parody 
accounts are sometimes used to make political statements, or can exist solely 
for entertainment, confusing the status of the genuine account. An example of a 
parody account on Twitter is @not_goodluck. Its impact might be to facilitate the 
spread of false information, confusing the criteria that should pertain to political 
dialogue. Bloggers for instance, are major producers of content found on the 
Nigerian Internet, and yet are not bound by any code of ethics. With the lack of a 
strong public culture, with its embedded codes and protocols of public 
acceptability, manners and behavioural standards, the emergence of self-
regulation is sporadic and uneven.  
Most of the respondents drew attention to how ‘petty’, ‘insultive’ and ‘emotional’ 
they found the public debate in Nigeria. Yemi Adamolekun (2013) states that, 
“the fact that it is uncensored, makes it an easy place for young Nigerians to 
vent. There is a lot of anger, so sometimes it does get quite abusive, insultive 
(sic), not necessarily a friendly place to be if you’re on the wrong side of the 
divide”. 
The Embyronic ‘culture’ of Democracy  
A culture of democracy in Nigeria is constituted through a range of disparate and 
partially connected practices of media enterprise, issue-based campaigning, 
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religious or social communication and political activism. In our previous chapters 
we have considered the character and concomitant behaviours involved in these 
practices, as well as their contexts – particularly how socio-political conditions of 
a ‘partly free’ society inhibits the full development of a public sphere.  
Democracy is a concept with multiple definitions, but its basic tenets are 
relatively unanimous in scholarly discourse. Democracy involves representation, 
participation and popular inclusivity, culminating in fully informed citizens 
contributing to the decision-making substance of the State in governing and 
regulating social, cultural and economic life. The conditions for this are 
communication media, spaces of communicative interaction, dissemination and 
publicity, education and an ever-developing enlightened understanding 
grounded on available and objective information, and the ascription of legitimacy 
to citizen activities by the State itself.  
By constitution, Nigeria operates as a democracy, yet in culture and the range of 
communicative activities and spaces of such, this thesis has revealed the 
country to be lacking in some democratic capabilities. The thesis also identified 
how behavioural attitudes, aptitudes and capabilities for communication between 
the state and the citizenry are symbiotic: a growing ‘culture’ of democracy only 
grows so far and then requires the facilitation of State legitimacy and regulation. 
This involves the following:  
• Define citizen identities and active citizens through mechanisms of 
representation.  
• Sustain the potential to facilitate an enlightened citizenry – through 
	   342	  
multiple access to information and incentives and motivation for public 
participation.  
• Promotes popular inclusivity (to some extent void of status differentials). 
• Provides an avenue for citizens to participate in matters that affect them 
beyond voting or elections – awarding them a sense of empowerment. 
 
I will briefly elaborate on these in order, articulating in succinct form the 
observations and claims made throughout this thesis: 
Define active citizenship: It is simplistic to assume that the adoption of new 
digital media technologies can immediately facilitate active citizenship. However, 
research has found that digital media for democratic purposes (such as 
elections) complements existing offline engagements: for example, Hargittai and 
Shaw (2013) in their study of young adults’ political attitudes during the 2008 US 
presidential elections, found that Internet usage alone is unlikely to ‘transform 
existing patterns in political participation radically’, yet again may indeed open 
up new pathways for engagement. In Nigeria, this can be argued to equally be 
the case. The gradual adoption of new media technologies have opened up new 
avenues for interaction and engagement, and as such citizens are becoming 
more informed, leading to taking actions such as voting, where citizens were 
once desensitised.   
Produce more enlightened citizenry: a presupposition of public sphere theory is 
that active citizenship is the result of a more enlightened and informed citizenry. 
Through a relatively vibrant digital public sphere in Nigeria, individuals and 
organisations such as BudgIT and iWatchNg, are able to provide systematic 
information that maintains the intellectual involvement of citizens in public and 
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social matters. It is important to note that the equally possible spread of 
inaccurate information online threatens this potential, as well as the activities of 
users who deliberately set out to manipulate discussions to suit private interests. 
Strategies would need to be put in place to manage this challenge.  
Promotes popular inclusivity: the assertion that digital media promotes the 
democratic ideal of popular inclusivity is a contested one. Scholar Jodi Dean 
argues against digital media (specifically, the internet) as a public sphere. The 
interview data in this thesis confirmed the basic assertions in the previously 
quoted 1997 paper, ‘Virtually Citizens’, where Dean categorically states that 
networked computers, the web, and the Internet do not meet the condition of 
popular inclusivity for the following reasons (1997:278): Firstly, access is often 
limited to only those who can afford it and are technology-savvy enough to 
‘figure out how to download the software’ that makes popular inclusivity possible. 
Secondly, Dean (1997: 278) claims that there is no freedom on the net; what 
exists as freedom is ‘freedom of the market’ – one that is ‘produced through the 
large interventions of large corporations, pornographers, hackers, and 
environmentalists.’ In other words, the meaning of freedom of the net is always 
channeled through the ‘hierarchies and drives’ that contain how it is exercised.  
It is clear how the notion of popular inclusivity may be challenged when applied 
to new media technologies. However, such a position may fail to take into 
account the nature of (deeply) communal societies where the digital public 
sphere participant speaks/participates not just for themselves, but for their 
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immediate community. To illustrate this counter-argument, if in one Nigerian 
household there is only one mobile phone through which this user is involved in 
the digital public sphere, he/she becomes a ‘middleman’ through which every 
member of that household participates in the public sphere. In addition, where 
mainstream media in Nigeria is increasingly culling content from online 
deliberations and interactions, the place of the digital public sphere is being 
consolidated and recognised. Suffice to say that mobile phone penetration is 
growing in Africa, and the growth will continue to increase.  
Dean’s second argument, on freedom of the net being the freedom of the market, 
does not entirely discount the potential democratic values inherent in new media 
technologies. These communication platforms offer spaces for democratic 
discussions wherein commercial corporations cannot control the agenda, try as 
they might (consider the ‘Arab Spring’). Indeed, there have been cases where 
Twitter owners or Facebook may take down a comment, block an account, or 
contribute towards facilitating the arrest of a user. However, this is not the norm 
in Nigeria, and some level of expressive freedom is provided. This is not to 
discount the validity of Dean’s argument as to the forces of commercialisation 
that are increasingly pervading the digital public sphere. It is to say that where 
corporations have made their business social media, the social communication 
dimension of their service provision needs to some extent to be maintained for 
their business to remain viable. Perhaps it is worth considering the formation of 
the digital public sphere that is outside commercial and state control, as we 
would see in the section on strategies for the development of a digital public 
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sphere later on in this chapter.  
Avenue for citizens to participate in public/social issues beyond elections and 
generate public opinion: free and fair elections are upheld as a major indicator of 
what constitutes a democratic society. While this may not be incorrect, the 
democratic function of suffrage and representation are subject to a range of 
cultural and social conditions. It is the contention of this thesis that while Nigeria 
maintains a democratic constitution, institutions and mechanism of government, 
the cultural and social values, behaviours and conduct within these do not 
altogether make for a democratic society. Democratic ‘culture’ transcends the 
ability to conduct free and fair elections, to also embracing an active citizenry 
that can contribute to how they are governed – in an on-going series of 
dialogues and organisationally-mediated relationships between the public and 
the state. This is the opportunity an effective digital public sphere portends – an 
essentially civil sphere, where ‘private’ interests can indeed be articulated and 
mediated within political discourse, but where a recognition of ‘public’ interest 
will allow the sphere’s impact on state decision making to transcend any one set 
of private interests. Although this is the ‘ideal’, in the sense that theoretical 
abstraction does not map seamlessly onto empirical reality, in Nigeria, despite 
an extensive civil and organisational infrastructure, national media of some 
capability, an educated middle class and extensive cultural production, this 
reality is not the case. Productive democratic discourses are hampered by 
harassments, insults, cyber-bullying, and restrictions in governance and a lack 
of political will, negating the need for transparency, accountability, devolution of 
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executive powers and a public voice within government decision-making.  
I conclude this thesis with a brief recapitulation of the discussion so far. I opened 
the thesis with a theoretical enquiry into the idea of a public sphere and digital 
public sphere. Here, I explained the structure, dynamics, and development of a 
digital public sphere, navigating arguments for and against the potential of the 
Internet and digital media to effectively serve as democratic public spheres. I 
equally reviewed studies that have engaged with the subject, especially in other 
African countries besides Nigeria, such as Zimbabwe, and the African diaspora. 
It was evident from literature, that with the influx of digital media, through mostly 
mobile telephony, therein lies a potential of social and cultural development on 
the continent – albeit not without certain challenges and prohibiting factors.  
In the second half of the thesis, the focus turned to the practical application of 
digital media by Nigerian citizens by way of considering how it facilitated a digital 
public sphere that, potentially at least, could assume a role within Nigerian 
constitutional democracy. In the process, I explored the socio-political 
organisation of the Nigerian society, highlighting her military history post-
independence from the British colonialists. This had significant impact on the 
development of Nigeria’s traditional public sphere via the mass media – where 
press freedom was stifled through legislation and outright harassment of 
journalists. In this half of the thesis, it was equally important to identify the newly 
formed relationship between old and new media, and how this spurred a 
potential to affect the nature of the public sphere in Nigeria. A field research trip 
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to Nigeria to conduct interviews with selected digitally active participants 
provided primary data on the digital public sphere in Nigeria and how it operates. 
The interview revealed in practical terms the complexity of the existing so-called 
democratic culture in Nigeria. From the online communicative activities of mass 
media practitioners, active citizens, cultural producers, religious organisations 
and leaders, to public officials themselves, it was evident that the ideal of a 
digital public sphere in a developing democracy such as Nigeria, is challenged.  
However, it has been asserted in this thesis that a digital mediated spectrum of 
communication spaces becomes a public sphere to the extent that the agents 
and agencies within it render it so. Hence, given the challenges facing the 
development of the digital public sphere in Nigeria, what needs to be done in 
order to progress beyond a mere embryonic sphere in Nigeria? Broadly 
speaking, what political or media or even social strategies can we identify that 
may be instrumental in developing a fully effective digital public sphere in 
Nigeria (as a model to other developing democracies)?  
In other words, the important question in this thesis remains: given the existing 
communication techniques, currently active agents and agencies, the nature of 
the dialogue, and existing prohibitive factors, can a culture of democracy be 
effectively promoted in Nigeria through a digital public sphere? I argue in the 
affirmative, on the condition that certain strategies are put in place to support the 
notion of a truly democratic digital public sphere in Nigeria. Succinctly put, the 
strategies/recommendations I propose fall under improving access to digital 
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media infrastructure in the country, and the strategic roles the mass/traditional 
media need to play in strengthening the Nigerian digital public sphere. 
Access: access to digital media infrastructure needs to increase. Although this 
recommendation does not guarantee an active citizenry, its benefit cannot be 
over-emphasised. In relation to this recommendation, policies such as the 
National Broadband Policy 2014-2018 need to be executed, and tariffs and cost 
of mobile Internet data needs to drop to more affordable prices. The ideal of 
popular inclusivity in the NDPS is challenged when only the rich can afford to be 
online. The Nigerian mass media are crucial to the establishment of an effective 
digital public sphere in Nigeria for the following reasons:  
(i) To combat the fragmented nature of the Internet, and in effect, the digital 
public sphere. A more active and conscientious Nigerian mass media is able to 
coalesce the discussions that take place online by ‘remediating’ them back 
through ‘old’ media and thus intentionally inserting them (or ‘referencing’ them, 
given the quantity of content) within the public agenda in the wider public sphere. 
This goes beyond waiting for issues to trend globally online before they are 
represented on mass media platforms. I advocate a more proactive approach to 
gathering news from everyday online dialogue and discussions. This way, even 
rural Nigeria, where only radio is available, could find some measure of inclusion.  
(ii) The barriers of language and literacy in participating in the NDPS are 
ameliorated when the mass media deliberately gather public views and dialogue 
online that have been shared in diverse (Nigerian) languages, and share them 
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on widely-accessible media platforms such as radio or TV. There is a thriving 
Nigerian-Hausa community online for instance, but non-local speakers are 
excluded from that sphere despite being online - likewise, Hausa-speakers who 
are not literate in the English language. The mass media can develop 
communication models that ensure a semblance of uniformity in access to 
information gleaned from online participation in dialogue. The challenge of 
language barrier can also be mitigated if government policies were put in place 
to encourage the creation of local technologies that would meet these 
communication needs. Local talent can meet local technology needs – this has 
been evident in this thesis, given the interview with Zubair & Bayo (2013), the 
creators of the Nigerian Constitution for Blackberry app. One of the challenges 
they claimed to face as tech-startups is poor infrastructure and implementation 
of government policies. In their words, ‘you don’t have the right kind of 
infrastructure…when government policies are not consistent. They say one thing 
and they do another…’ Zubair & Bayo (2013). The government needs to create 
an enabling environment for local ‘tech talents’ to thrive, however, this is but one 
challenge facing the development of local technology in Nigeria.  
(iii) The mass media is well-placed to combat the challenge of the spread of mis-
information that plagues the Nigerian digital public sphere. The Nigerian mass 
media needs to gain the trust of citizens as the sources of credible information. 
Where citizens turn to citizen journalists who are not guided by any ethics or 
social responsibility for accurate information, they become vulnerable. This 
recommendation needs further research.  
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(iv) The mass media is instrumental to keeping public issues that arise in the 
digital sphere as top agenda until they are resolved or necessary action taken. 
Activities in the NDPS appear to assume some form of co-ordination when 
geared towards social activism/protests, yet, the public issues raised are 
transient and rarely stay current regardless of whether they have been resolved 
or a form of consensus reached or not. An example is the Bring Back Our Girls 
campaign. The hashtag around which the protest was organised has lost 
momentum online, and the NDPS has moved on to other issues despite the fact 
that the girls remain unfound, and no definite cause of action outlined. This is 
not fruitful for the Nigerian public sphere.  
These recommendations are by no means exhaustive of avenues through which 
a culture of democracy can be promoted in Nigeria through a digital public 
sphere. For instance, the role of public officials equally needs to be addressed. 
Where they are not willing to engage with citizens online, the digital public 
sphere becomes significantly deficient. On the part of Nigerian citizens active in 
the digital public sphere as well, there is a need for improvement in digital 
literacy, as well as a national consciousness that would encourage online 
discussions to be democratic. By this, I mean free expression void of bullying 
and harassment, especially where views are dissenting. There is the potential 
for digital media to be used in promoting democratic culture in Nigeria through a 
vibrant digital public sphere, but void of an enabling democratic environment, 
relevant institutions, infrastructure, and an enfranchised and active civil society, 
this assumption is strongly challenged.  
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What does the future hold – for an active, politically effective, digital public 
sphere, and the Nigerian political public sphere more specifically? In the light of 
recent developments, where social media was used to spread information and 
curb mis-information about the spread of the Ebola epidemic in Nigeria, and 
added to that, the recent Nigerian 2015 presidential elections, it is evident that 
these events of national concern have generated a stimulus for the ‘embryonic’ 
digital public sphere in Nigeria to evolve.  
When Ebola became a subject of popular discussion, fear and panic, and 
general professional discourse on health, risk and the duties of public policy (in 
the Nigerian and (West) African digital public sphere), a no well-known 
Facebook page called ‘Concerned Africans Against Ebola’ appeared. It 
functioned to immediately host a community of interlocutors, where reliable 
information about the virus could be shared, and political solidarity against the 
public inaction, could be resisted (Sarmah, N.D). Likewise, Taylor (2014). Big 
Cabal Media, a private publishing company, also launched a public service 
educational website, [ebolafacts.com], in solidarity in fighting the epidemic. 
According to their email traffic (see appendix), the purpose of this enterprise was 
information sharing, public access of news and information on medical 
developments, and education on the symptoms of Ebola. Given how HIV, in the 
past generated appalling myths and popular beliefs, facilitating the spread of the 
disease, we can surely understand the need for a critical intervention of 
information, advice and education  (Taylor, 2014).  
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My point in citing these roles in public information, protection and health 
education, is that these functions were once the exclusive preserve of state 
controlled mass media, and where mass media were similarly the only organs of 
representation that could effectively promote or enforce official public policies. 
Here, however, non-governmental agencies and new media organisations, are 
generating a greater impact through effective communication techniques, 
access to popular social media channels, and through using a language, 
targeted to specific needs, that provides a concise, practical and consistently 
updated information. A culture of autonomous digital media communication, 
formed through a critique of the state, has demonstrated more facility to respond 
to public needs. 
More recently, specific events during the Nigeria presidential elections of March 
2015 are of significance in the light of our research. In the last elections, social 
media indeed amplified certain debates at particular times concerning 
presidential candidates and their issues. This time, in March 2015, the situation 
was tangibly more intensive and dynamic, where digital media was playing a 
central role: citizens arguments for or against a candidate were, according to the 
mainstream polls and press, being swayed on the basis of series of debates that 
took place online (among other factors communicated through social media). An 
example is Mark Amaza’s (2015) opinion article published on YNaija’s citizen 
journalism blog is indicative – entitled, ‘How I went from being a Goodluck 
supporter to a Buhari campaigner’. Heated debates on Facebook and other 
social media platforms were in the minds of the critical mass of professional and 
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educated people: [see Appendix 4-7, for examples of Twitter conferences, 
campaigns, and fitness walks that were organised to discuss and support the 
elections].  
Nigerian political parties were more vocal on the Internet with their (targeted) 
strategic advertising campaigns. The People’s Democratic Party (PDP), the 
political party to which the then incumbent president, Goodluck Jonathan 
belonged, held its first Google Hangout (Agbaje, 2015: YouTube Video). INEC’s 
electoral process in 2015 was more digitized than in the past, with the use of the 
Electronic Voters Card, to limit electoral malpractice (NDI, 2014). This election 
saw the resuscitation of previous election monitoring apps such as REVODA, 
and new initiatives such as PollWatch, Nigeria Decides, goVote.org etc. (See 
Appendix 5). Another trend featured the rise of online crowd funding for political 
campaigns [See Appendix 8]. TechCabal blog published a comprehensive blog 
post on the roles digital media was used to play in the Nigeria May 2015 
elections (Cf. Fadoju, 2015: online). 
The future of the digital public sphere in Nigeria will see the introduction of more 
creative technologies for social good and cultural development, and the 
intensification of the kinds of discourse in popular opinion that can make an 
immediate impact (as in a political election). In evidence, is also the state and 
ruling party’s ability to respond to shifts in public opinion, a condition of which is 
the facility for surveillance. The power of mass surveillance is of serious concern, 
with issues to do with Internet censorship, media control, the roles of public 
authority in public communication, need to be further researched. The Nigerian 
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government’s response to matters of constitutional freedom of expression and 
freedom of the press is random and uncertain. There are no strong parameters 
for a state-civil society distinction, and this can only be mediated and ‘policed’ by 
an effective public sphere. If we can make a general observation on the 
elections, the power of the state is in evidence, the lobbying of civil society was 
in evidence, popular resistance against both was in evidence, but a strong public 
sphere needs far more than popular resistance through communication. It 
requires consistent, institutionalized and stable, mediation. This is not an 
argument (as Habermas indeed argued, and as was cited in the conclusion of 
Chapter One) for the absorption of a digital mediated public sphere into the 
mainstream mass media, notwithstanding the need for a liberalization of the 
mass media and its freedom from state control. The argument of this thesis 
served to identify how a significant level of public sphere activity has been 
generated by relatively autonomous actors and agencies, without the support of 
the state and of mass media. This embryonic public sphere was facilitated by 
digital media, and empowered by characteristic behaviours I identified as 
‘cultural’. 
This thesis does not exhaust a description and analysis of the embryonic public 
sphere and its digital mediation. Further research is required to examine the role 
of religion – organisations, their platforms, charismatic individuals, communities 
and collective action, and so on. What impact do religious social formations 
have on the political complex of the public sphere, where even non-believers are 
often highly influenced by the ethical frameworks or metaphysical assumptions 
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of such formations? Also, private corporations – it is evident that they are 
players in the NDPS, but their roles and impact is yet to be ascertained, given 
how difficult it is for researchers to gain access to such corporate spheres. This 
also calls for further research, but also political action for greater public 
information and laws of access to corporate data and the function of 
corporations within the public realm. I end this thesis with these twin foci of 
concern – the religious and the corporate – which animated Douglas Kellner’s 
research and promoted his call for a critical theory of new communications 
technologies. Such a tradition of critical theory is yet to emerge in Nigeria, but I 
hope, through pursuing this proposal for further research, that this thesis could 
serve as a starting point.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: List of early Newspapers in Nigeria from 1859 - 1960s 
S/N Publication Date of First 
Issue  
Place of 
Publication  
Publisher/Edit
or  
1. Iwe Iroyin Dec 3, 1859 
Abeokuta  
Rev. Henry 
Townsend   
2. Anglo African  1863 Lagos  
Robert 
Campbell  
3.  
Lagos Times 
and Gold 
Coast 
Advertiser 
Nov 10, 1880 Lagos  
Mr Andrew 
Thomas  
4.  
Lagos 
Observer 
Feb 15, 
1882 
Lagos  
Bagan 
Benjamin  
5.  
Eagle and 
Lagos Critic  
March 31, 
1883 
Lagos  
Mr Owen 
Emeric 
Macaulay  
6.  The Mirror  Dec 17, 1887 Lagos   
7.  
Lagos Weekly 
Times  
March 3, 
1890 
Lagos   
8. 
Lagos Weekly 
Record 
Dec 31, 
1890  
Lagos 
John 
Payne 
Jackson and 
Horatio 
Jackson  
9. 
Nigerian 
Chronicle  
Nov 20, 
1908 
Lagos  
Christoph
er Kumolu 
Jackson  
10. 
Lagos 
Standard  
1908 Lagos  
G.A. 
Williams  
11. 
Nigerian 
Times  
1910 Lagos  
Mr Sapara 
Williams & 
James Bright 
Davies  
12. 
Nigerian 
Pioneer  
1914 Lagos  
Sir Kitoye  
Ajasa 
13.  
African 
Messenger  
March 10, 
1921 
Lagos  
Ernest 
Ikoli  
14.  
Nigerian 
Advocate 
   
	   372	  
15. 
Nigerian 
Spectator  
May 19, 
1923 
 
Dr 
Akinwande 
Savage 
16. Daily News 1925  Lagos 
Victor 
Bababomi/He
rbert 
Macaulay 
(1927) 
17.  Daily Times 
June 1, 
1926 
Lagos  
Ernest 
Ikoli (editor)  
18. 
Nigerian Daily 
Telegraph 
1927   
19. 
The Nigerian 
Sunday 
Digest 
1931 Lagos 
Mr J.C. 
Roberts 
20. The Comet 1932 Lagos 
Duse 
Mohammed 
Ali  
21. 
West African 
Nationhood  
  J.C. Zizer 
22.  Dawn   
Port-
harcourt 
Mr. M.C. 
Labor  
23.  
Nigerian 
Eastern Mail  
1935 Calabar 
Mr J.C. 
Clinton  
24.  
West African 
Advertiser 
 Calabar 
M.T.O> 
Nottidge & Mr 
J.T. John  
25. 
West African 
Pilot  
1937  Lagos  
Dr Nnamdi 
Azikwe  
26.  Gaskiya  1939 
Northern 
Nigeria  
 
27.  
Eastern 
Nigerian 
Guardian  
1940   
28. 
Nigerian 
Spokesman  
1943 
Onitsha, 
Eastern 
Nigeria 
Dr. 
Nnamdi 
Azikwe  
29. 
Southern 
Defender  
1943  Warri  
Dr. 
Nnamdi 
Azikwe  
30.  Northern 1949 Jos  Dr. 
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Advocate Nnamdi 
Azikwe  
31. 
Nigerian 
Tribune  
Nov 16, 
1949 
Ibadan  
Chief 
Obafemi 
Awolowo  
32.  
Eastern 
States 
Express 
March 13, 
1950 
Aba 
Dr. E.U. 
Udoma  
33. Sketch 1964 Ibadan  
Western 
Region 
Government  
 
 
Source: Mabadeje, I. (2004) The Nigerian Press Under the Military. Akwa 
Ibom, Nigeria: Robertminder & Lofty Communications 
 
 
Appendix 2: List of Research Interviewees and additional 
information  
 
S/N Interviewe
e Name  
Category 
Date Location Notes  
1. Kayode 
Fayemi 
Public 
official  
2013 Email 
 
Governor, 
Ekiti State, 
Nigeria, at 
the time of 
interview  
2. 
Rotimi 
Ogunmola  
Public 
Official 
2013 Lagos   
3. 
Gbenga 
Olorunpom
i  
Public 
Official  
2013 Lagos   
4. 
Kayode 
Idowu 
Public 
Official 
2013 Abuja 
Chief 
Press 
Officer, 
Independe
nt National 
Electoral 
Commissio
n 
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5. 
Abang 
Mercy  
Citizen 
Journalist  
2013 Abuja 
Journali
st on 
Citizens 
Platform 
Ng. 
6. 
Japheth 
Omojuwa  
Social 
Activist, 
Blogger 
2013 Abuja 
Active 
in the 
Occupy 
Nigeria 
protest 
7. 
Gbenga 
Sesan  
Social 
Activist 
(civic 
actor) 
2013 Lagos  
Founde
r, 
Paradigm 
Initiative 
Nigeria 
8. 
Bukola 
Ogunyemi 
Social 
Activist 
(civic 
actor) 
2013 Lagos 
Founder, 
Policy NG.  
9. 
Seun 
Fakuade  
Social 
Activist  
2013 Abuja  
Founder, 
Beacons 
Ng.  
10. 
Yemi 
Adamoleku
n 
Social 
Activist  
2013 Lagos  
Executi
ve 
Director, 
Enough is 
Enough, 
Nigeria 
11. 
Amara 
Nwankpa  
Social 
Activist 
2013 Abuja  
Co-
Creator, 
#LightUpNi
geria 
12. 
Azeernarh 
Mohamme
d 
Social 
Activist  
2013 Abuja 
Active in 
the Occupy 
Nigeria 
protest  
13. 
Zubair 
Abubarkar 
(and Bayo) 
Tech 
Developer/
expert   
2013 Lagos  
Creators, 
Nigerian 
Constitutio
n App for 
Blackberry 
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14. 
Seun 
Onigbinde  
Social 
Activist, 
Techie, 
civic actor  
2013 Lagos  
Creator, 
BudgIT for 
sharing 
information 
on the 
Nigerian 
budget. 
New 
venture 
now is 
TrackNg, 
to track the 
spending.  
15.  
Según 
Fodeke  
Tech 
developer, 
civic sctor  
2013 Lagos 
Founder, 
iWatchNG  
16.  
Sunday 
Ogidigbo  
Religious 
Leader 
2013 Abuja 
Pastor, 
Holyhill 
Church 
17.  
Tunde 
Kelani  
Cultural 
Producer  
2013 Lagos 
Film 
maker, 
Mainframe 
Production
s  
18. 
Ishaya 
Bako  
Cultural 
Producer  
2013 Abuja 
Docum
entary 
Filmmaker, 
“Fuelling 
Poverty”  
19.  
Tolu 
Ogunlesi  
Journali
st 
(freelance) 
2013 Lagos 
Formerlty 
with NEXT 
newspaper 
20.  
Bankole 
Wellington 
Cultural 
Producer  
2013  Musician 
21. Sasha P  
Cultural 
Producer  
2013 Lagos Musician 
22. 
Jon 
Gambrell 
Journali
st 
(internation
al 
correspond
2013 Lagos  
He was 
Chief 
Correspon
dent for the 
Associated 
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ent) Press in 
Nigeria at 
the time of 
interview. 
Now 
Correspon
dent in 
Egypt.  
23. 
Fidelis 
Mbah 
Journalist 2013 Lagos  
He was 
a journalist 
with the 
BBC World 
Service at 
the time of 
interview  
24. 
Tomi 
Oladipo 
Journalist  2013 Lagos  
Journali
st with the 
BBC World 
Service  
25. 
Sunday 
Alamba  
Journalist  2013 Lagos  
Photo 
Journalist 
with 
Associated 
Press in 
Nigeria 
26. 
Seun 
Okinbaloye  
Journalist  2013 Lagos  
Channels 
Television, 
Lagos, 
Nigeria 
27. 
Bankole 
Taiwo  
Blogger  2013 Lagos  
Blogger at 
Tech 
Cabal blog 
28. 
Ayeni (the 
Great) 
Adekunle  
Cultural 
Producer 
(Public 
Relations) 
2013 Lagos 
Owner, 
Black 
House 
Media  
29. 
Mark 
Amaza  
Blogger  2013 Abuja  
He runs a 
Twitter 
show 
called 
NHBi (No 
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Holds 
Barred 
Interactive) 
30.  
Egghead 
Odewale  
Social 
Activist 
2013 Lagos  
Formerly 
worked 
with Ekiti 
state 
governmen
t 
31. 
Chika 
Oduah  
Freelance 
Journalist  
2013 Abuja - 
32. 
Kole 
Shettima  
Civic actor  2013 Abuja  
Director, 
MacArthut 
Foundatio, 
Nigeria  
33. 
Soji 
Apampa  
Social 
activist, 
civic actor 
2013 Abuja  
Executi
ve 
Director, 
Public 
Integrity 
organsatio
n, 
Egunje.info 
34. 
Henry 
Okelue  
Social 
Activist, 
Blogger  
2013 Abuja  
Co-creator 
#LightUpNi
geria 
35. 
Jaiye 
Gaskia  
Social 
Activist  
2013 Abuja  
United 
Action for 
Democracy  
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Appendix 3 
Email correspondence with Dr Seyi Taylor (2014) 
 
Hi, 
 
We thought this story might interest you: 
 
Nigerian Ebola educational website receives 
over half a million hits in one week 
 
In the wake of West Africa's most recent and deadly ebola outbreak, 
Lagos-based publishing house Big Cabal Media has curated and 
launched an educational website called Ebola Facts 
(www.EbolaFacts.com) warning of the symptoms of ebola, explaining 
what the virus actually is, dispelling myths, as well as the means of the 
virus' transmission in a manner that communicate effectively to a local 
audience. The launch comes as the virus continues to ravage 
communities in West Africa, and is creeping across international 
borders at an alarming rate.  
 
The site, designed and built in 24 hours, is targeted specifically at the 
	   379	  
West African market, an increasingly tech-savvy market that is using 
the internet as its first point of call when searching for information about 
the deadly disease  and how to protect themselves.  This community 
often plays the role of influencer and information provider in their local 
communities. 
 
Since launch, the site has received over 600,000 hits and has been 
seen on Facebook about 850,000 times.  There have also been 
requests for it to be printed for wider distribution to communities without 
the internet.  Content from the site has also been developed into a flyer, 
newspaper ads and digital billboards.  Work is now ongoing to translate 
the site to French, Swahili, Yoruba, Igbo, Hausa and Pidgin to cater to 
a growing regional audience. 
 
Dr. Seyi Taylor of Big Cabal Media says, "With the launch of Ebola 
Facts, we're tackling an age-old problem of containing a deadly virus 
with 21st century technology. Millions of Africans are now regular 
internet consumers and see it as a first point of call for medical 
information. Ebola Facts was designed to be easily accessible, on all 
tech platforms - mobile being the no. 1 platform here on the continent - 
and, importantly, free. We're hoping that people share this potentially 
life-saving information as part of the global effort to contain and kill this 
ebola outbreak.  We are also very grateful to all the individuals and 
organizations that have stepped up to support this effort." 
 
"Technology is a great enabler, for commerce, for social interaction and 
we hope, with Ebola Facts, for healthcare. We're been contacted by 
government officials and medical professionals, who are very excited 
about the fact that young Africans are finding new and innovative ways 
of reaching out to as many people as possible to help save lives." 
 
-end- 
 
If you would require any more information about the site or the work 
being done on EbolaFacts.com, please contact: 
 
Dr. Seyi Taylor 
staylor@bigcabal.com 
+234 809 800 6699 
Skype: seyi.taylor 
 
Bankole Oluwafemi 
bankole@bigcabal.com 
+234 818 787 7294 
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Skype: iandbanks 
 
--  
Dr. Seyi Taylor 
www.bigcabal.com 
skype: seyi.taylor 
 
Sent with Airmail 
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Appendix 4: United for Peace Twitter Conference
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Appendix 5: Truppr Fitness App + govote org Election Walk  
 
 
Appendix 6: Omojuwa promoting the Nigeria 2015 elections  
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Appendix 7: Invitation to a Twitter chat on the Nigeria 2015 elections  
 
